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I have wrestled with the ideas presented in this dissertation for almost two decades. 
My interest in politics and economics of internet started when I worked for a consulting firm 
in the 1990s and advised an internet service provider in Estonia. I went on to co-found an 
ecommerce start-up where we had to tackle differences in internet use on a daily basis.  While 
the internet banking was widely used in Estonia already in the late 1990s, we had to set up a 
special entity in Delaware for accepting checks from our customers in the United States. This 
practical business experience was certainly eye opening for my academic and policy interests. 
I am  grateful to my business partners and co-workers – Oliver, Pirkko, Risto, Allan and many 
others - from these turbulent times.         
 Since Estonia was a transition economy in the 1990s, then my first instinct was to 
explore whether any lessons can be learned from more advanced Nordic countries. I wrote my 
Master of Science thesis on political economy of internet diffusion in Finland and Sweden at 
the London School of Economics and Political Science  in 2001. This was an attempt to apply 
traditional political economy ideas to what was then considered a field outside of traditional 
realm of political economy. I am grateful to my supervisor David Stasavage and professor 
Razeen Sally for the advice as well as to the Michael Peacock Scholarship Program for fully 
funding my studies at LSE.         
However, the key understanding that resulted from these explorations was that there 
are not many lessons to be learned from Finland and Sweden. First, these countries had 
different political economy systems and had followed different development trajectories than 
Estonia. Second, Estonia was actually quite advanced in the use of internet and related 
technologies in comparison with Finland and Sweden. Hence, my interest shifted towards 
improving my understanding internet diffusion in Estonia and Central Eastern Europe. 
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 Immediately after my graduation from LSE,  I received international policy fellowship 
from the Centre for Policy Studies (affiliated with Open Society Institute and Central 
European University) to study Estonia and Slovenia, which were considered most advanced 
countries in the ICT development in the Central and Eastern Europe. This fellowship allowed 
me to travel to Slovenia in January 2003 and conduct first set of interviews there. As a side 
project I also travelled to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to evaluate 
activities of the Global Internet Policy Initiative (GIPI) in the summer of 2002. This 
experience certainly deepened my understanding on how different institutional constraints and 
development trajectories of countries shape internet diffusion. I am thankful to Jerzy 
Celichowski, Darius Cuplinskas, Pamela Kipaldi and for others for making this fellowship 
possible.            
 I continued pursuing my research interest at the Fletcher School at Tufts University 
where I wrote my Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy thesis in 2004 on the impact of 
economic openness on internet diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia. This was an attempt to 
combine my newly gained understanding of international trade economics with that of 
technology diffusion. I am very grateful for my supervisor Carsten Kowalczyk for his advice 
and support.  I would like to thank Fulbright Program of US State Department, Humane 
Studies Fellowship of Institute for Humane Studies at the George Mason University, Armand 
Hammer Scholarship Program, Lellep Scholarship of Estonian Students Fund in the US and 
Linna Scholarship of Estonian World Council for making my studies at the Fletcher School 
possible.             
After the graduation from the Fletcher School, I pursued my research on internet 
diffusion in the PhD program at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. Simultaneously, I 
have presented early versions of different parts of this dissertation at numerous conferences of 
American Political Science Association, International Studies Association, Industry Studies 
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Association, Midwest Political Science Association, Oxford Internet Institute, Ronald Coase 
Institute, International Conference on Theory and Practice of Electronic Governance 
(ICEGOV), Electronic Government (EGOV) and Digital Government Society of North 
America. My contributions have also been published by Journal of Politics, Policy and 
Internet, Journal of Information Technology and Politics as well as by MIT Press, ACM and 
IOS Press. I am indebted to colleagues I have met in these conferences and many anonymous 
reviewers who have provided me feedback on my work. I am very thankful to the University 
Massachusetts in Amherst, US National Science Foundation, Hayek Fund for Scholars at the 
Institute for Humane Studies and Estonian Business School for funding my conference 
travels. I benefited tremendously from participating in the OECD workshops on broadband 
and internet economy in Paris, London and Washington, DC. I would like to thank the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications in Estonia for making it possible.  
 I am especially grateful to Jane Fountain, Eric Einhorn and Charles Schweik for 
serving in my PhD committee and for willing to read the whole manuscript under severe time 
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This dissertation investigates how institutional frameworks and entrepreneurial 
discovery processes condition internet diffusion. While internet and internet-based 
technologies have received considerable scholarly attention, the dissertation emphasizes tacit 
elements in understanding internet diffusion. In order to do so, it incorporates perspectives on 
insttitutional complexity stemming from interactions of formal and informal institutions and 
different institutional logics. Empiral part consists both macro level comparisons of Estonia 
and Slovenia as well as micro level analysis of internet diffusion processes within Estonia.   
Estonia and Slovenia are selected for comparison because of  considerable variance in 
insitutional frameworks. At the same time, both countries are relatively small and members of 
the European Union. This allows to focus on specific institutional configurations and path-
dependencies in constraining and enabling the diffusion of internet.  I find that internet is 
diffused more extensively and intensively in Estonia. Different socio-economic groups use 
more sophisticated online services in Estonia than in Slovenia. Once specific institutional 
configurations in general and in the telecom sector in particular are considered then it emerges 
that insitutional frameworks in Estonia have been more facilitative of entrepreneurial 
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discovery processes over time. As a result, supply and demand for innovative online services 
in Estonia is greater than in Slovenia.  
After comparative perspective on two countries, the dissertation proceeds to analyze 
specific cases of online initiatives in Estonia such as internet banking and internet voting. 
Examination of outcomes shows how some of these initiatives have been successful and 
created reasons for adoption and use of internet on the individual level leading to  a greater 
diffusion on macro level. My analysis demonstrates that positive outcomes have often been  
unintended result of experimentation through the process of entrepreneurial discovery within 
the context of institutions and path-dependencies. Evidence for this finding is bolstered by 
study of  heterogeneous cases of various ICT initiatives. By emphazing institutional 
complexity and policy heterogeneity, the dissertation illuminates and explains the tacit nature 
of internet diffusion in a specific context of Estonia. This implies that Estonia has followed a 
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1.1 Background of the Problem 
Often the internet is perceived as a global borderless technology which is not limited 
by politics, morality and geography. Some governments may try to stop its use or regulate 
some aspects of its use but even these governments often face an uphill battle. In the early 
days of internet, internet activist John Perry Barlow published a “Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace” where he argued that governments do not have sovereignty in 
the cyberspace (Barlow 1996). He told to “Governments of the industrial world” that 
“Cyberspace does not lie within your borders” (Barlow 1996). Following the true spirit of 
early internet pioneers, Estonian computer programmers created Kazaa in 2001 to facilitate 
peer-to-peer online file-sharing which soon became the most download computer app in the 
world. However, they soon discovered that there are clear borders in the cyberspace. 
According to the Hollywood-based entertainment industry they had violated some of these 
borders. The United States imposed its extraterritorial sovereignty in the cyberspace and 
Kazaa founders became fugitives of  the US justice system. The case over different perception 
of borders was finally settled for 100 million dollars in 2006. Fortunately, Kazaa founders had 
just sold their other internet-border-testing venture called Skype to eBay for 2.6 billion 
dollars.  
The internet clearly is not a borderless technology. The nature of its use and diffusion 
is clearly limited by geography, state sovereignty, economics, politics and numerous other 
factors. If the world would be flat and internet would be borderless, we would expect internet 
to be diffused evenly and its use to be uniform. Yet within the borders of developed countries 
internet is more diffused than among developing countries. In addition, among different 
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countries of industrial world internet diffuses also with different speeds. This is quite 
revealing for at least two reason. First, it clearly indicates that internet is a global technology 
but its diffusion is not aspatial but spatial. As it reaches different countries in different points 
of time, then its diffusion is also not ahistorical but historical. It other words, history matters 
for how internet diffuses in time with different extensity and intensity in different locations.  
Second, if  internet diffusion is dependent on historical, geographical, political, social and 
other factors, then it is important to understand how these factors enable and constrain the 
diffusion of the internet.  
Understanding the relationship between internet diffusion and vast variety of social, 
political and economic factors has increasingly become a crucial issue as more and more 
societies rely on the internet for a wide range of interactions ranging from work to leisure. 
While there has been an increasing number of studies on internet diffusion which have used a 
variety of variables to explain diffusion, the specific contextual factors of internet diffusion is 
not well understood. Some scholars have emphasized the importance of national wealth. More 
income people have more likely can they afford to use internet and related technologies 
(Kiiski and Pohjola 2001; Kiiski and Pohjola 2002; Norris 2001; Beilock and Dimitrova 
2003; Corrales and Westhoff 2006, 912). Other scholars have emphasized the role of 
institutions which are defined as rules of the game. Most scholars focus on what are called 
formal rules – laws and regulations of a country (Dasgupta et al 2001; Milner 2006;  Guillen 
and Suarez 2005; Caselli and Coleman 2001). This is understandable because formal rules are 
easier to measure than informal rules such as social norms, expectations and culture. Some 
scholars have found that democracies have a greater rate of internet diffusion than 
authoritarian regimes (Milner 2006). This is not surprising because authoritarian governments 
often try to discourage their citizens from using internet for at least certain purposes and 
particularly for activities which may in some ways undermine the legitimacy of the 
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government. However, other scholars have found that much more specific rules may matter 
for the diffusion of internet and related technologies. Particularly, how governments regulate 
telecom sector and how much competition they allow for offering various telecom services 
matters to a great deal (Dasgupta et al 2001; Guillen and Suarez 2005; Caselli and Coleman 
2001).   
Nevertheless, most of the studies focusing on income or formal institutions rely on a 
limited set of variables to study a large number of countries. Ultimately, it means that many 
factors that may matter for the diffusion of internet may be assumed away. However, 
countries with similar levels of wealth and fairly similar institutional settings may still have 
different levels of internet diffusion. This suggests that a country’s internet diffusion is not an 
issue to be explained by a small number of country-level variables but there are important 
elements outside overly simplistic formalized models which must be considered. Indeed, 
studies focusing on a small number of cases usually come to the different conclusions on 
factors that matter for internet diffusion than studies based on large number of cases (Howard 
et al 2009). Partially, such outcome is dependent on research methods. Case studies allow 
incorporating more details and to draw a richer picture. If we think how internet diffusion is 
limited by borders, then it is not just easily measurable borders that matter. Mental and 
epistemic factors are much more difficult to grasp than political, economic, geographical and 
legal borders of countries. Hence, it is important to incorporate both literal and metaphorical 
borders into analysis. This dissertation aims to do that by describing what it calls a tacit web. 
The metaphor refers tacit knowledge which is important for understanding how internet 
diffuses in different countries and domains as well as tacit nature of internet diffusion where 




Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries are particularly illustrative in this 
perspective. They had socialist economic and political systems until 1991 albeit with some 
important differences. They all went through economic, political and social transition in the 
1990s towards democracy, freer markets and greater social openness. The most advanced of 
these countries joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007. However, the rate of internet 
diffusion varies considerably in these countries. This outcome cannot be explained by national 
wealth because countries with similar level of wealth can have different outcomes in internet 
diffusion. They are all democracies. The formal institutional framework of these countries is 
fairly similar as they all had to adopt the EU laws and regulations. To be clear, they have 
adopted also EU regulations in the telecom sector, which some scholars emphasize as 
important variable in explaining the diffusion of internet and related technologies. In order to 
understand differences in internet diffusion rates among these countries, I will undertake a 
more nuanced and detailed study of Estonia and Slovenia as well as seven specific cases 
within Estonia to characterize the processes behind internet diffusion.  
This exploration contributes to our broader understanding of technology diffusion in 
general and to political science and political economy research on internet diffusion in 
particular. The internet is a relatively new technology making it an understudied topic in the 
broader systematic context of research concerning technology diffusion. 
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
This dissertation focuses on specific country level cases and cases within country in 
order to understand processes behind internet diffusion. I describe both country-level 
characteristics of internet diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia as well as specific processes in 
Estonia. Therefore, this dissertation has three research questions. The first question of this 
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dissertation is the following: How do Estonia and Slovenia differ in the outcomes of internet 
diffusion?  
Internet diffusion is understood in this study as a process indicating increased adoption 
and use of digital network technologies by growing numbers of people in their daily lives. 
Internet diffusion is understood both as a macro and a micro process in this study. Diffusion is 
usually seen how innovation spreads from its source to a wider public. Micro process of how 
individuals and firms adopt internet is also seen as part of diffusion process in this study. 
Essentially, macro and micro processes interact and are mutually interdependent. Macro 
process means diffusion of internet to a wider public while micro process means adoption of 
internet by individuals and groups of individuals such as companies.1 Furthermore, this 
research offers methodologically sound conceptualization of the internet diffusion, which 
utilizes more sophisticated approach to the measurement of the internet diffusion than it is 
standard in the literature. This is vital for advancing our understanding of diffusion outcomes 
and processes behind, which is still limited due to weak conceptualization and measurement 
errors. Particularly, as the reliance by scholars on different non-correlated dependent variables 
has led to different causal explanations. This dissertation will measure internet diffusion by 
eleven different variables focusing on extensity and intensity of its diffusion instead of single 
datasets that dominate in most studies. The study tries to capture what Kitsing and Howard 
(2009) called “effective internet diffusion”, not formal internet diffusion. Chapters Three and 
Four will discuss internet diffusion and its measurement in both conceptual and theoretical 
terms.  
The second research question of this dissertation is the following: How have the 
entrepreneurial discovery processes and internet diffusion intertwined in Estonia? 
Entrepreneurial discovery process is understood as a combination of Schumpeterian and smart 
                                                 
1 Appendix A offers definition and discussion of key terms and concepts used in this paper. Both Chapters Two 
and Three also discuss key concepts in a greater detail.  
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specialization scholars’ approaches (Schumpeter 1975; Foray, 2015; McCann and Ortega-
Argiles 2013; 2014).  An entrepreneur is a risk-taker and innovator who breaks routines by 
adopting new processes and bringing new products and services to the market. However, such 
entrepreneurs do not operate only in private sector but also in public and non-profit sectors. 
This means also involvement of entrepreneurs in policy-design as well as use of creation of 
entrepreneurs in public sector and vice-versa. Chapter Two offers theoretical discussion of 
entrepreneurial discovery process. Chapters Five and Six apply the concept in empirical 
analysis.  
The third research question of this dissertation is the following: How has institutional 
complexity constrained entrepreneurial discovery processes and internet diffusion in Estonia? 
Institutional complexity is understood as interactions of formal and informal institutions as 
well as interactions of formal institutions on different levels of government regulations. 
Different institutions, their interactions, conflicts and institutional logics behind these 
institutions creates institutional complexity (Greenwood et al. 2011; Room 2011; Smets et al., 
2012; Thornton et al. 2012). The regulations of European Union may conflict with domestic 
government regulations or they may be against informal rules based on attitudes and 
expectations of people. Macroeconomic framework may conflict with government regulation 
on a micro level. Communities may not respect micro-level government rules because they 
conflict with their social norms. Chapter Two will discuss institutional complexity 
theoretically while Chapter Six will apply this concept to specific cases.  
 
1.3 Scope of the Study 
The research aims to connect a broad institutional perspectives and theories on 
entrepreneurial discovery process with the literature on technology diffusion. The dissertation 
argues that institutions and the entrepreneurial discovery process are crucial in understanding 
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different outcomes of the internet diffusion. To add precision to the concept of institutions, 
the study factors in the interactions between informal and formal institutions. It explores how 
different institutions encourage greater social, economic and political use of the internet and 
how it is essential for understanding the spread of internet in local environments.  This 
approach examines how institutions and entrepreneurial discovery processes facilitate spread 
of tacit and dispersed knowledge, which, in turn, facilitate internet diffusion. The technical 
aspects and transferable knowledge - which make the Internet seemingly global - represent 
only the tip of the iceberg in explaining the intensity and extensity of diffusion. My goal is to 
characterize complexity and heterogeneity in the internet diffusion process on the basis of 
case studies. I am convinced that such approach is more meaningful in understanding internet 
diffusion on the ground than overly deterministic studies based on assumptions of linearity. 
Obviously, my study comes with important limitations. 
This dissertation research is explicitly descriptive and particularist. By descriptive I 
mean that I describe internet diffusion on basis of comparison between two countries and 
cases within one country.  I do not make any causal claims. That’s why research questions 
start with “how”, and not “why”. The use of “why” would imply causal inference and making 
if-then claims.  By particularist I mean that I do not aim to generalize my findings for a larger 
population. I do not claim that Estonia and Slovenia are representative of all CEE countries or 
European countries. I also do not claim that seven cases within Estonia are representative of a 
broader set of cases outside of Estonia. Actually, I think that some of the cases such as 
narratives in Chapter Five on Skype, internet banking, internet voting and ID card are unique. 
Other cases in Chapter Six may bear closer resemblance to a broader population. Essentially, 
my aim is to explore some of these context-specific country differences through comparison 
of two countries and comparison of cases within one country.  
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I start by analyzing internet diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia, two countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe that joined the European Union in 2004. This comparative study focuses 
on particular critical junctures in their development, which is crucial in understanding the 
variance in the internet diffusion between two countries. I have chosen Estonia and Slovenia 
as cases from 1991 to present for country-level comparison because they offer high degree of 
comparability. In addition to the factors that I pointed out above which make CEE countries 
similar to each other, Estonia and Slovenia are both small countries with populations 1.3 and 
2 million respectively and they are geographically, economically and culturally close to 
economically more advanced Western European countries. They are also most advanced in 
terms of ICT developments. In the early 2000s they were relatively similar in the diffusion of 
internet. However, Estonia has leaped ahead over time. Slovenia is also wealthier than 
Estonia, which rules out wealth as an explanatory variable for these differences. In other 
words, there are considerable similarities on a very general level, which allows focusing on 
particular institutional dimensions in understanding the differences between Estonia and 
Slovenia.2  
The work on Estonia and Slovenia is a continuation of my earlier study, which 
emphasized the importance of economic openness for internet diffusion (Kitsing 2004). 
Meanwhile, significant time has passed which has re-enforced my view that economic 
openness is a crucial factor in explaining internet diffusion. At the same time, it is one factor 
among many and it is clearly not sufficient factor. Incorporation of newer and more 
comprehensive data allows offering a more detailed description of internet diffusion in 
Estonia and Slovenia in this dissertation.  
The comparisons of Estonia and Slovenia will be followed by analysis of seven cases 
in Estonia. I have chosen cases within Estonia because Estonia is poorer than Slovenia and 
                                                 
2 Appendix B offers an overview of Estonia and Slovenia.  
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has had less sophisticated institutional frameworks in the 1990s and 2000s. Yet Estonia is a 
more advanced country in internet diffusion. Hence, case studies within Estonia allow to 
making a step further and offering an even more detailed study on how entrepreneurial 
discovery processes have been crucial for internet diffusion in some domains and how these 
processes have been constrained by institutional complexity in other domains. 
I recognize that there are many variables that may influence outcomes in the internet 
diffusion. Essentially, internet diffusion outcomes are overdetermined. My aim is not to study 
all these variables and reveal their relative importance. My research methods do not allow me 
to do it because I use descriptive methods. However, I am focusing on how institutions and 
entrepreneurial discovery interact with internet diffusion and I aim to describe these 
processes. I realize that increased diffusion of internet has both advantages and disadvantages. 
The desired or undesired effects of the internet are certainly linked to the causes of its 
diffusion. However, my goal is not to make moral claims about the costs and benefits of 
diffusion but rather describe diffusion and related processes.  
 
1.4 Summary of Chapters 
The next chapter reviews literature on internet diffusion as well as political science 
and related literature on institutions. This synthesis of literature aims to demonstrate how 
institutionalist perspectives can be linked to a number of theoretical perspectives on 
innovation and diffusion of internet. It emphasizes the importance of epistemological nature 
of technology and role of tacit knowledge. It points out the necessity to look beyond formal 
institutions in researching internet diffusion. The chapter pays particular attention to 
institutional complexity combining both formal and informal institutions in understanding the 
technology diffusion processes. It highlights the interactions between entrepreneurial 
discovery processes and internet diffusion and reveals how institutional complexity constrains 
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entrepreneurial discovery in different economic, political, social and geographic context from 
contributing to technology diffusion.  
Chapter Three offers an overview of the research methodology, which incorporates 
discussion of conceptualization, use of variables and the measurement issues and rationale for 
case-selection and elite interviewing. It offers a critique of quantitative approaches relying on 
one or two measures of internet diffusion and limited number of explanatory variables, which 
cannot demonstrate the complexity of diffusion process. This chapter introduces the idea of 
index of “effective internet diffusion” and shows how this concept can be operationalized on 
the basis of 11 different indicators measuring network nature, sophistication of use and social 
distribution of internet. It highlights the benefits of thick description, which focuses on 
diffusion processes on the basis of a limited number of cases.  
Chapter Four turns to comparative and descriptive analysis of Estonia and Slovenia. It 
focuses on outcomes of internet diffusion as measured by 11 variables in the last available 
year of data availability and change in outcomes over time. Estonia and Slovenia are 
compared on the basis of internet users per 100 inhabitants, households with internet access 
and broadband access at home, enterprises with broadband access, regular use of internet by 
males and females, by individuals with low formal education as well as by age. It also 
compares internet use by households in the areas with high and low population density as well 
as by income distribution. It further compares countries on the basis of supply side indicators 
such as broadband penetration rate, mobile broadband coverage and download and upload 
speed. This is followed by the discussion of national wealth and income distribution in 
Estonia and Slovenia. Then the chapter explores institutional framework in general and formal 
rules of the telecom sector in particular with the focus on reforms undertaken by both 
countries prior their membership in the EU. The chapter concludes by discussing human 
capital in the form of ICT skills in Estonia and Slovenia.  
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Chapter Five explores four positive cases within Estonia. It starts by discussing the 
emergence of Skype in order to demonstrate how open ecosystem and competitive telecom 
market facilitated new entrant, which quickly become a global player. The narrative on Skype 
aims to highlight a broad institutional framework governing businesses in Estonia as well as 
how entrepreneurial discovery process was unleashed in this post-socialist country. This is 
followed by discussion of how start-up retail banks introduced internet banking 1996, which 
essentially becomes a critical juncture in path-dependent process of encouraging internet use. 
Internet banking was not just about making banking transactions online but by providing 
secure online identification method it becomes a platform for offering various public and 
private sector online services.  The chapter discusses the option to submit tax declarations 
online which was introduced by the Estonian Tax Authority in 2000.   
This is followed by the case of national ID card  which was introduced in 2002 to 
serve as identification method in online and offline environments. The chapter emphasizes the 
cooperation between two largest retail banks, two largest telecom companies and Estonian 
government as a fundamental factor in the success of ID card. It also emphasizes that ID card 
builds on the path-dependent process started by internet banking. Chapter Five concludes by 
discussion of internet voting in internet voting in Estonia from 2005 to 2015. It highlights the 
use of national ID card as mobile ID in the voting process as well as outcome of internet 
voting and its distributional impact.  
Chapter Six explores three heterogeneous cases within Estonia in order to balance 
emphasis on agency in Chapter Five. It starts by challenging conventional wisdom on 
Estonian policy-making in the area of ICT which often sees Estonian policy design as 
homogeneous, centralized and smart. On basis of secondary data and interviews it 
characterizes Estonia as an average innovator and not particularly innovative in its policy 
design.  It argues that Estonian approach to ICT policy has been relatively de-centralized and 
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hands-off by focusing on general rule-making. This is followed by a case on network 
neutrality legislation in the context of 2009 EU telecom package. It shows how Estonian 
policy was heterogeneous by design and outcomes concerning network neutrality issues in 
spite of presence of powerful vested interests and considerable experience in telecom policy-
making.  The last case focuses on government venture capital, which has primarily benefited 
ICT companies.   It shows how this government initiative has led to heterogeneous outcomes 
and straightforward policy failures in capturing positive externalities of innovation. Common 
theme to all cases in Chapter Six is a focus on institutional complexity as a constraint 
entrepreneurial discovery and how this leads to policy heterogeneity in various Estonian ICT 
policies and initiatives. Chapter Seven offers the discussion and conclusion of main findings, 
discusses the limitations of the dissertation, and offers recommendations for future research 

















ANTECEDENTS OF INTERNET DIFFUSION: FORMAL AND INFORMAL 
INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss how scholars have understood and explained 
internet diffusion. What have been causal claims made in the literature about internet 
diffusion as well as descriptive accounts on diffusion of internet? In order to accomplish this 
goal this synthesis of literature draws from the scholarship in economics, economic history, 
economic geography, political economy, political science and public policy for understanding 
diverse set of explanations concerning the internet diffusion. This chapter uses the terms  
internet diffusion, penetration, adoption, connectivity, access, use and digital divide 
interchangeably to describe the same phenomena which is  internet diffusion. Usually, 
internet diffusion is seen as macro phenomena (Dholakia et al 2004).  While adoption is 
defined as a micro process where individuals make decisions about the use of internet. 
However, micro and macro processes interact. Often macro outcomes are simply aggregates 
of multiple micro processes. Adoption of internet by groups of individuals such as students or 
businesses in manufacturing sector, for instance, increases diffusion of internet on per capita 
basis on macro level.   
Although the internet is now 20 years old, the research subject remains a relatively 
new phenomena and the literature available on the internet diffusion has still considerable 
gaps, then the chapter discusses perspectives on the diffusion of different information and 
related technologies with an assumption that these insights are applicable for understanding 
the internet diffusion. One of the main contributions of this literature review is to connect 
different theories in different branches of social sciences in order to understand better how 
internet diffuses in different countries. Scholars are often creatures of their habits in 
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conducting research tend to rely on theories and methodological approaches that they feel 
comfortable with. This implies that theoretical explanations and methodological approaches 
applied to understanding internet diffusion have been limited in different scholarly domains. 
Over the years a specific literature on internet and electronic government has emerged. 
Nevertheless, this literature often lacks strong links to crucial theories in social sciences, 
which allows us to understand better important features of technology diffusion.  
 Bearing this in mind, this literature review and synthesis starts with linear and 
unidimensional accounts in offering causal inference for internet diffusion. Some scholars 
have found that income is key explanatory variable of internet diffusion (Kiiski and Pohjola 
2002). Wealthier people and wealthier nations can afford to connect to internet and purchase 
necessary hardware and software while poorer nations and people can do it to a lesser extent. 
These wealth based accounts have been challenged by scholars who emphasize the 
institutions as explanatory variable for internet diffusion. Since most of these studies have 
relied on quantitative methods and a large sample of countries, then the concept of institutions 
have been operationalized in a reductionist fashion. Institutions are seen as formal institutions 
meaning formal rules of the game such as laws and regulations of a country. The concept is 
operationalized through the use of datasets showing whether a country is a democracy or not, 
has certain type of telecom regulation, is economically open or some other variable.  
 However, such reductionist approaches ignore institutional complexity as it is argued 
in the pages that follow.  First, institutions are not just formal rules of the game but also 
include informal rules such as culture, informal networks, habits and so on. Both informal and 
formal institutions interact and impact outcomes. Second, focus on some formal institutions 
because they are easily measurable implies that method drives particular social science 
inquiry and determines the research question. It needs to be other way around. Third, 
reductionist approaches based large samples use a limited number of variables and assume 
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that the relationship between variables is linear. As it is demonstrated in this chapter, 
technology diffuses in a non-linear way. Markets and government policies are characterized 
by non-linerarity as well. Thus, institutional complexity (defined precisely under key terms 
and in the following parts of this chapter) means interactions of formal and informal rules in a 
non-linear world characterized by path-depence and imperfections in markets as well as 
government policy.  
 In order to grasp the nature of institutional complexity and its interactions with 
agency, the chapter discusses literature on geography, international trade, smart specialization 
and entrepreneurial discovery to emphasize how technologies diffuse differently in different 
contexts. Trade openness and environments that encourage entrepreneurial discovery 
processes tend to encourage internet diffusion. At the same time, geographical location may 
enable or impose serious constraints how the diffusion of technology takes place. It also 
interacts with the entrepreneurial discovery process, which is important for bringing new 
technologies to markets and to governments. This chapter emphasizes the role of entrepreneur 
and their discovery processes as characterized by Schumpeter and more recent literature on 
smart specialization. It defines entrepreneurship more broadly including entrepreneurial 
discovery processes in private, public and non-governmental sector. The agency of 
entrepreneurs is important but as this chapter emphasizes they do not operate in a vacuum. 
The entrepreneurs face institutional complexity, an imperfect market and the network nature 
of internet as well as policy environments where path-dependencies on previous decisions 
may enable or constrain their ability to bring new technologies to the market. While there are 
many factors which may constrain agency, the chapter also draws from the literature on social 
capital and networks emphasizing the role of entrepreneurial networks and communities in 
overcoming constraints imposed by uncertainty and complexity of their external environment. 
This chapter’s aim is not to offer a deterministic and universal approach on how 
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entrepreneurship and institutional framework interacts, but. rather, to emphasize the nuances 
and details which often tend to be overlooked in the studies of technology diffusion. The 
complexity and uncertainty in the diffusion process highlights a high degree of fragility. 
Galvanizing changes influencing internet diffusion are often spontaneous and not a result of 
some masterplan. It can be success without strategy (Kitsing 2011). The same institutional 
framework may produce both successes and failures in the diffusion processes.  As Paul 
Pierson argues in his influential book on institutional analysis: “Every step and every 
movement of the multitude, even in what are termed enlightened ages, are made with equal 
blindness to the future; and nations stumble upon establishments, which are, indeed, the result 
of human action, but not the execution of any human design.” (Pierson 2004, 102)  
This points towards accidental nature of diffusion outcomes. The chapter concludes by 
emphasizing the importance of decentralized and tacit knowledge in understanding the 
internet diffusion. The success of internet diffusion is highly dependent on its nature as a 
decentralized network, which facilitates the use and exploitation of vast variety of related 
actors by diverse set of agents in different institutional environments. This chapter calls it 
“tacit web”.     
 
2.1 Income versus Institutions in Explaining Internet Diffusion 
The main debate and key streams of theory and research regarding the internet and 
information technology diffusion can be summarized as emphasizing either the role of income 
or institutions. Institutions are rules of the game in society consisting both formal and 
informal rules (North 1990; 2005). Pierson says that they are “humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction” (Pierson 2004, 27). A more detailed definition will be offered 
in the following parts of this chapter. To start with income-based explanations, economists 
and other scholars have often taken a reductionist approach by looking at the relationship 
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between relative prices at which Internet is supplied and demand for Internet by looking at per 
capita income. A standard  microeconomics approach assumes that both supply and demand 
are equally crucial. The father of neoclassical microeconomics, Alfred Marshall, pointed out 
that supply and demand are like blades of scissors where it is hard to argue which blade is 
more important for cutting (Marshall 1920, Bk VI, Ch. II, 16). Individuals in richer countries 
may have more income for paying for the Internet connectivity and, thus, supply of Internet 
has to meet the demand. Whether Marshallian assumptions about supply and demand are 
correct will be discussed in a detailed way in this chapter.  
Some studies have revealed a strong correlation between the rate of per capita internet 
diffusion and per capita gross domestic product (GDP) (Kiiski and Pohjola 2001; Kiiski and 
Pohjola 2002; Norris 2001; Beilock and Dimitrova 2003; Corrales and Westhoff 2006, 912).3 
Norris (2001) finds that the level of economic development is a crucial aspect in 
understanding the different outcomes in the internet diffusion. Howard et al (2009) argue that 
when scholars study technology diffusion in global and comparative setting, they find that 
economic productivity explains diffusion patterns. Productivity is directly related to income 
as countries with higher productivity levels have also higher income. Jorgensen et al (2008) 
have demonstrated how the use and diffusion of information and communication technologies 
(ICT) contributes to productivity growth. This may lead to circular reasoning where wealthier 
countries adopt ICTs and diffusion of internet and related technologies, in turn, increases their 
productivity, which increases their income and which in turn allows them to use more ICTs. 
In other words, studies using per capita GDP or other measures of income as explanatory 
variables for internet diffusion are able to establish correlation at best. True but the effect may 
be genuinely “self-reinforcing” as is often the case with economic development. It is difficult 
                                                 
3 The synthesis of literature was first developed by Kitsing (2008) and Kitsing and Howard (2009), which 
demonstrated that such approached rely on a limited number of biased variables in explaining internet diffusion 




to entertain the possibility of causality on the basis of such models – even when their 
statistical analysis are robust. It can, however, be argued that internet diffused first in 
countries with high levels of productivity, and thus income, than in countries with low levels 
of productivity and income. Thus certain level of productivity and income are pre-condition 
for internet diffusion and it can be argued that correlation between internet diffusion and 
productivity equals causation because high productivity level existed before high level of 
internet diffusion. However, there is considerable scholarly literature on how the European 
Union, a relatively wealthy economic bloc with a high productivity in a comparative 
perspective, has not been able to utilize ICTs as well as the United States (Jorgenson 2001; 
2008; Oliner 2007; Inklaar 2008). The failure of EU to turn ICTs into productivity gains 
indicates a possibility that the link between productivity and internet diffusion is not as 
automatic and linear as the studies discussed above suggest.  Certainly, EU has also lower 
productivity than the US but it is still questionable that certain degree of productivity would 
translate automatically into certain degree of internet diffusion in a linear fashion. These 
insights have led to an emergence of literature on smart specialization in Europe, which will 
be discussed in a more detailed manner later in this chapter. Most importantly, we have to 
incorporate other variables, which may be crucial in explaining internet diffusion.  
The focus of empirical part of this research is on comparison of Estonia and Slovenia 
and comparisons of different cases of internet use within Estonia. Since Slovenia has higher 
level of productivity and national income than Estonia, but internet diffusion per capita terms 
is greater in Estonia, then an interesting puzzle emerges. Most importantly, the literature 
which emphasizes the importance of national wealth and productivity in explaining internet 
diffusion cannot solve this puzzle. Hence, the literature review has too look beyond the 
studies on income, productivity and internet diffusion. The argument developed in empirical 
part cannot refute their findings entirely because it is based on case studies which are not 
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generalizable for a wider population. However, theoretical part can demonstrate as a matter of 
logic their shortcomings. On one hand, the difference may stem from a level of analysis. In a 
highly abstract universe, where stylized analysis aims to explain internet diffusion for all or 
most countries  in the world, wealth and income may seem important variables. In a messier, 
more detailed look on activities on the ground, different explanations emerge.  As Howard et 
al (2009) point out studies on regional, national and subnational level find politics and culture 
to be main reasons for different internet diffusion outcomes. Certainly, the scale of analysis 
matters and a research about single or some case studies is not sufficient for rejecting 
hypotheses found in papers based on a large number of cases.  
However, the difference in explanations is more fundamental and does not stem 
simply from the different levels of analysis. Scholars who emphasize the role of institutions in 
explaining the outcomes of internet diffusion have studied the diffusion by comparing a large 
number of countries in the world (Dasgupta et al 2001; Milner 2006; Guillen and Suarez 2005; 
Caselli and Coleman 2001). More conceptually, the institutionalist approach reveals both 
shortcomings of wealth based approached as well as  technological determinist explanations. 
The former was discussed above.  The latter claims that technology impacts society 
independently of institutional framework (Fountain 2001, 84). Technological determinists 
would see the spread of the Internet as the objective technology as sufficient for spreading 
openness or increasing productivity (Rogers 1995; Jensen 2007). The key difference between 
institutionalist approaches and income and technologically determinist views concerns 
constraints and enablers of internet diffusion. Income-based approaches would assume that 
main constraint for internet diffusion is income. As was explained above once higher level of 
income is achieved, it will correspond to higher level of internet diffusion. Technological 
determinism is idea that availability and changes in technology drives the development of 
society and its culture. Though most studies on internet diffusion and income are probabilistic 
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rather than deterministic, it could be argued that technological determinism is directly linked 
to income and productivity as demonstrated above. More income leads to new and better 
technologies, which increases productivity, which in turn translates into more income.  
Most importantly, these approaches assume institutions away or see institutions as by-
products of technological economic processes. Institutionalist approaches see institutions as 
rules of the game, which facilitate diffusion of technologies. Availability of income and 
technology may be necessary but it is certainly not sufficient condition for diffusion of 
internet. The differences in internet diffusion outcomes are result of institutions because 
institutions increase or reduce transaction costs for diffusion in society. These institutions can 
be formal such as laws and regulations. For instance, in a telecom market dominated by 
monopoly with high prices and poor quality of internet connections, internet diffusion may be 
lower than countries with competitive markets, lower prices and superior quality of 
connections. As will be discussed below, many studies focusing on technology diffusion 
operationalize formal institutions because of data reliability and availability.  
However, institutionalist approaches can be broadened by incorporating both formal 
and informal institutions. The latter is defined as social norms, culture and other 
nonformalized rules of the game shaping the behavior of agents. Thus, broader understanding 
of institutions-based approaches to internet diffusion, must incorporate earlier studies on 
technology diffusion, which highlight the role of institutions and organizations in “social 
shaping”, which impacts technology adoption (Mackay and Gillespie 1992). Economic 
historian Joel Mokyr emphasizes the vitality of broader institutional environment by arguing 
that the importance of openness to new information and "exposure effects" to new knowledge 
as crucial elements for technology diffusion (Mokyr 1990, 186-190). Sociologist Manuel 
Castells argues on the basis of the empirical example of the Soviet Union that the politics of 
information control was a crucial barrier for diffusion of new technologies of information 
21 
 
processing (Castells 2000, 35). The ICT threatened the power of the Soviet state, but by 
blocking the inflow of the new information technologies the Soviet state undermined its 
economic position in the world particularly in the times when the economies around the globe 
became more information-based than ever before (Castells 2000, 35-37). 
As far as internet and openness is concerned, then Beilock and Dimitrova’s (2003) 
statistical study found that openness of a society was strongly correlated with outcomes in the 
internet diffusion. They defined openness as a non-economic factor.  Openess was important 
in their study in addition to the level of infrastructure development and national income. 
Guillen and Suarez (2005) how, using data about 121 countries from 1997 through 2001, that 
democracies tend to have higher levels of internet use. Corrales and Westhoff (2006) have 
confirmed this finding by providing evidence that authoritarian regimes tend to have lower 
levels of internet diffusion than democracies.  They also found that per capita income in 
authoritarian countries is be more important explanatory variable than it is in democratic 
countries (Corrales and Westhoff 2006, 912). In other words, open political institutions serve  
to some extent as substitutes for the level of per capita GDP.  An authoritarian country with 
same level of wealth as a democratic country cannot expect to have same level of internet 
diffusion. In order to achieve the same level of internet diffusion as democracy, the 
authoritarian country either has to increase its wealth or become more democratic.  
This is consistent with earlier finding by Przeworski et al (2000) that “democracies 
benefit more from technical progress and use labor more effectively” than dictatorships (p. 
153). Democracies with per capita income more than $2500-3000 use labor more productively 
than dictatorships in the same level of development (Przeworski et al 2000, 166-176). Along 
the same lines, Milner (2006) researches 184 countries and finds that on the average 
democracies have higher levels of internet diffusion than autocratic countries.  Milner’s 
findings confirm that political institutions are important in understanding internet diffusion. 
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As was highlighted in the introductory part of this chapter, institutions are rules of the game 
and incorporate both informal and formal rules. However, Milner’s explanatory variables are 
narrow, focusing on one set of formal institutions, and she takes a rationalistic view of 
institutions by arguing that  
“…political institutions in particular matter for the adoption of new technologies 
because they affect the manner and degree to which winners and losers from the 
technology can translate their preferences into influence. Groups that believe they will 
lose from the Internet try to use political institutions to enact policies that block the 
spread of the Internet. These “losers” hope to slow down or stop its diffusion, and 
some institutions make this easier to do than others.” (Milner 2006) 
 
Obviously, authoritarian governments are more eager to limit the use of internet and 
related technologies. For instance, the use of Facebook is not possible in China. By doing so, 
they also minimize its diffusion.  Even though, Milner’s (2006) findings support that 
democracies are better in adoption than authoritarian regimes, the question remains what 
explains the differences among democracies. If all cases to be studied would be democracies, 
then political regime type is not necessary and sufficient condition for explaining different 
diffusion patterns. 
The importance of institutions in comparison with income has been confirmed by 
scholars studying specific institutions and policies affecting access to telecom services. 
Access to telephone services is comparable to access to internet because one of the pre-
conditions for internet use is existence of basic telecom infrastructure. In the early years most 
internet users needed a telephone line to use dial-up service to internet. Even in the 
technologically advanced such as the United States, 3 percent of the adult population still used 
dial-up service in their homes in 2013 while 30 percent of adult Americans did so in 2004  
(Pew Research Center 2013). In 2004, 21 percent of Estonian households with internet access 
used dial-up connection while 53 percent of European households did the same (Eurostat 
2015). Most importantly, the literature on rules governing telecom sector and telecom policies 
brings in richer understanding of institutions than simple democracy-authoritarianism 
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dichotomy as discussed by Milner (2006) would suggest. Dasgupta et al (2001) carried out an  
econometric analysis and argue that differences in income among countries cannot be an 
explanatory variable for understanding internet diffusion. They argue that internet diffusion is 
linked to availability of main telephone lines and countries with lower levels of main 
telephone lines also have lower levels of internet diffusion. As was pointed out above, this 
may be particularly true in 2001 when the study was completed because vast majority of 
internet users used dial-up connection.  Dasgupta and others go in their paper to demonstrate 
that state competition policies are an important explanatory variable in understanding internet 
diffusion. Low-income countries with high World Bank ratings for competition policy have a 
significantly higher number of internet subscriptions per main telephone lines (Dasgupta et al 
2001, 15).  The importance of competition for explaining the diffusion of technologies in sync 
with studies on telecom regulation by Heimler (2000) and Taylor (2002). Similarly, Fink et al 
(2003) researched 86 developing countries and their econometric analysis shows that 
complete telecom liberalization pays off by increasing teledensity by 8 percent (Fink et al 
2003, 99). By teledensity they mean the main telephone lines in per capita terms.   Along the 
same lines, Guillen and Suarez (2005) demonstrate that one important factor contributing to 
the internet diffusion is privatization and competition in the telecom sector.   
Furthermore, as personal computers used to be the main method for connecting to the 
internet and still are an important devices in this respect, then internet diffusion is linked to 
the adoption of computers. As John Gage, a co-founder of Sun Microsystems, once said “the 
network is the computer” (Gapper 2007, 11; Weber 2004, 7).  Caselli and Coleman (2001) 
show that the size of government reduces the adoption of computers while smaller size of 
government encourages the adoption of computers. They also found that sound property-
rights protection encourages the adoption of computers.  
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These findings emphasizing the role of competition and extent of government 
intervention can be linked to an underlying theme in trade policy literature, which holds that 
trade protectionism, i.e. reduction of competition and increase in government intervention, 
reduces the benefits of technology transfer for small countries (Besley and Case 1993; Dollar 
1993, 434). Trade protectionism decreases adoption incentives created by network, market 
power and learning externalities (Besley and Case 1993, 399). The connection between rules 
governing international trade and internet diffusion will be explored further in this literature 
review.  
This set of literature discussed above highlighted some key findings of the literature 
on internet and related information technology diffusion. The first question is whether 
institutions or national income matter more for explaining the outcome in internet diffusion. 
The discussion above demonstrated how institutions can possible be a more powerful 
explanatory variable than income, particularly when comparisons are made on the basis of 
small sample of countries and various institutions are considered. The second question is what 
type of institutions are more important than others in understanding how internet diffuses in 
different countries. This will be explored in the next parts of this chapter.  
 
2.2 Institutional Complexity 
 
The common denominator of the studies discussed above is their reliance on factors 
that are easily measurable. Variables such as GDP, democracy, size of government and some 
other “thin” measure of tangible resources and easily identifiable “institutions”. The reality, of 
course, is profoundly “thicker” than any number crunching on the basis of these datasets 
would reveal. The studies may establish correlations and tell us something that happens on the 
average in the world but at best the contribution to the understanding of Internet diffusion 
they provide is extremely limited. Particularly, as they do not incorporate the insights of 
earlier studies on technology diffusion which emphasize social shaping, specific context and 
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informal factors in understanding technology diffusion. Most importantly, quantitative 
approaches using a few variables may not result in improving our understanding of how 
internet actually diffuses on the ground. For instance, if we learn that higher GDP or 
democracy improves internet diffusion, then it cannot explain differences in internet diffusion 
outcomes among democratic countries with relatively high GDP. Even the data that is 
collected on the use of internet carries very different meanings, but in spite of that the thinness 
of the approach implies that it may still represent one and the same data point in the 
quantitative analysis. In other words, the quality of Internet connection may vary so 
significantly in different countries that the use in country carries completely different meaning 
from the use in other country. For instance, many wifi users may have experienced a situation 
in various setting where heavy use and high traffic volume slows down access for all users. 
Obviously, in that kind of situation it is difficult to carry out online bank transactions or make 
a skype call. At the same time, all users have internet connection and use the internet. In 
quantitative studies relying on large data sets low quality internet connection and high quality 
connection would often receive the same ranking or would be represented as a same data 
point. However, quality of connection would determine what is possible to achieve with the 
connection and hence, would impact extensity and intensity of diffusion. Therefore, the 
arguments about institutions and resources have to be much more detailed in explaining the 
patterns of diffusion than quantitative studies analyzing large number of countries would 
accommodate. A Ookla speedtest in 2014 found that Hong Kong at 72.49 Mbps has highest 
average download speeds in the world while the US was 31st at 20.77 Mbps which is slower 
than in Estonia and Slovenia (Ookla 2014). Low internet speeds mean that it is more difficult 
to carry out complex transaction online and hence limits the use of internet.  Obviously, the 
Ookla speedtest is not a perfect measure because it is an aggregated country measure, which 
takes into account rural areas. Internet adoption in some degree is dependent on geography 
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and topography and cost to put in infrastructure lines. Nevertheless, these are the choices that 
policy-makers have to make either by encouraging private infrastructure investment in remote 
areas or intervening directly. However, most studies focusing on internet diffusion overlook 
these  important details. This small but important detail has direct connection to the rules of 
the game, i.e. how sector is regulates and what kind of leverage belongs to service providers. 
In others, words there are many different rules that influence internet diffusion. These rules 
are complex. 
Therefore, institutional complexity behind adoption cannot be reduced to the variables 
such as whether country has had their free elections or what is its ranking in some index  
measuring political freedoms. Particularly, as the collection and demonstration of data in 
these indices itself is highly questionable. Such reductionism in treatment of institutions 
ignores the interactions between informal and formal institutions, context specific factors such 
as physical and topographic barriers, interlinkages with ideas and path dependencies on early 
decisions. So what is meant by institutional complexity in this dissertation? The working 
definition refers to the interactions of formal and informal institutions as well as interactions 
of formal institutions on different levels of government regulations. This implies that broad 
rules governing macroeconomic environment may conflict with regulations on micro level. 
There is considerable literature on institutional complexity and one way to define it is 
“incompatible prescriptions from multiple institutional logics” (Greenwood et al. 2011, 317). 
Different institutions, their interactions, conflicts and institutional logics (see discussion 
below) create institutional complexity. Room (2011) offers a good overview of different 
approaches to institutionalism and incorporates institutionalist perspectives with that of 
complex adaptive systems as found in what is called “complexity science”.  The complexity 
science is developed to understand physical and biological processes where local interactions 
may lead to complex patterns on a global level through the positive feedback loops in self-
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organizing processes (Room 2011, 15-49). These scientific perspectives have been applied to 
a variety of social sciences and there has been expansion of such inquiries in the past decade 
but it has not generated considerable empirical enquiry yet (Room 2011, 9).  
 
 Usually, it can be assumed that greater institutional complexity implies greater 
constraints on agency. For instance, Pierson defines institutions as constraints rather than 
enablers by writing that institutions are “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, 
the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (Pierson 2004, 27). For 
instance, the convergence of national and international standards for professionals will lead to 
convergence of institutional logic of different polities (Pierson 2004, 138-139). This implies 
that the result may be “institutional isomorphism” because different institutional logics are in 
conflict with each other. Most importantly, institutions and institutional complexity do not 
have to be constraining. First, good institutions can reduce uncertainty, which encourages 
entrepreneurial activity. Second, some entrepreneurs and policy entrepreneurs may be well 
equipped for navigating in institutional complexity and achieving desired outcomes. They 
may benefit from complexity and it may create absolute or comparative advantages for them. 
It is possible for what Crouch (2005) calls “institutional entrepreneurs” to weave the 
international institutions into distinctive domestic patterns.  
Institutional logic may stem from laws and regulations imposed by government in the 
case of formal institutions as well as socially constructed historical patterns of behavior, 
mental models of agents, habits, assumptions, expectations, values, culture and other rules, 
which may constrain or enable individuals and groups of individuals in their behavior and 
define social reality for them. Institutional logic may operate on community level as long as 
community members share the same beliefs. On a macro level, community may be a nation. 
Different nationalities may share the same beliefs about themselves and other nations. On a 
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micro level, such abstract community as a nation may consist many different communities, 
which may follow different institutional logic. These communities may have different 
understanding of the same issue depending on their beliefs, knowledge and other factors 
(Smets et al., 2012; Thornton et al. 2012). For instance, nation as a community may be proud 
of IT developments in their country. They may experience the differences in quality and 
availability of services when spending time abroad or read about it in the newspapers. Within 
a nation IT community may also share the view about overall progress but may be more 
critical of recent developments finding that the government is not investing enough in IT 
development. Within the IT community an open source community may have a different view 
finding that government has overinvested in proprietary software solutions and should rely on 
open source solutions instead.  
  The notion of institutional complexity considerably broadens the possibilities how 
institutions may enable or hinder internet diffusions. The institutionalist explanation discussed 
earlier in this chapter has relied primarily on the approaches found in rational choice 
institutionalist literature in political science and new institutional economics literature. 
However, conceptualization of institutions as would benefit from recognition that there are 
three different accounts of institutionalisms in political science literature and integration of 
insights from rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 
1996). New institutionalist approaches in political science and economics have often focused 
on formal institutions (Hall 1984, 19-20; Streeck and Thelen 2005, 11) Subsequently, the 
institutionalism, particularly, its rational choice brand, has often been criticized that their 
minimalist definition of institutions does not capture the substance of activities taken by 
different actors (Wedeen 2002). Actors actual practices, their work habits, their norms of 
behavior, mental models, their self-imposed constraints, expectations and many other factors 
that influence their behavior are assumed away in formalistic approach to institutions.  
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However, this critique of overly rationalist and instrumentalist approaches does not 
imply that assumption of rational strategic interaction should be given up and institutionalist 
explanations for internet diffusion have to rely solely on social and historical context as the 
key determinant of outcomes. Rather, the conceptualization and operationalization of 
institutional variables would benefit in recognizing that rational action of actors is embedded 
in institutional structures and social context (Granovetter 1985). This is not to say that actors 
cannot make choices and their action is pre-determined but their rational action is more 
constrained by uncertainty, imperfect information and institutional complexity than the 
calculative approach to institutions would suggest. The nature of institutions can be 
significantly broadened by incorporating definitions found in historical and sociological 
institutionalist literature (Hall and Taylor 1996; Granovetter 1985). These insights are not new 
for political science as broad range of scholars combine rational choice, historical and 
sociological institutionalism in their studies. However, these different streams of 
institutionalism have not found sufficient attention on scholarship on internet diffusion. It is 
also an opportunity for the author to add historical and sociological perspectives his previous 
study on Estonia and Slovenia which focused primarily on rational choice and formalistic 
approach to institutions (Kitsing 2004).  
Furthermore, this understanding of institutions is consistent with Douglas North’s 
relatively recent work (North 2005) where the role of informal institutions and mental models 
are emphasized in contrast with his earlier more rationalistic interpretation of institutions. 
North's earlier work on institutions also makes it clear that he is referring to both informal 
(habits, norms et al) and formal (laws, constitutions et al) institutions (North 1990). 
Institutions “…are in turn a function of the shared mental models and ideologies of the actors” 
(Denzau and North 1994, 15). North’s views have a resonance with the discussion above on 
institutional logic, where it was already pointed out that the operation of institutions may rely 
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on belief systems. These beliefs may be translated into formal institutions at some point or 
they may be essential for maintaining informal rules of the game. As beliefs and ideas change, 
it also implies that institutional framework is dynamic over time. Certainly, the change in 
beliefs takes time and hence, it can be also constraining factor for institutional change. Most 
importantly, these interactions between ideas and institutions relate very well to the discussion 
of openness and epistemological nature of technology as important aspects affecting 
technology diffusion. However, such definitions by aiming to capture a broad range of 
phenomena that goes under institutions sacrifice precision and concreteness for universality 
and applicability to broad categories of social phenomena. Hence, the following synthesis of 
the literature suggest a number of abstract ideas from a vast institutionalist literature on how 
institutions, agents and technology interacts. 
 
2.3 Trade, Geography and Entrepreneurial Discovery  
In addition to more nuanced understanding of institutions, the dissertation seeks to  
incorporate broader perspectives on technology diffusion into the analysis. This would allow 
me to develop a more meaningful understanding of internet diffusion. Since the discussion of 
trade and its potential impact on technology diffusion was briefly mentioned above, the 
literature on technology and trade can be taken up again. Kitsing (2004) examined the effects 
of economic openness (defined as openness to trade and capital flows) on internet diffusion. 
However, international trade, increasingly, is not just about material goods but increasingly 
about diffusion of ideas. The fact that trade leads to non-material effects - causal relationships 
- that was already understood by Plato and Aristotle. These Greek philosophers made the case 
for restricting trade for various non-economic reasons associated with moral and civic dangers 
stemming from extensive contacts with foreigners that could make it difficult to ensure 
loyalty of citizens  (Irwin 1997, 14-15). Most importantly, this non-material impact of trade is 
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fundamental for technology diffusion (Lall 1993, 125). Technology diffusion depends both on 
importation of technical equipment and inflow of know-how, this in turn among other things 
contributes to increase of human capital (Caselli and Coleman 2001).  These new adopted 
ideas mix with local already existing ideas by creating a new symbiosis. The relationship of 
international trade to the transmission of ideas and to increases in human capital is 
particularly important in the context of this study where both country cases are small open 
economies heavily dependent on trade.  
It is also important because increasingly global trade is intra-industry trade within 
global value chains of large multinationals. Apple has made it blatantly clear letting all of its 
users know that Apple products are made in China but designed in California. As scholars 
have shown “makers” of Apple in China capture insignificant portion of value-added while 
most of the value-added in Apple products goes to designers in California (Linden et al 2009). 
This is so because they are in business of ideas and own the intellectual property. Even more 
detailed study on global value chain of Nokia revealed similar result where most of value-
added is captured by intellectual property owners in Finland while final assembly of Nokia 
smartphone is activity with low value-added (Ali-Yrkkö et al 2011). For instance, on the basis 
of the supply chain’s geography and the assembly volume, Finnish scholars estimated that 
service exports from Finland to China in 2007 resulting from the production of Nokia N95 
smartphone were approximately €0.8 billion while official data showed that the total service 
trade across all industries from Finland to China was €0.6 billion in the same year (Ali-Yrkkö 
et al 2011).  
These and other studies on global value chains and international trade have come to a 
conclusion that available trade statistics reveal little about the economic consequences of the 
increasing global dispersion of production processes.  The globalization often means 
fragmentation of production across borders within supply chains of single multinational and it 
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has exaggerated the growth of trade.  The trade statistics tend to overemphasize the role of 
final assembly while actually the value-added of final assembly is miniscule. Furthermore, 
traditional data underrepresent the role of service exports, which is a crucial part of modern 
production networks. And services are intangibles and connected to epistemological nature of 
technology. Reliance on „commodity“ statistics does not allow to understand the importance 
of ideas and intellectual capital involved in trade.  
What are the alternatives for improving our understanding of trade and thus 
interactions with diffusion of technology? As a start trade figures should produced using value 
added in each country, instead of including the value of intermediate imports. This would give 
a better picture of trends in globalisation of trade.  The joint initiative of Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
called Trade in Value-Added (TiVA) addresses this issue by considering the value added by 
each country in the production of goods and services that are consumed worldwide.  The 
TiVA indicators provide new insights into the commercial relations between nations. 
However, the data is relatively old, aggregated to level where it is difficult to see specific 
product categories and is distorted by transfer pricing. One component of value added is profit 
but because of profit shifting by multinationals and exploitation of transfer pricing schemes - 
where profits are booked in low tax jurisdiction - the actual value-added may be different 
from real value-added. 
Alternative approach is taken by Hidalgo (2015) to demonstrate how different 
knowledge and know-how is embedded in different products. Hidalgo and his team have 
developed a database, which uses trade data to show how networks of knowledge evolve and 
grow by mapping a “product space” (the database is available at atlas.media.mit.edu). 
However, while the database might be useful for a broad global study involving multiple 
countries (The Observatory of Economic Complexity 2015), it is not as useful for conducting 
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detailed case studies on two countries and sectors within countries. First, trade data comes 
with errors (for instance Russia was shown as more important trade partner for Estonia in 
2012 than Sweden and Finland, which contradicts Eurostat and Statistical Office of Estonia.) 
Second, the entire product category ‘electronics’ was simplified as “telephones” for Estonia 
for 2012.  Estonian electronics firms do not produce telephones or even mobile phones but 
more sophisticated technology such as Ericsson’s RBS family mobile stations. This RBS 
technology is important for creating mobile phone networks and allowing mobile phones to 
communicate with each other but it is certainly not a telephone.  
However, Hidalgo’s emphasis on knowledge embedded in trade of different products 
as well as the literature on global value chains emphasizing the value-added of intellectual 
property in products is connected to the broader understanding that adoption of ideas is 
crucial for technology diffusion (Eaton and Kortum 1999, 563; Mokyr 1990; 186-190, 
Castells 2000, 35-37). In essence, the nature of technology is epistemological which means 
that diffusion and use of technology takes place within the social frameworks of knowledge. 
Our previous knowledge and beliefs affect how we use technology. At the same time, 
technological change affects how we think and our thinking about thinking. It is circular 
process but technological change does not have uniform impact. We perceive technology 
differently depending who we are.  Braman (2012) see information policy as epistemology 
policy. She argues that epistemology affects perceptual entity, i.e. how we perceive 
technology, it affects how material and social world are experienced, translation of 
experiences into facts and which facts are  discussed in social groups and lead to consensually 
understood truth (Braman 2012, 137).  This means that the use of technical equipment differs 
in different contexts as has been pointed out by many scholars (Mokyr 1990, 186; Fountain 
2001, 88-90, 98; Keller 2002, 138; Murmann and Homburg 2001, 203; Zanfei 2000, 527). For 
instance, it will be discussed in a more detailed manner later in the empirical part of the study 
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greater proportion of Estonians use internet banking than Slovenians. Or we can experience it 
every day that younger generation tends to be more active users of social media than older 
generation.  Keller argues, for instance, that language could be an important factor in 
understanding the emergence of clusters in technology diffusion (Keller 2002, 138). If this is 
true, then simple change of formal institutions (from authoritarian to democratic regime, for 
example) or increase in GDP does not necessarily translate into increased rate of technology 
diffusion.  Of course, much of the internet-related technology and services are quite new and 
dynamic, so we don't know which ones will expand, nor do we know if they have a “life-
cycle” both as services/products or for age cohorts. For example, will people continue to use 
social media as intensely as they age? 
 This literature on fragmentation of global production networks, embeddedness of 
knowledge in products and social frameworks of knowledge emphasize the importance of 
context. This context is linked to geography which matters greatly. Different geographic 
regions have different perceptions, experiences and knowledge about technologies. 
Technology is diffused among the clusters of countries – even if the technological knowledge 
has become more global. Porter (1998) has pointed out that location has maintained a key role 
and global economy essentially consists of clusters of related companies in different locations.  
The world is not flat. Internet does not diffuse on a basis of some universal model but its 
diffusion can vary greatly depending on specific knowledge embedded in different regions, 
the previous experiences, skills and perceptions of population and obviously geographical 
location of a region or country. This context specificity is often left out in the literature on 
electronic government and internet technologies as more linear and technologically 
determinist approaches dominate. There is often implicit or explicit assumption that particular 
models can be transferred to other countries and all cases are comparable which ultimately 
assumes away the importance of informal institutions and context-specificity, i.e. knowledge, 
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experiences, perceptions and so on, in the diffusion process of internet and related 
technologies.  
Therefore, the literature on internet diffusion and electronic government would benefit 
by carefully studying recent trends in the scholarship of innovation systems and management. 
In the 1990s, the innovation management and innovation systems literature tended to 
emphasize technocratic, universal one size fits all and top-down policy-orientated approaches 
in explaining the outcomes in innovation, including diffusion of innovations such as internet. 
During the past decade, a new set of studies has emerged from a wide range of disciplines, 
which emphasize the importance of location, entrepreneurial discovery and local context - 
such as embeddedness of specific knowledge, experiences and perception - in understanding 
innovation and its diffusion. This perspective emphasizes the importance of small and well 
educated entrepreneurial communities and local ecosystems of universities, firms and other 
types of organizations within which experts and entrepreneurs operate as key agents in 
bringing about changes in innovation and encouraging diffusion of technologies (Saxenian 
1994; 2006; Feldman, Francis, and Bercovitz 2005). Similar notions may be conceptualized 
differently as startup communities (Feld 2012) or creative classes (Florida 2005), but the key 
to all of them is the process of entrepreneurial discovery in explaining diffusion of 
technologies such as internet as well as broader outcomes in innovation. These approaches 
emphasize the role of entrepreneurs and their agency in ecosystems and deemphasize the role 
of old-fashioned top-down national or regional public policy in shaping diffusion of 
technologies. This does not imply that institutional frameworks do not matter. Quite the 
opposite. Top-down public policies attribute too much to the ability of government by 
changing the formal rules of the game to achieve desired outcomes in technology diffusion. 
More recent approaches highlighted above actually emphasize the importance of informal 
institutions in the emergence of ecosystems, which facilitate diffusion of technologies. Smart 
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specialization scholars are skeptical of government’s ability to pick a completely a domain in 
economy and turn it into high-tech success unless these domain is already embedded in real 
economy and/or it is built of different domains embedded in the current economic structures. 
As smart specialization literature is essential to these debates, then next part of the chapter 
will explore in a greater detail.  
 
2.4 Smart Specialization  
Shifting to a related line of research, the process of entrepreneurial discovery is central 
as well to the emerging focus on “smart specialization”, which has not only shaped academic 
deliberations but policy making in the European Union (Foray, 2015; McCann and Ortega-
Argiles 2013; 2014; European Commission 2012). This stream of research emerged on the 
basis of scholarly accounts which studied the productivity differences between European 
Union (EU) and the Unites States. The key finding was that technology diffusion and use are 
crucial variables in explaining the “productivity gap” between the United States and Europe. 
The productivity differences exist and are growing because EU countries have been slower 
than the US in adopting and using new technologies, particularly ICTs  such as internet. The 
ideas from smart specialization literature will be explored in the empirical part on the basis of 
different domains in Estonia. However, as the empirical part is descriptive, then the predictive 
power of these ideas will not be tested.  
The approach of smart specialization literature differs from traditional technology and 
innovation policy literature which emphasize the need to develop high-tech sectors such as 
ICT and biotechnology. Foray (2015) and McCann and Ortega Argiles (2013; 2014) argue 
that regions not only have different technological and industrial capabilities but also differ in 
their evolutionary trajectories. This is essential for understanding internet diffusion because it 
reveals that diffusion may take different routes in different environments depending on local 
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context and time. There is no one-size fits all model which is ahistorical and aspatial in 
explaining diffusion of the internet. It has strong links to ideas of new institutionalist in 
political science such as Pierson (2004) which have been highlighted throughout this chapter.  
One of the most well known smart specialization scholars, Foray (2015), emphasizes 
that regions have to focus on their traditional strengths and competences and find domains 
where step-by-step innovation process allows develop new skills and knowledge for greater 
use of technologies, particularly ICTs. When we consider ICT sector, then Helsinki has 
strengths in online gaming (Angry Birds), London has strengths in financial services 
(Transferwise) and Stockholm has strengths in online music streaming (Spotify). It would 
make sense to develop similar companies in these locations in Europe. Alternatively, focus 
does not have to be ICT sector specific and ICTs can be as universal horizontal technologies 
applied to different sectors to make them more efficient. For instance, it could be exploitation 
of ICT in car manufacturing in Bavaria or production of bicycles in Northern Italy. Most 
importantly, the use of new technologies relies on exploiting them in domains where different 
countries and regions have already a comparative advantage. It is not a creation of new 
domains for economic activity in a top down fashion and attempt to transfer some supposedly 
universal model from one environment to another one without any consideration of 
differences in their respective ecosystems. Furthermore, the diffusion of knowledge and 
technology has to take place across different domains, activities and sectors, not only among a 
few high tech sectors. In this sense, diffusion of internet in financial services, for example, is 
not about focusing on ICT sector but making financial sector more efficient and customer 
friendly. This allows new technologies to be diffused and adopted widely across different 
sectors. 
Traditional approach to innovation emphasized the role of research and development 
(R&D) but disconnect between R&D and entrepreneurial activity is one of the core problems 
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in the EU (European Commission 2012). Instead of high level policy-making and scientific 
approaches to innovation, Foray stresses the importance of (2015) decentralized knowledge of 
entrepreneurs for developing new domains which can adopt and adapt ICTs as was discussed 
above. There are significant information asymmetries between policy-makers and 
entrepreneurs and policy has to rely on information gained through entrepreneurial process of 
discovery. According to McCann and Ortega-Argiles (2013) an entrepreneurial process of 
discovery allows identification of new domains for technological development. The degree of 
embeddedness and relatedness of domain increases the impact of innovation developments 
across different activities and sectors. It has to be pointed out that smart specialization 
literature defines entrepreneurs very broadly: public universities and research institutes can be 
entrepreneurial and part of the process. It is not impossible that policy makers can be 
entrepreneurial.  Hence, there is some overlap with what Mazzucato (2011) calls 
“entrepreneurial state” but I am not making the same normative argument about considerable 
extension of state into different realms of economy. Quite the opposite, entrepreneurial 
discovery process in the public sector is a fact of life. However, if left uncontrolled it may 
become easily rent-seeking where the benefits are concentrated and privatized and costs are 
diffused and socialized. The understanding of entrepreneurial discovery process is also 
consistent what Room (2011) and Crouch call “institutional entrepreneurs”. They are 
“creative political schemers, looking for chances to change and innovate” (Crouch 2005, 37). 
Economic geography literature on the relationships among entrepreneurship, 
innovation, ICTs and geography can be summarized on basis of six stylized facts (McCann 
and Ortega 2013, 4). First, entrepreneurship and innovation tend to be more widely spread in 
more densely populated areas and cities than in regions with lower population density. 
Second, regions with greater sectorial diversity rather than regions where one or some sectors 
dominate tend to have higher degrees of innovation and entrepreneurship. Third, innovation 
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and entrepreneurship tends to be lower in regions dominated by small number of large firms. 
Fourth, regions with internationally connected multinational companies tend to have higher 
degrees of innovation and entrepreneurship. Fifth, regions with greater market potential tend 
to have more innovation and entrepreneurship. Sixth, the diffusion of ICTs has increased 
differences among what is labelled core- and non-core regions. This is because ICTs are 
complements to knowledge-intensive activities which also require face-to-face interactions 
but they are substitutes for activities which can be routinized (the last idea is further discussed 
under social networks and capital). In other words, if greater adoption and adaption of ICTs 
was one of the main arguments for developing smart specialization concept, then in reality the 
diffusion of ICTs has increased differences between core and periphery (McCann and Ortega 
2013, 4). Hence, public policies aimed at encouraging internet diffusion can be self-defeating 
if they do not factor in local informal institutions, knowledge, skills and geographical 
specificity and ensure that positive externalities of diffusion process is internalized by local 
actors rather than by outsiders.  
The role of entrepreneurial discovery in contributing to the diffusion of innovations 
spatial and local context shares with the Schumpeterian understanding on innovation the 
emphasis on entrepreneurs. Let’s recall the introduction to this chapter and emphasize that 
entrepreneurs do not operate only in private sector but they can also be found in public and 
non-governmental sectors. Even though, the emphasis in this research are often on cases in 
private sector such as financial services, then it must be pointed out that in some countries 
financial services are provided by government owned entities. For instance, the largest bank 
in Slovenia is owned by government. Furthermore, financial services and other business 
services have important social functions. Internet bank saves time and makes transactions 
more efficient for businesses but also for NGOs, individuals and government agencies.  As 
was discussed in the introduction, the entrepreneurial discovery and entrepreneurs are defined 
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more broadly in this dissertation than in the traditional Schumpeterian approach. 
Schumpeter’s ideas and role of entrepreneurs in technology diffusion will be further discussed 
in the next part on supply and demand. 
 
2.5 The Interactions of Supply and Demand 
In order to understand the role of entrepreneurs in the process of internet diffusion we 
have to consider supply and demand for internet. At first this approach seems going 
backwards after discussion of formal and informal institutions, trade and spatial factors. 
However, the interactions of supply and demand is not just narrow and reductionist 
“economic” issue. The supply and demand for internet exists in marketplace but it also exists 
in government as well as in non-governmental sector. Hence, the discussion of information 
technology and its role in innovation above should be seen in the context of interactions of 
supply and demand. Most importantly, previously discussed broader perspectives on 
conceptualization of technology diffusion, where the importance of local context and 
epistemological nature of technology is revealed, is strengthened further by the asymmetrical 
relations between demand and supply in the process of technology diffusion. By analyzing the 
history of different cases of technology diffusion Mokyr argues that supply is more crucial 
than demand (Mokyr 1990, 152, 297).  "The "demand" for technology is a derived demand, 
i.e., it depends ultimately on the demand for the goods and services that technology helps to 
produce; there is little or no demand for technology for its own sake," writes Mokyr (Mokyr 
1990, 151). Logically, it follows that the internet is not necessary demanded for its own sake, 
but rather as a means for achieving whatever goals individuals may wish to pursue. In other 
words, there are many substitutes for the internet.  Kitsing (2004; 2008) already pointed out 
asymmetry between hosts and users of internet. Hosts can be used as supply-side indicator. 
The term “internet hosts” refers to organizations or firms that have computers directly linked 
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to the worldwide internet network. For instance, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) serves as 
host, and individuals can connect through the ISP host computer to the internet. However, 
hosts can have many internet users. Internet users are usually identified by calling up 
individuals and asking them whether they have used internet. This can be seen as demand side 
indicator. Both concepts are discussed in greater detail in the methodology section of this 
dissertation. However, as Kitsing (2004) as well as Kitsing (2008) and Kitsing and Howard 
(2009) have pointed out hosts and users do not correlate. Countries which have more internet 
hosts do not necessarily have more internet users and vice-versa.  
The asymmetrical relations between supply (internet hosts) and demand (internet 
users) are very well revealed by looking at the data that Milner (2006) provides in her study of 
digital divide (although she does not explicitly point it out). Differently from many other 
scholars who either use hosts or users as their measure of internet diffusion in quantitative 
studies relying on a large sample, Milner uses both hosts and users. The asymmetry is 
demonstrated by the fact  that hosts and users do not correlate very well as it is clear from 
tables that  regime type has different influence on hosts and users (Milner 2006, 182). Her 
study was discussed in greater detail in earlier parts of this chapter. Therefore, the role of 
supply and demand for internet has to be analyzed on the basis of theories on diffusion of 
innovations. Innovation is not simply a new product or service or a process, but much more 
than that. It is one of the most important economic and social processes as the key to 
innovation is application of new product, service, process and/or idea in practice. Without 
application it would be just invention, not innovation. Well-known supply-side understanding 
of innovation emphasizing the role of entrepreneurs comes from Schumpeter (1975) who 
describes innovation as a process of  “Industrial mutation (…) that incessantly revolutionizes 
the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a 
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new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism” 
(Schumpeter 1975, 83). 
According to Schumpeter, the process of creative destruction is the source of 
innovation and the essential nature of competition. It is much more important than any other 
form of competition, for example, competition of prices or quality, as usually discussed in the 
economics. Schumpeter was well-known for his criticism of neoclassical microeconomics 
which its emphasis on marginal analysis and equilibrium between supply and demand. 
According to Schumpeter, neoclassical microeconomics was based on comparative static 
models, which failed to explain the change and emergence of profit. Marginal analysis 
demonstrated decreasing returns, which led to stationary state where profits disappeared. 
Schumpeter, however, argued that economy is in constant disequilibrium and analysis must 
not focus on equilibriums but how economy moves from one equilibrium to next one.  
Innovation through the process of creative destruction was key to understanding the economic 
change and emergence of profits.  
The key actor in implementing the creative destruction in Schumpeter’s theory is the 
entrepreneur. An entrepreneur is not an ordinary businessman. Actually, Schumpeter 
emphasizes differences between entrepreneurs and businessmen. Businessmen follow 
routines. Entrepreneurs break routines. They are true innovators who are always looking for 
new ways of doing things and new products. An entrepreneur is not a calculative economic 
man who engages in constant marginal analysis and calculates opportunity cost in every step. 
Constant calculation of costs and benefits would make it difficult for entrepreneurs to get out 
of the bed each morning. Rather, entrepreneur is akin to medieval knight whose motivations 
cannot be understood on the basis of simplistic marginalist analysis. This is not to say that his 
motives are completely irrational but rather that they are not rational in the narrow sense used 
in neoclassical economics. Entrepreneurs may be motivated by honor, need to do something, 
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desire to put their ideas into practice and numerous other things that simplistic analysis of 
rational choice fail to account for.  Ideas matter for Schumpeter. In a different essay, 
Schumpeter (1949) actually argues that ideology is a necessary pre-condition for scientific 
progress as ideologies generate ideas, which can be tested empirically.  Schumpeter’s 
emphasis on the role of entrepreneurs connects his insights on diffusion of innovation with 
those scholars discussed previously, who emphasize the importance of entrepreneurial 
discovery and decentralized contextual knowledge of entrepreneurs.   
This dissertation relies on even broader definition of entrepreneurial discovery than 
identified by Schumpeter. One the one hand, it is Schumpeterian approach where 
entrepreneurs are risk-takers and innovators who find ways to break old routines and establish 
new ones. Entrepreneurs engage in constant process innovation as well as improve existing 
products and bring new products to the market place. On the other hand, the entrepreneurial 
discovery also includes what in smart specialization literature McCann and Ortega-Argiles 
(2013) call an entrepreneurial process of discovery (discussed in previous part). This process 
means in addition to Schumpeterian approach involvement of entrepreneurs in policy-making 
process and consideration of their insight in early stages of policy design, which allows 
identification of new domains for technological development as well as re-designing public 
policies through constant feedback mechanism between entrepreneurs and policy-makers. The 
involvement of entrepreneurs in policy-making concerning ICTs and other technologies is 
crucial because successful innovation policy has to be aware of developments in real 
economy. The degree of embeddedness and relatedness of domain increases the impact of 
innovation developments across different activities and sectors. It has to be pointed out that 
this dissertation relies smart specialization literature, which defines entrepreneurs very 
broadly: public universities and research institutes can be entrepreneurial and part of the 
process. It is not impossible that policy makers can be entrepreneurial.  Hence, the 
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entrepreneurial discovery is not only limited to private sector, but can also take place can also 
take place in public sector as well as in the non-governmental sector.  
However, demand side must be considered as well. One of the key criticisms of  
Schumpeter's theory of innovation is that it does not take into account the demand side and 
similarly to Mokyr and the smart specialization literature emphasises supply. Schumpeter 
describes demand as having little importance for the development of innovations. He points 
out that innovations are not generally generated by the wants of consumers. Consumers do not 
have the ability to determine what goods are produced. Producers initiate the innovation 
process and bring about economic change. The consumers are then "taught" by the producers 
to desire the new products that they offer.  As Henry Ford once supposedly said “If I had 
asked people what they wanted, they would have said faster horses” (Vlaskovits 2011). More 
recently, Steve Jobs has said that “It’s really hard to design products by focus groups. A lot of 
times, people don’t know what they want until you show it to them” (Ciotti 2013).  Obviously, 
supply is necessary precondition for the initial introduction of innovation. No consumers 
asked in the 1950s for the internet. Rather it was result of work in several computer 
laboratories, which later led to its adoption and commercialization. Similarly, consumers did 
not demand internet banking in the 1990s. Rather, the supply of this service created demand, 
which depending on country can obviously vary, as we will see later in the empirical part of 
the dissertation.   
However, supply is not sufficient pre-condition for the diffusion of innovation.   
To gain a more comprehensive picture on the role of the demand side in the innovation 
process needs to be considered.  Rogers (1995) and his diffusion of innovations is most well-
known take on demand side which was first published in 1962. However, the same idea 
presented more succinctly can be found in F.A. Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty published in 
1960.  Hayek describes the demand side as the determining force in the innovation process. 
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Due to the associated high cost, innovations are initially used only by a few wealthy 
consumers, as they benefit more from the innovation than other consumers. Luxuries today 
are necessities of tomorrow. Their special needs are better satisfied by new products or 
services, i.e. innovations. The consumption behaviour of these initial consumers serves as a 
test phase for the innovation. By experimenting with the innovation, the initial group of 
consumers assesses whether the innovation can in fact serve a wider range of consumers in 
the society. If these initial consumers consider an innovation useful or important, they will 
buy it. If the innovation fails to gain their favour, they will reject it by not buying it. Thus, the 
decision to buy or not to buy an innovation is a vote for or against it. This voting 
characteristic of the initial consumer's consumption behaviour steers the innovation process of 
the society in the direction favoured by these initial consumers. Obviously, consumers do not 
make these decisions in a vacuum but are influenced by choices of other consumers, 
imperfections of their knowledge, informal and formal institutions and may other factors. 
Hayekian understanding differs from neoclassical economics because he does not assume that 
markets are perfect and reach equilibrium but markets are imperfect. Hence, his theory is not 
necessarily in conflict with Schumpeter’s and other theories emphasizing supply side. Supply 
matters for bringing new innovations to market place such as internet banking. If the 
environmental factors, consumer tastes and thousands of other variables are favourable, then 
the innovation spread. Again, it is important to link back to literature to formal and informal 
institutions, geography and smart specialization and to emphasize that conditions governing 
supply and demand differ in different countries and thus rate of internet diffusion differs as 
well.  
To simplify the innovation diffusion literature we can say that essentially there are 
different types of consumers.  The first group are early adopters who may be wealthy or at 
least willing to spend a high cost on a given product. Cost here does not only refer to direct 
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cost in dollar or euro terms,  but also to opportunity cost of using new products. They have 
special needs and desires than can only be satisfied by the innovation. They are the “test 
drivers” of the innovation process. Their decision to buy or not to buy steers the innovation 
process in the direction they favorite way. They willing take risks and in a way they can 
entrepreneurial in their adoption of products. And there are laggards. They are not willing to 
spend a premium on a given product and/or they are risk-averse. Only have average needs and 
desires that are satisfied well enough by the existing products. They will only adopt an 
innovation once it became a mass product. Between laggards and early adopters are different 
groups some more and others less cautious in adopting new products.  
Hayek (1960) overemphasized agency and income but for Rogers (1995) innovation 
itself, time, communication channels and social system are main variables in the diffusion 
process. Rogers’ work was based on summarizing earlier diffusion theories in sociology, 
some of them dating back to the 19th Century. Hence, the fact that similar ideas were covered 
by Hayek in 1960 is understandable.  Key to successful diffusion was human capital and 
characteristics of different adopter groups such as innovators, early adopters, early majority, 
late majority and laggards. He distinguished between diffusion and adoption seeing the latter 
as an individual phenomena and latter a broader societal phenomena.  In order to innovation 
to diffuse, a critical mass of adopters must emerge to make innovation self-sustainable. For 
Rogers (1995) perceived advantage is most important factor explaining innovation adoption. 
This implies studying relative advantage of innovation meaning whether consumers perceive 
the use of technology to be convenient. For instance, in the case of internet banking relative 
advantage can be whether internet banking gives consumers better overview of their finances 
as well as quicker access than offline banking.  The perceived advantage also entails 
complexity and context of user. The lack of technological complexity implies that consumers 
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find it easy to use internet banking, for instance, and it does not require sophisticated ICT 
skills. 
Eriksson et al (2008) studied the adoption of internet banking in Estonia on the basis 
of Rogers’ model. Ironically, they called internet-banking adoption of “Western style” 
technology forgetting that it was developed and introduced in Estonia in 1996 and is more 
widely used than in most Western countries. They found that adoption of internet banking is 
consistent with Rogers’ theory and also with other empirical studies carried out in the 
Western markets. They found that the use of internet banking is strongly influenced by 
relative advantage and lack of technological complexity in Estonia. They also found that 
perceived risk (meaning trustworthiness of services and worries about security and data 
leakages) is an important factor influencing decision when consumers start using the service 
but its importance disappears once use becomes regular (Eriksson et al 2008, 164-165). 
Rogers (1995) did not identify perceived risk but it has been found to be important factor by 
scholars building on his work (Eriksson 2008).  Eriksson et al (2008) also argue that their 
findings in Estonia are consistent with technology acceptance model developed by Davis et al 
(1989), which relied on the empirical analysis on the USA. The shortcoming of this study is 
that it does not factor in supply side and broader environment concerning internet banking. It 
does not answer to the questions on how and why banks started to offer this service and on 
how and why government started to build its own e-government services on top of internet 
banking.  
Obviously, both supply and demand-side explanations of innovations can be 
integrated. In some sectors innovation is more supply-driven and other sectors more demand 
driven. As internet is general purpose technology it can be argued that innovation occurs 
because of the interactions between the supply and the demand side in a competitive situation. 
However, the interaction is not simultaneous. First, there must be supply which enables a 
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select number of consumers or businesses have to experience the innovation. They simply 
may not know what to demand in the first place.  Suppliers achieve temporary monopolies by 
bringing an innovation to the market. Because of the high monopoly price the innovation is at 
first consumed only by a limited number of consumers. They can pay the monopoly prices 
because they benefit more from consuming the innovation than the average consumer. For 
instance, Black et al (2001) found that users of online financial services have higher income 
and they are heavy users of internet (Eriksson et al 2008).  Second, if the innovation proves to 
be successful, it becomes more widely distributed in the market. This motivates imitators to 
copy the innovation and to undercut the monopoly prices of the innovator. In effect, the price 
is further reduced and large parts of the society are able to consume the innovation. This in 
return motivates the innovators to come up with a new innovation, which again secures them 
the consumption done by the early adopters and the resulting monopoly profits. 
  The individual supplier relies on the process of entrepreneurial discovery and 
decentralized knowledge to experiment with new innovations in the market place. A wide 
disparity between consumers in the market contributes to the importance of a decentralized 
knowledge of entrepreneurs in searching and discovering new market segments for their 
innovation (Foray 2015; McCann and Ortega 2013). The suppliers have to consider the nature 
of market and think of potential reaction of consumers. For instance, scholars differentiate 
between radical and incremental innovation. It is a stylized fact that incremental innovations 
are more likely to diffuse than radical. Introduction of internet banking to consumers who 
have not used banking before would be radical innovation. Introduction of internet banking to 
users of banking services would be incremental innovation (Eriksson et al 2008, 157). 
However, the line between incremental and radical innovation is often blurred in reality. 
Furthermore, scholars differentiate between voluntary and involuntary innovation. Most 
private sector innovations are voluntary because transactions in the market place occur on the 
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basis of mutual consent. Hence, internet banking is an example of voluntary innovation 
(Eriksson et al 2008, 157). Entrepreneurs in private sector cannot force anybody to adopt 
innovation. However, policy entrepreneurs in public sector can do it. For instance, Estonian 
government has made it almost impossible to file annual reports of companies by regular mail 
or in person. It must take place in government’s business registry, which does not enable the 
uploading pdf or word files but requires the data to be filed into pre-existing forms. This is 
certainly involuntary innovation and it is possible to speak of “forced digitalization” (author’s 
term), which will be explored further.  Most innovation adoption models assume that 
innovation is voluntary, though.  
Most importantly, the stylized fact that innovation process is likely to be the more 
efficient and productive if it is voluntary and incremental points towards assumption that 
innovation benefits from the utilization of decentralized and tacit knowledge (Hayek 1945). 
The development of an innovation by a central order, a single business or government or 
incumbent monopoly internet provider, can only draw from the limited amount of available 
knowledge. Even if it is highly scientific, it is not sufficient and under some conditions even 
necessary for introduction of innovation.  Both kinds of knowledge, the scientific knowledge 
and the specific, decentralized knowledge are used to further accelerate the innovation process 
in society (Foray 2015; McCann and Ortega 2013). That’s why smart specialization literature 
does not only emphasize scientific innovation but also knowledge-based innovation. 
Innovation does not have to be and is not always science based but it is always knowledge-
based. If the innovation process also incorporates the specific, localized and tacit knowledge, 
it is likely to be more efficient. The specific, localized and tacit knowledge provides an 
assessment of the new innovation in practice – an assessment made under the specific 
circumstances under which each individual consumer or groups of consumers exploit it. 
However, to understand the interactions of supply and demand better and to spell out 
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constraints on both consumers and entrepreneurs, we need to consider the network nature of 
internet and path-dependencies involved in diffusion process. The next part of this chapter 
will discuss these themes.  
 
2.6 Network Good and Path-Dependency 
The importance of informal and formal institutions, interaction of supply and demand 
and process of entrepreneurial discovery is reinforced further once the nature of the internet is 
understood. It is important to understand that the internet is not an independent good. This 
implies that  the value of the internet is not determined solely by the connection at a particular 
speed. The internet is a network good. This means that the value of the internet depends on 
the network  and on different technologies which are connected to this network. This is the 
case with internet as well as with many information technology goods (Harknett 2001, 242-
246). The network good means that a value of a good for any given person is influenced by 
consumption choices made by other persons. This notion is grounded in basic 
microeconomics and study of externalities. In other words, there are externalities to being 
connected to certain classes of goods.  The externalities are particularly important because 
internet is by nature a decentralized network, i.e. applications are hosted at the edge of the 
network by absolutely anyone. This means that internet is much less controllable than a smart 
network. In the case of smart network applications are hosted in the network’s core amd 
usually by operator of the network (Icenberg 1998, 24-31). A typical example of a smart and  
centralized network is a telephone network. Even though, there are attempts to make internet 
more similar to smart network by various governments and other entities, in essence it 
remains a decentralized and stupid network.  
Nevertheless, the simple assumptions of neoclassical microeconomics are not 
sufficient for understanding the network nature of internet. The increasing returns associated 
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with the technology adoption and its subsequent use has led some scholars to see technology 
diffusion as a path-dependent process (Mokyr 1990, 163; Fountain 2001, 85; David 1985). 
What is meant by path-dependence? The concept is often used without explicit specification 
of causal mechanism involved in the process (Campbell 2010, 90). Political science literature 
emphasizes that actors gain increasing returns through feedback mechanism, which is 
consistent how they acted in the past. This locks in particular type of behavior. Another 
approach from sociology is less rationalistic and emphasizes that practices become 
institutionalized and they are taken as given by different agents involved. In other words, it 
becomes difficult to change particular models of behavior or traditions. Particularly, when 
they work or at least there is a perception that they work well. Comparative political economy 
literature on varieties of capitalism emphasizes institutional complementarity as a result of co-
evolution of different institutions. This makes it difficult to change one institutions because it 
is tightly interconnected with other institutions (Campbell 2010, 90-92). This dissertation will 
combine these different casual mechanisms of path-dependence in the empirical part. 
However, it tends to emphasize non-rationalistic chance elements behind the path-dependent 
processes.  
Most importantly, the outcomes for network-goods are often path-dependent and, thus, 
neoclassical model based on rational expectations is not helpful for analyzing the dynamics of 
the adoption process for eventual outcomes (Radner and Sundararajan 2005, 3).   The path-
dependent process can be understood as following:  
 
“A path-dependent sequence of economic changes is one of which important 
influences upon the eventual outcome can be exerted by temporally remote events, 
including happenings dominated by chance elements rather than systematic forces. 
Stochastic processes like that do not converge automatically to a fixed-point 
distribution of outcomes, and are called non-ergodic. In such circumstances "historical 
accidents" can neither be ignored, nor neatly quarantined for the purpose of economic 
analysis; the dynamic process itself takes on an essentially historical character.” 




Most importantly, the notion of path-dependency violates the basic assumptions of 
microeconomics such as rationality because agents’ choices are severely constrained in 
choosing particular technology.  Idealized rational action in explaining the diffusion of new 
technologies implicitly assumes that over time and through some degree of trial and error the 
superior technologies will be chosen and used in increasingly better manner (Fountain 2001, 
84). Milner’s  (2006) discussion of digital divide is a great example of such rationalistic 
understanding of technology adoption. Very narrow and overly rationalistic conceptualization 
of institutions is combined with oversimplified characterization of interests where potential 
losers block the Internet adoption, while winners facilitate it (Milner 2006, 178). Evidently, it 
implies that we are dealing with forward-looking rational agents who can predict the future 
risks and engage in cost-benefit analysis in determining whether they will be losers or winners 
as a result of technology adoption.   
However, perfect rational calculation as articulated by neoclassical economics and 
rational choice literature in political science is not an option for agents facing constant change 
and a high degree of uncertainty, which is the case in the technology adoption. Most 
importantly, uncertainty and risk are fundamentally different (Keynes 1936; Knight 1921). 
Uncertainty implies that the role of rational calculation and bargaining based on consideration 
of risk is significantly reduced (March and Olsen 1998). If technology adoption would not be 
messy and path-dependent process and would lead to fixed point of distribution of outcomes, 
then “known unknowns” can play vital role and risks can be assessed and considered in the 
calculations of agents.  
Nevertheless, non-ergodic process of technology adoption implies that accidental 
outcomes cannot be cancelled out. Particularly, as this process is rapidly changing and highly 
imperfect where chance may matter more than systematic forces, which implies that 
“unknown unknowns” dominate. The best we can do in light of uncertainty and constant 
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change, we should see the rationality of agents in the adoption as highly “bounded” or 
“adaptive” (see Simon 1955 for the discussion of “bounded rationality” and Mueller 1986 for 
“adaptive rationality”). Furthermore, since the rational calculation does not provide a formula 
for action for agents faced with uncertainty, the agent will follow “the logic of 
appropriateness” instead of “the logic of consequences” that rationalist calculation would 
require (March and Olsen 1998).  The role of mental models and ideologies of agents 
becomes essential in influencing the institutional change (Denzau and North 1994). And these 
changes in institutions can either encourage or discourage the ways technology is diffused. It 
is important to emphasize that these changes take place in specific time-frame. Pierson (2004) 
emphasizes the importance of temporal nature of institutional change which is often not 
captured by rationalistic approaches to path-dependency. He writes:    
“There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional 
arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice. Perhaps the better 
metaphor is a tree, rather than a path. From the same trunk, there are many different 
branches and smaller branches. Although it is possible to turn around or to clamber 
from one to the other— and essential if the chosen branch dies— the branch on which 
a climber begins is the one she tends to follow.” (Pierson 2004, 20)  
 
Pierson (2004) connects temporal nature of institutional change also to the spatial 
nature of path-dependency, which is also emphasized by the smart specialization literature. 
Pierson argues that “If there is one single area of economics in which path dependence is 
unmistakable, it is in economic geography — the location of production in space” (Pierson 
2004, 25). 
Since new technology maybe represent more unknown unknowns than known 
unknowns by increasing uncertainty, bad decisions can be made (Fountain, 2001, 85). In other 
words, perceived losers and winners may get their cost-benefit analysis wrong. This 
assumption of rationality in individual behavior or in market as a whole implies that the actors 
are capable of understanding and learning of how technology adoption works and 
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consequently encourage and/or discourage the process depending on their interests and how 
institutions may constrain these interests. The notion of “critical juncture” for the path-
dependent process where all following actions are severely limited by some decision carried 
out long time ago is conceptually probably the best way how to think about the constraints on 
rational action. The examples of critical juncture can range from the adoption of QWERTY 
keyboard for typewriters to granting excessive privileges to telecom monopolies in countries 
such as Armenia and Latvia. The former locked in a particular type of keyboard that we use 
today. The latter increased the cost for spreading of internet connectivity. Path-dependence is 
not the same as inevitability. As Pierson emphasizes there are real alternatives available when 
choices are made. However, previous choices will affect outcomes and sequence of events 
(Pierson 2004, 20).  Path-dependence does not rely on causal independence through time but 
it allows narrowing down the set of choices and show how decisions are linked through time 
(Pierson 2004, 52).   
The path-dependency and imperfect bounded rationality challenges the assumption 
that actors will learn “right” lessons, which is basis for rational actor models (Fountain 2001, 
85). Such assumption is not justified because actors may also learn the “wrong” lessons 
(Fountain 2001, 85). As Pierson emphasizes the outcomes are result of human action but do 
not result from human design (Pierson 2004, 102). Nye (1999) uses the term “path-insistence” 
to capture ideological and political  insistence on specific policies regardless of rational 
criteria. His work concerns attitudes of Americans and Europeans towards energy issues but 
its certainly fits well with the importance of path-dependence in understanding technology 
diffusion.  Manuel Castells (2000) gives example how Soviet Ministry of Electronics in 
copying American chips rounded the space of US chip leads from 1/10 inch to 0.25 
millimeters instead of proper equivalent of 0.254 millimeters. As a result the Soviet chips 
looked like American but these chips did not fit into a Western socket.  The Soviet 
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semiconductor assembly equipment  that was built as a result of this copying efforts was in 
the end not able to make chips that could be exported because the inherent desire to simplify 
of what seemed to the Soviet government officials as an unimportant aspect of chip design. 
As this mistake was covered quite late, then one bad decision contributed to the widening of 
technological gap between the West and the USSR (Castells 2000, 32). However rational the 
Soviet leaders might have been in promoting adoption of Western technology, they failed to 
learn what makes it work, which, in turn, had devastating consequences on the Soviet 
economy. Paul Roemer, an expert in the Soviet economy, echoes this view by arguing that the 
technological innovation so crucial for so-called intensive growth was insufficient in the 
Soviet Union (Roemer 1994, 44).  The growth of the economies became more dependent on 
the adoption of new information technologies by the 1980s and, as a result, “the Soviet-type 
economies failed dismally” (Roemer 1994, 44).  Innovation did not occur because there were 
no incentives to innovate without competition and no other mechanisms for innovation are 
available (Roemer 1994, 46).  
To conclude, this synthesis highlighted network nature of internet where outcomes 
may be highly asymmetric and choices path-dependent rather than perfectly rational. This 
discussion brought out that agents in making critical decisions in the technology diffusion 
process are characterized by imperfect rationality and their decisions may be accidental but 
with long term consequences.  Chance elements and critical historical events remotely 
connected to the outcome may matter more than rational calculation and choices. This again 
neatly fits into the previous discussion of entrepreneurial discovery process where learning 
through trial and error has emphasizes the asymmetry and non-linearity in the technology 





2.7 Entrepreneurial Discovery and Social Networks  
It is not just decentralized nature of Internet as a network which creates certain pre-
conditions for its diffusion. Social capital and social networks of entrepreneurs, consumers 
and other agents affect its diffusion as well. These networks of social relations can be 
understood as institutions. Particularly, seeing networks of social relations as institutions, this 
project argues that studies on digital divide and internet diffusion would benefit by 
incorporating insights of social network theories into their models.  That’s why the title of the 
dissertation refers only to institutions and not to social capital and networks because it is 
assumed that the term institutions incorporates social capital and networks.  
Interactions of formal and informal institutions are fundamental for understanding the 
emergence of particular type of network institutions in different localities. Ultimately, the 
institutional governance structure can be seen as network (Lazer 2005; Castells 2009). Lazer 
(2009) sees international system as a network. Castells argues that in the network societies 
power lies within networks and distinguishes among four types of power: networking power, 
network power, networked power and network-making power (Castells 2009, 42-47, 418-
420). The network-making power is the ultimate form of power (Castells 2009, 47).  This 
insight can be linked to the role of knowledge in these networks and specific social capital 
that they rely on.  
The connection between information technologies and knowledge is usually made in 
the context of debates concerning information society and knowledge society (Servaes and 
Carpentier 2006). This synthesis shares the view that technology transformative role is 
dependent on knowledge embodied in people and on social, economic and political context of 
society (Servaes and Carpentier 2006, 5-6). However, the following parts take a more 
concrete approach by trying to highlight how knowledge, networks and social capital are vital 
factors in explaining the diffusion of technology.  
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The significance of ideas, epistemological nature of technology and informal 
institutions that this synthesis highlighted above can be linked to the importance of social 
capital and social networks. After all, networks connecting computers are ultimately social 
networks as they link individuals, groups, organizations, ideas (Wellman 2001). The internet 
should not be studied in isolation as merely technological network but as a social institution 
that is a part of every-day life (Wellman 2001). Wellman (2001) argues that the use of internet 
increases peoples social capital (Wellman 2001, 2032-2033). However, communities with 
higher levels of social capital may be more eager to adopt and use the internet in the first 
place. Indeed, scholars have found that establishing identity, trust, and group cohesion 
through social and cultural structures is essential for creating and sustaining productive virtual 
work groups (DeSanctis et al 2001; Kiesler and Cummings 2002; Neus 2001). More 
specifically, researchers have demonstrated that facilitating face-to-face meetings once in a 
while among the members of virtual teams is an important element in building social capital 
and purely virtual communities may result in low-trust environment (Maznevski and Choduba 
2000; Nardi et al 2002; Ostrom and Ahn 2001, 33). In addition, virtual communities will 
increase social capital when they develop around physically based communities (Blanchard 
and Horan, 1998).  If face-to-face meetings would not be important, then activities are not 
knowledge-intensive and information technology can be used as substitute for activities as 
smart specialization experts McCann and Ortega (2013a) pointed out. Activities that require 
internet as a complement require face-to-face meetings (McCann and Ortega 2013a, 4). This 
in turn builds social capital. For instance, venture capitalists are still clustered primarily in 
specific locations such as Silicon Valley which makes face-to-face meetings easier.  
Nevertheless, the concept of social capital must be clarified in order to understand 
how it might or might not impact the internet diffusion. Traditional approach in the social 
sciences has seen social capital as an important aspect in understanding the well-being and 
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vibrancy of a community (Putnam 1993, 2007; Costa .and Kahn 2004; Jacobs 1993; Schweik 
et al 2012). The concept of social capital is defined as trust among community members and 
is measured by mapping out the strength of ties among community members in considering 
their attendance in public meetings, participation in elections and group activities. Putnam 
writes that social capital “…refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and 
networks that can improve efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam 
1993, 167).  Trust is based on expectation that agents will act in a particular way in a given 
situation. If this is not the case, then social sanctions will follow. Particularly, in voluntary 
and cooperative arrangements with low levels of formal institutionalization social capital can 
be seen as a substitute for formal institutions and their enforcements. In other words, social 
capital reduces transaction costs in situations where formal institutions cannot achieve this 
goal (Putnam 1993, 172; Pretty 2003, 1913; Schweik et al  2012, 69).  
The literature on trust has identified that in commons settings, trust between 
participants is often created when participants engage in “reciprocal cooperation” situations 
(Axelrod, 1984; Putnam 1993, 172-173; Schweik et al 2012, 70). Reciprocity of transactions 
creates social capital. However, these reciprocal transactions does not have to be understood 
as market transactions because they are about social intangibles, not  about money and 
material goods (Portes and Sensebrenner 1998, 130; Schweik et al 2012, 70).  The key 
implication of the reciprocity in the context of social capital is that reciprocity does not have 
to be “balanced” or “specific” (Putnam 1993, 172).  Reciprocity can be generalized or 
diffused (Putnam 1993, 172).  And the generalized reicprocity can become embedded in the 
entire social network, which allows solving dilemmas of collective action (Putnam 1993, 
172).  
We should not understand the social norms that govern behavior in terms of narrow 
self-interest but their motivations can be nonconsequantialist (Knight and Ensminger 1998, 
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105). Individuals may follow social norms because it is appropriate thing to do in a given 
context.  If participants in any undertaking have expectation that their trust won’t be 
exploited, then cooperation is more likely to endure. Networks of interpersonal 
communication and exchange can be horizontal  (agents are equivalent) or vertical (unequal 
agents and asymmetric relations) (Putnam 1993, 173). More horizontal networks should 
contribute to more successful outcomes – in this case technology diffusion. More hierarchical 
networks should be less successful (Putnam 1993). Saxenian (1994) found that horizontal 
social networks explain the success of Silicon Valley.  
Usually social scientists have operationalized social capital by exploring at civic 
participation in Italy, phenomena of rotating credit agencies, voting turnout, attendance at 
public meetings membership in voluntary organization, tendency to get involved in group 
activities such as bowling and by various other measures that usually relate to physical 
attributes and geographic attributes of communities (Putnam 1993; 2007; Costa and Kahn 
2003; Schweik et al 2012, 69).  However, scholars studying high-tech clusters emphasize the 
trust does not have to come necessarily from having personal and family connection, living in 
the same neighborhood and/or having particular physical characteristics but it emerges as a 
result of reputation for performance in professional peer groups (Patton and Kenney 2003, 
13). This approach is based on Coleman (1988) for whom social capital was defined by its 
function. Social capital consists a certain social structure and it accommodates actions of 
agents within the structure. Social capital is productive as are other forms of capital but it 
resides in the structure of relations, not within entities and human beings (Coleman, 1988). 
For example, on the basis of traditional understanding that emphasizes community life and 
civic engagement Silicon Valley seems to have very low levels of social capital as it is a 
world of strangers who primarily focus on their work. However, scholars have pointed out 
that the region has very high levels of social capital and its important factor in understanding 
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its success (Patton and Kenney 2003, 4, 12; Fountain 1997; Saxenian 1994). This is so 
because “community is defined by the professional peer groups and not by physical 
neighborhood where one sleeps” (Patton and Kenney 2003, 4).  
All of this literature highlighted above with emphasis on trust and reciprocal 
interactions, which obviously take time, implies that social capital leading to a more extensive 
and intensive use of internet is more likely than the use of internet leading to a creation of 
higher levels of social capital. One way how social capital can matter in the diffusion of 
technology is  that scholars have found social capital to be an important factor in knowledge 
creation which facilitates technology diffusion. Ghosal and Nahapiet (1998) have found that 
social capital makes possible knowledge creation. They argue that more dense social capital 
creates “organizational advantage”. There have been a numerous studies showing importance 
of social capital for technology firms and military (Honig et al, 2006), in understanding 
business interactions in Silicon Valley(Castilla 2003),  in call centers (Castilla 2005) as well 
as more general studies showing how social networks interact with markets and organizations 
(White 2002; Wasserman et al 1994; Eccles and Nohria 1992). 
The literature on social capital and networks has a straightforward link to the 
international relations’ concept of “epistemic communities” (Haas 1992). Haas defines 
epistemic community as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge 
within that domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992, 3). Members of an epistemic community may 
have different backgrounds and represent different disciplines but they share normative and 
principled beliefs, which helps to establish trust among the members of community.  The 
density of social capital and affiliated social networks is thus affiliated with the emergence of 
epistemic communities, which may more or less connected to the international networks of 
experts. Even though the research question here is not an issue of international policy 
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coordination, such communities may have direct links to IT groups and experts in different 
locations of the world and by including both experts from private and public sector form a 
network that transcends traditional relations of market and hierarchical organization. The 
explicit knowledge can be shared in these communities globally. However, the actual 
implementation on the ground depends on local and national institutions and tacit knowledge 
of local epistemic community.  The existence of such epistemic community may be important 
for understanding why the internet has diffused in a particular location and not in other 
locations. Their authoritative claims to knowledge may have lead governments to follow their 
advice in reforming formal institutions – if the conditions are right.  Essentially, as this 
implies, that study of the role of social networks of experts has to take into account mental 
models and ideologies of agents and whether they are shared widely or not this knowledge 
within their epistemic community.  In the context of this project social capital, social 
networks and epistemic communities are seen broadly as institutions because they structure 
action of agents (more specifically it will be discussed under methodology section below). As 
these networks of knowledge-based experts with authoritative knowledge transcend 
traditional hierarchy of organizations and challenge the assumption of frictionless transactions 
in the market. If market would be frictionless and non-market hierarchies would set the 
course, then the role of social capital, networks and epistemic communities would be marginal 
at best.    
In sum, the value of this literature allows exploring the importance of social capital 
and social networks in understanding the technology diffusion. Social capital creates trust and 
disseminates knowledge which have positive impact on the increased internet use. The 
existence of social networks among experts can accommodate the process of entrepreneurial 
discovery and  affect diffusion process as well. This can happen through formal process as the 
involvement in policy-making or through more informal mechanisms.  
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2.8 From Tacit Knowledge to Tacit Web 
 
The discussion of diffusion on innovations and epistemic communities and social 
capital already introduced distinction between explicit and tacit knowledge (see Hayek 1945 
for discussion of tacit and dispersed knowledge). Following Hayek (1945), it is argued that 
most useful knowledge in society is dispersed and localized. Ultimate outcomes depend on 
local implementation and understanding of issues (Room 2011, 58). Particularly considering 
the institutional complexity that is potentially linked to the outcomes in the internet diffusion, 
it is easy to see how international and regional policy measures can lead to a diverse set of 
domestic outcomes. This is especially so because the internet is decentralized and 
unintelligent network, which leads to a proposition that its diffusion can be explained by  the 
extent of tacit and dispersed knowledge found within the local entrepreneurial networks. By 
nature tacit knowledge is difficult to code which means that it cannot be shared and managed 
as explicit knowledge (Haldin-Herrgard 2000). Perception, language, time and distance create 
barriers for sharing tacit knowledge (Haldin-Herrgard 2000). Hence, such tacit and 
decentralized knowledge is best utilized through process of entrepreneurial discovery with 
emphasis on experiments and trial and error.  For instance, in Estonian language and policy 
debates e-government is understood much more narrowly than in English – primarily meaning 
only the use of information technologies by the executive branch or in some cases even the 
cabinet. Obviously, this is not merely a linguistic difference but leads to a different emphasis 
on implementation, and thus, to the diffusion of technology within government.  
Most importantly, the vital role of tacit and decentralized knowledge and 
entrepreneurial discovery implies that the existence of similar formal institutions may lead to 
different outcomes. If tacit knowledge matters for the spread of information technology, than 
any attempt at offering explanation and/or policy lessons must consider this possibility.  
Indeed, Castells and Himanen (2002) argue that there is no single model that countries can 
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adopt and each country should follow its own path to “informational economy”. This fits well 
with the smart specialization literature highlighted above which emphasizes different 
evolutionary trajectories  (McCann and Ortega 2013; Foray 2015)  Even in the European 
Union where the degree of harmonization of regulation related to information technologies is 
greater than in any other region in the world and all kind of EU-wide initiatives to encourage 
the use of information technologies have been launched,  research on the European 
information society has pointed out that there is “no single road to the Information Society” 
because “different national authorities in Europe react differently to the plans of Brussels” 
(Servaes 2003, 27).  
Even more radical interpretation is given by Drahos and Braithwaite (2003) suggest 
that we have entered into the area of “information feudalism”. Of course, their approach is 
limited as they discuss intellectual property rights of information economy. In addition their 
understanding of medieval feudalism is narrow primarily focusing on relations between lords 
and serfs. They suggest that “the majority, the peasant serfs who had to work the land, had to 
live with the arbitrariness that absolute power brings” (Drahis with Braithwaite 2003, 3).  
“The redistribution of property rights in the case of information feudalism involves a transfer 
of knowledge assets from the intellectual commons into private hands” (Drahis with 
Braithwaite (2003, 3). Indeed, information economy is governed by medieval system but it is 
much more complex than the simple dichotomy between serfs and lords. In fact, medieval 
systems as the current information economy is really a non-system as there are multiple 
sources of authority with overlapping powers. This is not necessarily negative development.   
Zielonka (2006) has argued that new member states from Central Eastern Europe have faced 
much fuzzier constraints on implementing supposedly harmonized EU imposed regulations 
than the traditional uni-dimensional literature suggests.  
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More specifically, Tenbuecken (2006) demonstrates that the EU harmonized telecom 
regulation has produced quite different regulatory policies in different EU member states in 
Central and Eastern Europe which had much less flexibility in adopting the EU Telecom 
Acquis than their Western European counterparts. The general terms “liberalization”, 
“regulation”, “de-regulation”, “re-regulation”, and “independent regulator” imply distinct 
policies in different contexts (Tenbuecken 2006, 156-167, 200-239). These findings 
correspond well to the argument by Vogel (1996) that globalization of telecom markets does 
not lead to the convergence of international regulatory regimes but to different reactions in 
domestic regulatory regimes. Since one of the key findings in “formal” institutionalist 
literature was that telecom regulation is an important causal factor in explaining outcomes in 
the internet diffusion, then in order to avoid conceptual stretching regulation has to be studied 
carefully in different domestic contexts. Furthermore, it has to be understood in the context of 
institutional complexity and conflicting institutional logics which was highlighted earlier in 
this chapter. Policy heterogeneity highlighted by Vogel (1996) and Tenbuecken (2006) is 
closely linked with institutional complexity because institutional complexity reduces certainty 
and increases ambiguity. Room (2011) shows how policy diversity and heterogeneity emerges 
by connecting complexity science and institutionalist analysis.  Knoepfel et al (2011) argue 
that if implementation of public policy falls under several ministries, or several departments 
within one ministry, then policy context is heterogeneous. If policy is implemented by one 
unit at the same ministry, then it is homogeneous. Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine 
completely homogeneous policy context, particularly when we discuss interactions of EU and 
national institutions. Hence, it is a question of degree of heterogeneity and homogeneity. 
Relatively homogeneous policy by design may still result heterogeneous results. This may 
stem from unintended consequences, interactions of government regulations with informal 
rules as discussed under institutional complexity. It is similar to competitive heterogeneity 
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affiliated by scholars such as Harold Demzets (1973) and Michael Porter (1980) in strategic 
management and industrial economics, which examines why industries do not converge on 
one single model of operations. In international economics policy heterogeneity is used to 
highlight regulatory differences between countries (Kox and Lejour 2005). However, there 
might be also regulatory differences within countries or among the group of countries such as 
EU as discussed Vogel (1996) and Tenbuecken (2006). It is a fact of life that regulations may 
conflict with each other and may be implemented differently by policymakers because of 
different institutional logics and path-dependencies.  
To reiterate, the technical aspects and easily transferable knowledge play only small 
part in explaining the intensity and extensity of Internet diffusion because the epistemological 
nature of technology. Most importantly, the existence of tacit and dispersed knowledge 
interconnected with the density of social networks and entrepreneurial discovery. 
Entrepreneurial discovery in the broadest sense involving both public and private sector 
agents contribute to a broader zeitgeist concerning internet in given society.  In this sense, the 
internet is really tacit as its diffusion and its use depends more tacit elements such as highly 
localized and dispersed knowledge, social capital and networks and informal rules of the 
game rather than on explicit knowledge and tangible factors. Thus, tacit web refers both to the 
nature of Internet as well as characteristics of entrepreneurial, social and institutional 
networks which impact its diffusion.  
 
2.9 Summary  
This discussion of technology diffusion and related literature, makes two suggestions. 
First, the research on digital divide and Internet diffusion would benefit by recognizing 
epistemological and network nature of the technology. Scholars can develop more nuanced 
arguments by incorporating insights from the broader accounts on diffusion of number of 
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different technologies instead of relying solely on the literature on Internet diffusion. This is 
particularly valuable approach as the literature of Internet diffusion is new in the broader 
context of technology diffusion literature.  
Second, scholarly explanations of Internet diffusion outcomes would benefit by 
moving beyond formal categories such as GDP and formal institutions. A more detailed 
approach to explanatory variables would give richer and more nuanced view of Internet 
diffusion. The discussion above focused on many different approaches found in social science 
literature to technology diffusion by highlighting how broadened concept of institutions, 
process of entrepreneurial discovery, social networks as well as path-dependence and tacit 
knowledge should be incorporated into the analysis. It particularly brought out the importance 
of intangible elements such as social capital and networks and tacit knowledge as important 
elements advancing understanding of the diffusion processes.  
On the basis of this synthesis of literature, the chapter suggests to consider 
institutional complexity and entrepreneurial discovery in order to understand the different 
outcomes in internet diffusion rates. The interactions between formal institutions and informal 
institutions as well as path-dependence must be considered in understanding different 
outcomes in the internet diffusion. Differences in formal institutions may not explain the 
outcomes in the Internet diffusion. Informal institutions which include habits, norms of 
behavior, social capital, networks and many other factors which have been discussed in length 
above have may offer better explanatory variables.  Internet diffusion has to be studied as a 
path-dependent process where the development of particular diffusion process can be traced 
back to a critical juncture. In the internet diffusion process both supply and demand matter 
even though their interaction may be asymmetric in different periods of diffusion process, i.e. 
in the beginning it may be more supply driven and in the mature phase more demand driven.  
Social capital and networks facilitate the process of entrepreneurial discovery which utilizes 
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of localized and dispersed specific tacit knowledge. This process can be more fundamental for 
extensity and intensity of Internet diffusion than relying on top-down social engineering and 
explicit scientific knowledge.  In the end, both scientific and tacit knowledge may matter but 
under certain conditions tacit knowledge is both necessary and sufficient for technology 
diffusion in a given country because the diffusion of technology does not require a domestic 
science base. Nevertheless, the domestic science can contribute further to the diffusion under 
certain circumstances. The next part aims to take the core ideas into more concrete level by 
outlining research methods. It starts by the overview of the conceptualization and the 




















METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND RESEARCH METHODS 
 
This chapter will offer an overview of key methodological issues concerning the 
conceptualization and measurement of internet diffusion and will conclude by discussing the 
research methods applied in the dissertation. The research strategy is based on descriptive and 
comparative approaches comparing cases. Essentially, it combines explanatory, descriptive 
and multiple-case study methods.  First, comparison of cases  focuses on variance between 
internet diffusion processes in two countries with an aim to offer a “thick description”. 
Second, it will describe different initiatives and processes within one country. Essentially, it 
uses different units of analysis in different chapters. Chapter Four will be a macro-level 
comparative study of two nation-states. Chapters Five and Six undertake a deeper, analysis of 
the initiatives and processes taking place within one country, Estonia, and explore how these 
processes  are linked with macro level processes in Chapter Four.  
This approach will provide more detailed and nuanced insights into the internet 
diffusion process that cannot be captured by survey research and quanitative approaches. 
Quantitative approaches often claim to establish a causality between different variables in 
explaining the diffusion. This dissertation will not make any causal claims but limits itself to 
the explanation and description of rules and processes that have facilitated internet diffusion.  
It also insists that previous studies have not been able to establish actual causality because of 
the lack of sufficient counterfactuals and overdetermination as well as weak conceptualization 
and operationalization of concepts such as internet diffusion. Hence, the explanatory and 
descriptive nature of the dissertation is purposefully self-imposed by suggesting that scholars 
studying internet diffusion pretend to claim causality on the basis of reductionist approaches, 
which ignore non-linearity and complexity of diffusion process. This disserstation aims to 
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celebrate complexity and particularities of internet diffusion processes. It emphasizes details 
that are often overlooked by reductionist approaches.   In order to understand the 
shorthcomings of more quantitative studies, and the benefits of this “thick description,” I will 
start by discussing the concept formation and measurement of variables often used in the 
internet diffusion research.  
 
3.1 A New Index Measure of Internet Diffusion and its Limitations 
As it was already pointed out in the Chapter Two of this dissertation,  the internet 
diffusion cannot be defined differently by differents scholars. No uniform definition of 
internet diffusion can be found the literature. In this dissertation, the terms  internet diffusion, 
penetration, adoption, connecitivity, access, use and digital divide are used  interexchangably 
to describe the same phenomena. One way to define diffusion is the following “diffusion of 
an innovation is a macro process concerned with the spread of the innovation from its source 
to the public” (Dholakia et al 2004). The internet  adoption can be  defined as “… a micro 
process that focuses on the stages through which an individual passes when deciding to accept 
or reject the innovation” (Dholakia et al 2004). In practice, it is not possible to distinguish 
between adoption and diffusion.  These processes are mutually interdependent. Micro and 
macro processes interact. Often macro outcomes are simply aggregates of multiple micro 
processes. Adoption of internet by groups of individuals such as students or businesses in 
manufacturing sector, for instance, increases diffusion of internet on per capita basis on macro 
level.  Indeed, the same authors after offering definitions write about “adoption and diffusion 
patterns of internet” without clearly drawing the line between the two (Dholakia et al 2004).  
Thus adoption, use, penetration and diffusion of internet describe the same phenomena in 
many scholarly accounts (Kitsing 2008; Kitsing and Howard 2009).  
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Internet diffusion is usually understood as referring to how widely the internet is used 
in society. The concept is operationalized by measuring in in relative terms, not in absolute 
terms. Different indicators are standardized and scholars consider per capita internet diffusion 
rates or use per 100 inhabitants or some other measure in relation to population.  Such 
approach is important because it establishes equivalance. This means that specific context is 
taken into account (Adcock and Collier 2001, 536). As it was emphasized in Chapter Two of 
this dissertation local context is crucial for understanding diffusion. Standardizing by 
population is important because it avoids effects that are the results of population size 
(Adcock and Collier 2001, 536; Jacob 1984, 30).  As it has been also highlighted in the 
literature review,  usually scholars have employed two standard ways of measuring internet 
diffusion. First, scholars measure the number of internet hosts per 100 inhabitants (Kiiski and 
Pohjola 2001; Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 279-280). Second, other scholars prefer measuring 
the number of Internet users per 100 inhabitants (Beilock and Dimitrova 2003).  
As Kitsing (2008) and Kitsing and Howard (2009) have pointed out, “internet hosts” 
are organizations or firms that have computers directly linked to the worldwide internet 
network. An Internet Service Provider (ISP) is a host.  This means that individuals can 
connect through the ISP host computer to the internet. The International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU) measures internet  hosts by two-digit country code,  e.g.;  France: .fr, United 
Kingdom: .uk.,  et al. or three digit-code referring to a specific classification of organization, 
e.g., .org, .com, .edu et al (ITU 2006). This way of measuring internet diffusion can be a 
reliable method of  measurement.  Errors in collecting the data are minimal as well as  from a 
technical standpoint, data is easily assesible (Jacob 1984, 34).  Most importantly, it is not 
necessary to conduct surveys in order to identify hosts. However, problems do arise with 
content validity (Adcock and Collier 2001, 538-539, Kitsing 2008; Kitsing and Howard 
2009). This method of measurement of internet hosts does not necessarily  inform use if a 
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counted host is physically located in a certain country. As ITU points out, the indicators are 
based on “approximation” (ITU 2006). This limitation is particularly relevant of hosts 
providing services under internet names ending with .com or .org. Therefore,  using the 
number of internet hosts per 100 inhabitants is not a meaningful operationalization of the 
concept of Internet diffusion (Kitsing 2008; Kitsing and Howard 2009). The indicator is not 
valid because the link between per capita internet hosts as operationalized variable and the 
concept of internet diffusion defined as a percentage of internet users in society may not exist. 
Convergent validity is missing because internet users and internet hosts do not correlate. 
discriminant validity is also not  present. This is so because he measurement does not 
differentiate between different types of hosts, e.g., internet hosts based in domestic economy 
and those based outside (Kitsing 2008; Kitsing and Howard 2009).  
The second method of operationalization of internet diffusion focuses on users. Again, 
it was highlighted in the Chapter Two that some scholars rely on these measures. But how do 
we identify users? Usually, it is done on the basis of survey research. Number of users per 100 
inhabitants is usually recorded by contacting people by telephone. Surveys ask whether they 
used the internet during a specific period  which can be one year or six months or some other 
time frame. It depends on survey as some surveys tend to identify heavy users in addition to 
regular users. As the operationalization of internet diffusion, surveys offer an better 
alternative to measuring hosts. Discriminant validity is present. The surveys differentiate 
between internet users and non-users in given country.  It is  a more direct measure of use 
while the internet hosts-based approach measured users indirectly. Measuring hosts is based 
on assumption  that supply equals demand. However, as it was higlighted in the Chapter Two 
relations between supply and demand are asymmetrical and nonlinear. However,  the 
measurement of internet users is  inferior in terms of reliability. Internet users are not 
trustatable in terms of validity either. Convergent validity which refers to correlations with 
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host is missing. As Kitsing (2004; 2008) as well as Kitsing and Howard (2009) have 
demonstrated by comparing indicators it is obvious that there is no correlation between users 
and hosts as well as between subscribers and users and formfo subscribers and hosts. 
ITU also has pointed out that surveys are differently conducted in different countries 
(International Telecommunications Union 2006). For instance, different age groups are 
included in various countries.  These survey design issues create systematic errors or biases 
for any cross-country analysis on the basis of ITU data. This again undermines measurement 
validity. Most importantly, both approaches to measuring the internet diffusion have serious 
limitations in term of  validity and reliability. Furthermore, these two approaches do not 
reflect well the nature of the internet as a network good as it was discussed in the Chapter 
Two. 
 
3.1.1 Index-based Approaches 
Again, one solution is to rely on more comprehensive datasets and not just on hosts or 
users. This means the creation of an index which has been used to measure complex social 
phenomena such as  institutional performance, for instance (Putnam 1993, 75). Some scholars 
promoted index-type of approach for the analytical framework of the Global Diffusion of the 
Internet Project already in 1998 (Press et al. 1998). Barzilai-Nahon (2006 ) has proposed 
index-based approach, where she treats internet as an independent good. Her approach is 
integrated index similar to approach by  Press and others (1998) and the World Economic 
Forum (Kitsing and Howard 2009).  
Based on these previous insights, Kitsing (2008) and Kitsing and Howard (2009) have 
proposed “the index of effective internet diffusion” which captures intangible elements of 
technology. The effective internet diffusion does not capture only the quantity of Internet use 
but also quality of its use while approaches using hosts and users as indicators capture only 
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“formal internet diffusion”. This index relies on conceptualizing internet as a network good 
and highlighting network nature of its diffusion. The index categorizes variables into three 
dimensions of Internet diffusion: network nature, sophistication of use and social distribution. 
The table 3.1 offers idealized vision of the index and summarizes the key elements of the 
index. It is emphasized by the authors that the concrete application of the index depends on 
data availaibility in the countries to be studied (Kitsing and Howard 2009).   
 
Table 3.1: The Three Dimensions of the Index of Effective Internet Diffusion. 
 
Dimension  Techniques for 
measurement 











between cities and rural 
areas, quality and quantity 
of connections to hubs, 
intensity (what for) and 
extensity of use 
(percentage) in different 
sectors: commerce, 
education, percentage of 
internet users, broadband 
users, wireless diffusion, 
number of internet hosts, 
number of internet 
providers, degree of 
independence of telecom 
regulator and market 
openness et al. 
Sophistication of use Quantitative and qualitative  The purposes of internet 
use, availability of services 
and content, nature of 
discourses about the 
internet et al.  
Social distribution  Quantitative and qualitative, 
network analysis 
Percentage of males, 
females, young, old, 
different ethnic groups in 
using the internet, 
differences in use of these 
groups, connections 
between the different 
groups, Gini coefficients for 
technology distribution 
Source: Kitsing and Howard (2009).  
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As it was discussed in the literature section of this dissertation, there  are many 
substitutes and complements to the internet. The index of effective internet use aims to  
demonstrate the actual use and diffusion of the internet in society more closely than would be 
achievable by looking at hosts or users. This dissertation will use insights from the index of 
effective internet diffusion in the Chapter Four. However, it must be pointed out that the 
index-based approaches have also serious shortcomings. First, they are still reductionist. 
Obviously, it is not as reductionist as using one or two variables. Nevertheless, index uses a 
limited number of variables, then significant portion of complexity is assumed away. Second, 
indexes are arbitrary. Authors decide which variables to use and which concrete values to 
assign to these variables. Several variables may correlate, which again may increase the 
arbitrariness. Third, construction of new index would offer a static snapshot in time and not 
dynamic evolution of variables over time. Of course, index could be constructed 
retrospectively covering many years but considering the scope and length of this dissertation, 
such exercise on its own would not leave time for anything else.   
Third, indexes may use unreliable data. It is not just data is collected differently in 
different countries and may be manipulated. Even the concepts may not have unified 
meaning. For instance, data on broadband use is often not comparable because there is no 
universal definition of broadband. The ITU Standardization Sector’s Recommendation I.113 
defined broadband as a transmission capacity that was faster than primary rate ISDN, which is 
1.5  megabits per second (Mbit/s) or 2 Mbit/s depending on country. In 2001, members of  
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries adopted a 
definition of broadband which is less than 256 kilobits per second (kbit/s). The ITU also 
began collecting data using this baseline definition. However, the European Commission’s 
Communication Committee established a different definition in 2002 at 144 kbit/s. Most 
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importantly, such definitions have become irrelevant as advertised broadband offers below 2 
Mbit/s are rare.  
An even more complex issue is the cost of internet access because of complexity of 
tariffs and bundles offered by different operators depending on the device, time of use and 
many other factors. Even comparisons within country are difficult, not to mention between 
countries. The OECD commissioned a working group on broadband metrics in 2010, which 
after several years and meetings in Paris, London and Washington DC still struggled with 
finding a new common simple definition of broadband because of quickly evolving 
technology, particularly in wireless form. In the end, the OECD working party recommended 
to continue using the old definition of broadband. The working group also went through 
complex topics such as broadband speed tiers, next generation access, availability metrics, 
investment metrics, performance metrics, competition metrics, prices and many other factors 
(OECD 2012) The sheer complexity of these issues highlights the challenges of generating 
comparable conceptualizations and data that can be used comparatively. The OECD efforts 
involved the best experts from member countries and the secretariat.  
The empirical discussion in Chapter Three mimics the index-based approach and 
internet diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia is measured across 11 variables which link back to 
the ideas developed in the index. Obviously, there are trade-offs involved. Including more 
than 11 variables would increase complexity to research design and would make 
interpretation of data extremely challenging. At the same time, it is certainly improvement in 
comparison with studies where only one or two variables are used in operationalization of 






3.2 Research methods  
Following the insights from the discussion on methodological issues, 11 different 
variables are selected for measuring and comparing internet diffusion in Chapter Four in 
comparison of Estonia and Slovenia.  
Table 3.2: The Three Dimensions of the Index of Effective Internet Diffusion and Measures 
Used for Comparing Estonia and Slovenia. 
 







a) internet use per 100 
inhabitants,  b) households 
with access to internet at 
home, h) broadband 
penetration rate, i) mobile 
broadband coverage  
Eurostat, United Nations 
Sophistication of use c) households with access to 
broadband, d) enterprises 
with access fixed 
broadband, and j) download 
and upload speeds.  
Eurostat, Ookla. 
Social distribution  e) regular internet use by 
females and males,  f) 
households with access to 
internet in rural and urban 
areas, g) households with 
access to internet on the 
basis of income quartiles, 
k) individuals with low 
formal education and senior 
citizens regularly using 
internet. 
Eurostat 
Source: Author on the basis of concept from Kitsing and Howard (2009).  
As the table 3.2 shows the internet diffusion is measured and compared on the basis of 
following ten indicators: a) internet use per 100 inhabitants,  b) households with access to 
internet at home, c) households with access to broadband, d) enterprises with access fixed 
broadband, e) regular internet use by females and males,  f) households with access to internet 
in rural and urban areas, g) households with access to internet on the basis of income 
quartiles, h) broadband penetration rate, i) mobile broadband coverage,  j) download and 
upload speeds and k) individuals with low formal education and senior citizens regularly 
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using internet. Measures a), b), i) and h) correspond to network nature of internet.  Measures 
c), d) and j) correspond to sophistication of use in the index. Measures e)  f) and g) and k) 
correspond to ideas of social distribution in the index.Furthemore, these 11 indicators offer a 
good mix of both demand side and supply side indicators and three variables out of ten 
capture diffusion among different demographic and socio-economic groups. As was 
emphasized in the discussion above, there is always a degree of arbitrariness involved in the 
selection variables. However, it is clear that this approach is more comprehensive than relying 
on one and two variables and captures well the intensity and extensity of internet diffusion.  
To understand factors that may create preconditions for the internet diffusion, the research 
uses variables such as per capita gross domestic product at purchasing power parity  
(per capita GDP at PPP) to demonstrate the variance in national wealth as well as the gini 
coefficient as a measure of income inequality.  
 The literature review suggested that institutions may be crucial in understanding 
different technology diffusion patterns. Hence, a background concept of institutions is used 
according to the definition offered by North: "Institutions are the rules of the game in society 
or, more fundamentally, are humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction" 
(North 1990, 3). North is explicit in stating that institutions are not the same as organizations. 
Institutions are more fundamental – rules of the game –- that interact with organizations. The 
Northian emphasis on incentives points out that institutions are enablers, not only 
constrainers. In other words, institutions may both create and remove incentives to engage in 
any type of  undertaking. Obviously, the operationalization of institutions relies also on the 
discussion on institutions developed in the literature review and insights from political science 
scholars such as Pierson (2004).  
 I will operationalize the background concept of institutions in the context of insights 
considered in the literature review. First, institutions will be divided into formal and informal 
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categories, with my focus centering on the formal rules, but the informal rules and social 
networks will be considered as well whenever the data allow me to do so. Second, the 
dynamics of institutional change will be considered in the analysis.  This analysis will not be 
static– it attempts to incorporate a description of how the change in institutions from 1991 to 
present may have affected the spread of technology.  It does not make any deterministic and 
probable linkages between institutions and technology diffusion. Rather on the basis of 
careful case study analysis it tries to demonstrate how institutions have contributed in the 
form of critical junctures for the spread of internet.   
On the basis of the literature review, the following analyses will examine changes in 
general formal institutions governing economy, international trade, foreign direct investment, 
privatization, competition policy, regulation of telecom companies and various government 
initiatives encouraging the use of the internet and targeted at the ICT sector. Furthermore, I 
will consider in my analysis specific institutional changes affecting the internet and 
information technology and informal rules of the game and how these rules interacted with 
formal rules. In general, formal institutions can be measured by examination of legislation, 
reports by government and international organizations and through semi-structured 
interviews. Formal institutions can be analyzed further by in-depth analysis of EU Regular 
Reports, which provide detailed overviews of overall and telecom institutional frameworks 
for different years.   
The impact of formal rules on the incentives of key actors cannot be explored without 
incorporation of informal rules. Credible commitment and rule enforcement depend on the 
interactions of the two – particularly in rapidly changing  economies. But the interactions of 
formal and informal institutions is challenging to measure. It heavily relies on semi-structured 
interviews, surveys and indirect secondary data which may or may not support particular 
interpretation.  Hence, the discussion of informal insitutions is significantly more subjective 
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and subject to biases than the changes in formal institutions. However, informal instutions 
have to be factored in because the impact of informal institutions can be either added or 
substracted from the perceived effect of formal institutions. Depending on the particular 
country and situation informal institutions may increase the credibility of commitments and 
contract enforcability or may reduce it.  In this analysis, I am particularly interested to see 
whether there are any fundamental discrepancies between formal and informal institutions, 
which undermine the projected effect of some or many formal institutions. It is important to 
see whether formal rules of the game created a credible commitment or not. Or opposite may 
be true that informal institutions may contribute to the internet diffusion despite the weakness 
of formal institutions and a lack of credible commitment mechanism in the formal institutions.   
I have highlighted the perspectives on formal and informal institutions in the Chapter 
Two. The following is my own synthesis on how I  will try to operationalize these 
perspectives in the empirical part. To further research on informal institutions, the empirical 
discussion will bring in percpectives on the roles of entrepreneurial discovery processes, 
social networks and social capital by combining them with more formal institutionalist 
perspectives whenever data allows me to do that. This analytical approach is based on the 
premise that the entrepreneurial discovery process is based  either explicity or implicitly on 
the rules of the game. The dominance of particular type of rule of the game is influenced by 
the network effect of internet and network effect embedded in the entrepreneurial discovery 
process. In some countries institutions that emerge encourage the diffusion of Internet through 
the entrepreneurial process of discovery. In other countries they do not.   In other words, 
formal institutions may facilitate the emergence and operation of localized networks which 
are fundamental for the diffusion of internet. Hence, the thesis aims to map out the role of 
tacit and often overlooked insitutional aspects which may encourage the spread of internet.  
Nevertheless, informal institutions and the interactions between formal and informal 
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institutions and mental models of key actors are difficult to measure. Opinion surveys such as 
the data from the Eurobarometer are clearly not sufficient as the thesis is interested in specific 
professional networks in specific contexts. On the basis of primary and secondary sources and 
in-depth elite interviewing in, the research aims to explore the role of specific entrepreneurial 
discovery processes. 
 
3.2.1 Case Selection 
The study is disciplined configurative as it will use established theories to explain 
cases (George and Bennett 2005, 75). Concerning the trade-offs involved between 
particularist and generalist approaches, it leans towards the particularist approach and rejects 
the generalist definition where the case study is “an intensive study of a single unit for the 
purposes of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Gerring 2004, 343). Population of 
the study is equal to the sample. The research is  not generalist and does not  aim to 
demonstrate that a particular set of independent variables creates necessary and sufficient 
conditions for higher outcomes in internet diffusion rates in particular population ( see for 
instance, George and Bennett, 2005, 26; Gerring 2001, 132 for the discussion of research 
methods). The research does not aim to establish causality and answer to “if …then” 
questions. Even the best designed quantitative studies never establish deterministic causality. 
At best, they show statistically significant correlations, which allows authors to entertain the 
possibility of causal relationship between different variables. Often authors may overinterpret 
their result and speak in deterministic language about causality. This does not certainly mean 
that correlations will equal causality. In this context, it is not possible to see how case study, 
comparative or not, can ever show causal relationships. Self-selection biases, 
overdetermination, measurement validity and other factors make it impossible. The  research 
cannot aim to establish a probalistic causality or deterministic causality between the 
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independent variables and the dependent variables (Gerring 2004, 342). By outlining the 
necessary conditions for internet diffusion in a particular institutional context, the lack of 
counterfactuals and overdetermination does not allow to establish causality.   
My strategy is closest to congruence tests, but  I argue that lack of counterfactuals and 
overdetermination is  still making it difficult to use the congruence tests for establishing 
strong casual relationship. The use of these tests moves the research strategy away from a 
ceteris paribus approach because of over-determination effects. In other words, the over-
determination implies that are too many variables that can explain the outcome in the 
dependent variable.  More specifically, small number of cases and presence of many variables 
limit the ability to focus on the effects of changes in particular variables while keeping 
everything else constant. Nevertheless, George and Bennett (2005) argue that it is possible to 
conduct congruence tests, which emphasize “similarity in the relative strength and duration of 
hypothesized causes and observed effects” (George and Bennett, 2005, 183). The congruence 
method “does not mean that causes must resemble their effects or be on the same scale…” 
(George and Bennett, 2005, 183). They argue that scholars can take into account theoretical 
reasons why our hypothesized causes affect variables in a particular way and on these grounds 
we can analyze whether independent and dependent variables are congruent (George and 
Bennett, 2005, 183). Hence, by starting with theories and on the basis of these theories one 
can make predictions regarding what kind of relationships we expect to see between 
dependent and independent variables. If one finds out on the basis of the interviews, for 
example, that the predicted relationship exists, then one can entertain the possibility that there 
is a causal relationship. According to George and Bennett (2005) the congruence method is 
the second best option in the situations where we cannot carry out natural experiments or 
where it would be unrealistic to assume ceteris paribus because there are more variables that 
change than one. Nevertheless, my approach takes more minimalist interpretation of 
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congruence tests and social science research methods in general concerning causality.  It 
stems from the understanding that even in the well designed causal research these challenges 
are almost never properly tackled because models are abstraction of reality and assumed 
sigficant portion of reality away. Hence, I will limit myself to description and explanation.  
The study aims to explain and describe conditions which allow understanding the 
diffusion of internet in a particular context. Thus, the findings cannot be generalized for a 
larger population than sample. It cannot be generalized for instance even for the transition 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe even if I study one of the countries, not to mention 
for all transition countries or the entire world. However, the studies should be illuminative for 
researchers with the aim to help in theory building and if possible in comparing a large 
sample of countries. Nevertheless, this study chooses a particularist approach in full 
understanding of trade-offs involved between particularist  and generalist approaches to the 
research design. It combines different case study methods as was pointed out in the beginning. 
Units of analysis vary from chapter to chapter. In Chapter Four, the sample consists of units 
that are defined as diffusion processes in countries;  the level of analysis is  on aggregate, 
macro- or country level.  
The research strategy emphasizes the extensiveness and intensiveness of the case-
study method based on case comparibility (Gerring 2004, 347-348; Collier 1993, 111). This 
description allows to improve our understanding of internet diffusion and processes which 
may constrain and enable the diffusion. The dissertation combines both macro and micro level 
processes. First, I start with macro level approach by combining two countries. Chapter Four 
examines diffusion proecesses in Estonia and Slovenia as a primary case and uses sometimes 
other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries as a secondary cases to highlight the 
importance of variance between two cases and with other CEE countries and understand 
factors affecting internet diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia. For illustrative purposes, it also 
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makes comparison with a larger set of countries in the Central and Eastern European as well 
as with other countries in the world. The purpose of comparison differs throughout different 
sections. If the purpose is to compare a country with aspirational examples, then it should be 
done so. If the purpose is to compare a country with most similar ones in terms of GDP, 
institutions, membership in the EU and some other factors, then it should be done so.  
After macro level approach, I will move to more micro level and describe diffusion 
process, institutional and policy variables within one country on the basis of several cases. 
Chapters Five and Six compare different initiatives and processes within Estonia. This allows 
me to examine better the social, economic and political context in one country and offer even 
thicker description than in Chapter Four. Chapter Five can be described as focusing on 
positive cases. Since study of positive cases may lead to false positives – meaning that wrong 
lessons can be learned on online studying success stories – the Chapter Six offers negative 
cases. This allows understanding heteregeneous nature of outcomes and through the method 
of elimination avoid fallacies associated with false positives. Combination of different case 
study designs and mix of different levels of analysis makes the research quite complex. 
However, it makes it more realistic by allowing to capture more complex phenomena. The 
aim of clean research design often excludes important research questions because reality is 
fuzzy. Hence, often methods determine the questions that scholars ask. However,  the purpose 
of the research drives the methodology in this dissertation, not other way around as it often 
happens in social science research.  
The diffusion processes in Estonia and Slovenia make good comparisons. They have a 
variation in the per capita internet penetration rate by both users and other measures.  At the 
same time, there is also variance in national wealth and institutions but external environment 
is rougly similar because both countries became independent in the early 1990s and  joined 
the European Union in 2004 (Overview of both countries is available in Appendix B). Hence 
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the EU membership implies fairly similar institutional setting as EU member countries have 
unified their legislation in broad economic, regulatory and sector-specific governance in 
telecom sector. Hence, degree of comparability is very high, many ambiguities can be avoided 
and a variance between different variables can be established  by nature of the units. It allows 
not to focus too much breadth and representability but on the depth and comparability 
(Gerring 2004, 347-348).  If I were to consider the breadth and representation extremely 
important,  it would make sense to have a large sample size and to apply statistical methods 
but as I have indicated above I doubt that it would be able to establish causality. Furthermore, 
institutional complexity implies that many variables are involved. At the same time, the 
number of units is very small. Therefore, it would make sense to increase the number of units 
and look at the units where are also many explanatory variables are similar or the same, in 
order to  diminish the number of variables involved (Collier 1993, 111-113). However, 
institutional complexity implies that variance across Estonia and Slovenia is already 
significant despite the factors I have mentioned above.   
Incorporation of larger countries, such as Poland and Russia, may add relevance and 
offer an opportunity to compare “least-likely” cases and introduce a “crucial” case (George 
and Bennett 2005, 80). However, these units will reduce comparability with smaller countries. 
For instance, there are differences regarding the external environment. In this sense, such 
large countries would introduce new variables (Collier 1993, 112-113) without necessarily 
contributing to the comparability.  
 
3.2.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
The main benefit of interviewing for my study stems from the possibility to collect 
information that is not available in other sources such as Eurostat surveys and secondary 
literature. The in-depth interviews will allow capturing the impact of internet diffusion and 
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institutional developments better than more formalized quantitative methods. Artificial 
intelligence researcher Parsaye (1988) has pointed out that elite interviewing is one of the 
three methods that allows capturing tacit knowledge from experts (other two being learning 
by being told and learning by observation which cannot be used in the context of this 
research). In comparison of quantitative and qualititative research methods in information 
collection Gerardo Munck pointed out benefits of in-depth interviews where “… informants 
not only answer but often offer own more nuanced responses and unprompted insights" 
(Munck 2004, 116).  In this sense, survey interviewing would not reveal these insights and I 
am not interested in the views of general population why the Internet is as diffused in their 
country. I am interested in much more specific information and therefore the elite 
interviewing is appropriate approach (Dexter 1970). 
The use of semi-structured interviews varies in this dissertation. In the case of 
Slovenia I use interviews in order to gain background information because I am less familiar 
with Slovenia than Estonia. I do not speak the language and I do not follow local news in 
Slovenia. In Estonia I used interviews to gain information which was not otherwise available. 
Hence, I rely heavily on interviews in Chapter Six but I combine interview insights with 
secondary data in Chapter Five. My three different research questions determine the way I use 
semi-structured interviews in three different chapters. In Chapter Four I compare internet 
diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia where huge amount of data is available. Hence, it did not 
make sense to rely heavily on semi-structured interviews but use it in combination with 
secondary data.  
In the years of 2003 to 2013 I interviewed 34 people in Estonia and Slovenia. They 
included top level officials of government agencies (telecom regulators, telecommunication 
ministry et al), top executives of ICT companies who provide internet and internet- related 
services, investors in telecom and ICT companies, content providers, bankers, politicians who 
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have been responsible for telecom regulations and oversight and experts who have a deep 
knowledge of telecommunications and internet related regulatory issues in given country 
(university professors, analysts at leading banks et al). As my analysis is not static but 
dynamic an important criteria for selecting experts was their experience and knowledge of 
dynamic changes that took place between 1990 and 2013. I compiled a database of population 
by publicly available information (Aberbach and Rockman 2002, 673) and by informal 
conversation with people with a deep knowledge of the issues. Because of tight conditionality 
outlined above and the small size of countries, my assumption was that the size of group of 
people I can interview would be quite small. Hence, I did not try to establish a representative 
sample of population and will not use probability sampling. In other words, population and 
sample would be identical. Certainly, this process introduces self-selection bias to the 
research as the individuals to be interviewed will be self-selected (not everybody will grant 
me the interview). In Slovenia I interviewed seven experts in January 2003 and six experts in 
June 2012 which gave me a dynamic overview of changes, especially as some experts 
overlapped in both years. In Estonia I interviewed 21 experts in the time period 2008-2013 
(the full list is given in Appendix C). Since I have deeper knowledge of Estonia, I was able to 
pre-select most candidates for interviews but to some extent I relied on snowballing, i.e. 
recommendations by other experts. I also used to some extent snowballing in Slovenia.  
General questions were prepared for interviews, but actual questions varied depending 
on the context. In Slovenia the questions were more general because I tried to understand the 
context. In Estonia I used interviews to gain information about specific situations and issues 
and therefore questions were often very detailed and targeted at specific person to be 
interviews. For instance, I would inquire about a specific meeting that took place. Specific 
location selected by a company for business activities. Information of use of ID card for 
specific online service and so on.  
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All interviews were made in person. Interviews were recorded and all interviewees 
agreed to talk on the record which is used for research purposes but not made publicly 
available. Interviews were coded because small sample size makes it relevant as the coding 
provides at least some degree of anonymity.  This may help to reduce significant biases as 
experts may give less constrained responses because they do not want to jeopardize ongoing 
official and/or social relationships. Methodologically, I did not create specific section that 
discusses only the results of interviews because the point of interviews was to gain specific 
insights rather than to offer some generalization on how many experts thinks this or that. 
Hence, insights from interviews are incorporated into the narrative in the following section 
and not discussed separately.  
3.2.3 Working Groups 
In addition to semi-structured interviews the research has benefited tremendously from 
a numerous working groups organized by international and domestic organizations. Since 
January 2011 the author has worked as head of economic analysis at the Estonian Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Communications and represented Estonian government at the OECD 
working parties as well as OECD high level ministerial meetings on internet economy.  The 
author participated on regular basis on the OECD Working Parties on Internet Economy and 
Information Society Indicators in Paris, France. Direct benefit from the OECD was 
participation on OECD workshops on broadband metrics held in Washington, DC, London 
and Paris in 2010-2012. This allowed gaining expert knowledge on the broadband 
measurement issues and hearing a variety of perspectives on causal factors. In addition, the 
author has benefited tremendously by participating in the workshops and seminars organized 
by the State Information Systems Department of the Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Communications which allowed to gain new insights into the factors affecting the use and 




This chapter discussed the research methodology by highlighting conceptualization, 
use of variables and the measurement issues and rationale for case-selection and rationale for 
elite interviewing. It offered a critique of quantitative approaches relying on one or two 
measures of internet diffusion and limited number of variables of internet diffusion. It argued 
that  the use of small number of variables cannot demonstrate the complexity of diffusion 
process. Hence, it discussed the idea of index of “effective internet diffusion” and showed 
how this concept can be operationalized on the basis of 11 different indicators measuring 
network nature, sophistication of use and social distribution of internet. It pointed out research 
strategy which in Chapter Four compares internet diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia and in 
Chapters Five and Six discusses seven cases within Estonia. The empirical part of the study is 
based on both secondary and primary data. Chapter Six relies more heavily on primary data 
while Chapters Four and Five combine secondary data with insights from semi-structured 
interviews. The rationale for interviews varied. In Chapter Four interviews were used as a 
exploratory tool to gain more background information. In Chapters Five and Six they were 
used to gain additional information because data in other forms were not available. 
Ultimately, research questions drive methodological choices in this research design and not 
















This chapter offers descriptive analysis of internet diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia 
during the last 20 years. It starts by comparing Estonia and Slovenia on a number of indicators 
on internet diffusion outlined in the research methods part of this paper. To give more context, 
it also compares Estonia and Slovenia on these indicators with other countries, particularly 
those in the Central and Eastern Europe, which joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007. 
After an introduction to the case countries, the CEE and more general comparisons, the 
chapter proceeds by offering a more detailed comparison of take-up of internet diffusion in 
Estonia and Slovenia based on descriptive statistics and semi-structured interviews.  
 
4.2 Internet Diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia 
I start by considering the traditional measure of internet diffusion by counting the 
number of internet users per 100 inhabitants.  In order to place Estonia and Slovenia in the 
broad international context, I will demonstrate how internet use in these countries compares 
with the averages of internet users in the world, European Union (EU), Europe and Central 
Asia. The comparison with the world average in showing the position of these two countries 
in the world. Since both countries are members of the EU, then the comparison with the EU 
average helps to see how number of internet users in Estonia and Slovenia fare in the EU 
context. Comparison with Europe and Central Asia helps to compare with the average in the 
region that does include only developed countries but also less developed countries.  
Figure 4.1 compares the percentage of users with the world, the EU and Europe and 
Central Asia’s (all income levels) averages. It is clear the growth of internet users has been 
constantly highest in Estonia reaching almost 80 percent in 2012. At the same time, Slovenia 
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lags behind both Estonia and EU average reaching 70 percent in 2012. If the spread of internet 
is often taken for granted, the data in Figure 4.1 is telling that only around one third of world 
population were counted as internet users in 2012 and in Europe and Central Asian average 
was slightly less than two thirds. 
 
Figure 4.1: Internet users per 100 people in Estonia, Slovenia, the European Union, Europe 
and Central Asia and the World in 1990-2012 on the basis of data from United Nations 
(2014).4 
 
The comparison with the world is merely illustrative. However, the internet diffusion 
has to been seen in the specific institutional context. Hence, it is more fruitful to compare 
Estonia and Slovenia with other countries in the Central and Eastern Europe as shown in 
                                                 
4 Here and below I am using datamarket.com, data aggregator and software tool, to generate figures from a 
multiple sources. Datamarket.com is available only for registered users and it has collected a variety of data from 
multiple sources. In this figure the data comes from United Nations (2014) which, in turn, is provided by the 




Figure 4.2. The membership of the EU indicates that their institutional context is more similar 
than with those countries outside of the EU.  
 
4.2.1 Demand-Side Indicators 
Figure 4.2 indicates that the growth of internet use has been constantly greatest over 
the years in Estonia. Only the Slovak Republic has caught up with Estonia over the years and 
both countries have about 80 percent of population using the internet in 2012. Slovenia is 
broadly placed with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland where the 
percentage of internet users varied between 65-75 percent in 2012 and where the growth of 
users has been slower than in Estonia over the years. Bulgaria and Romania are clearly 
lagging behind as the growth of users has been slower reaching 50-55 percent in 2012. 
 
Figure 4.2: Internet users per 100 people in selected Central and Eastern European 
countries in 1990-2012 on the basis of data from United Nations (2014).5 
                                                 




However, when we look at data on households with internet access at home (in Figure 
4.3, below), then the difference between Estonia and Slovenia is significantly smaller as 80 
percent of Estonian households had internet access at home in 2013 while the percentage was 
76 in Slovenia. Certainly, the data indicates that Slovenia has been quickest in adopting 
internet at home in the early years as already in 2004 about half of households had internet 
access (Figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.3: Households with internet access at home in the European Union and the selected 
CEE countries 2002-2013 on the basis of data from Eurostat (2014) .6 
 
 
At the same year, less than a third of Estonian households had internet access. Estonia 
by this measure was more similar to the average of the CEE countries and below the EU 
                                                 
6 More detailed data is available in Appendix D.  
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average in 2004. In 2013 Estonia is on the same level with the EU average and above the CEE 
average (Figure 4.3). Only in the Slovak Republic has the growth of internet access at home 
been more remarkable than in Estonia over these years. The households with internet access 
have been growing four-fold between 2004 and 2013 in the Slovak Republic.  Similarly to the 
data on internet users, the data in Figure 4.3 shows that Bulgaria and Romania lag behind with 
the percentage of households with internet access varying between 55 and 58 percent.  
However, it is not important to measure only connectivity at home but it is also crucial 
to measure its quality as I emphasized in the Chapter Three.  One way to do so is to look at 
the households with broadband connection, which would indicate whether households can 
access the internet at certain minimum speeds. This is also important variable in 
demonstrating sophistication of use. Users of more sophisticated internet services require 
certain minimum speeds to secure quality of connections.  Figure 4.4 shows clearly it is 
obvious that most countries have reached close to 100 percent broadband access in their 
households. This certainly stems from the fact that the EU uses very minimalist definition of 
broadband, which in fast-changing technological landscape has lost substantive meaning. 
Eurostat defines the broadband connection at home in the following way: “The availability of 
broadband is measured by the percentage of households that are connectable to an exchange 
that has been converted to support xDSL7-technology, to a cable network upgraded for 
internet traffic, or to other broadband technologies. It includes fixed and mobile connections 
(Eurostat 2014a).” The Eurostat definition of broadband means minimum download speed at 
144 kilobits per second (kbps) while the OECD’s and ITU definition is 256 kbps. In essence, 
almost all internet connections meet the standard of broadband in the European Union.  
                                                 
7 xDSL refers to all types of digital subscriber lines. It includes ADSL, HDSL, SDSL and VDSL. DSL 
technologies are known as last-mile technologies because they are used to provide a connection between 
telephone switching station and a home or office. However, they are not used between different telephone 
switching stations.  
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Nevertheless, the data in Figure 4.4 shows dynamics of this minimalist broadband 
access over the ten years, which is even more crucial to consider.  In 2004, two-thirds of 
Estonian households had already broadband access while only one third of the EU households 
and of most CEE households had broadband access then. In Slovenia only one-fifth of 
households had broadband access in 2004. In other words, Estonian households have had 
significantly longer experience with faster and better quality internet than Slovenian 
households. 
 
Figure 4.4: Households with broadband access in the European Union and selected CEE 
countries in 2003-2013 as a percentage of households with internet access at home on the 
basis of data from Eurostat (2014).8 
 
What about enterprises with broadband access? This is not just for understanding the 
quality of internet among enterprises but also the quality of internet people can access in 
                                                 
8 More detailed data is available in Appendix D.  
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general because many people use internet at work. Entreprises with broadband assess also 
signals sophistication of internet use as low quality inernet connection would make difficult to 
use some services.   Figure 4.5 indicates that in the most Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries around 90 percent of enterprises have access to fixed broadband with is consistent 
with the EU average. Exceptions are usual suspects Bulgaria and Romania but also Poland 
where the access is significantly lower. There is no significant difference between Estonia and 
Slovenia as both have one of the highest outcome in 2012 and the highest in 2004, where 
already two-thirds of enterprises in Estonia and Slovenia had access to fixed broadband while 
in other countries less than half did. It is also important to keep in mind that this data is 
collected by Eurostat only about companie which employ at least 10 persons. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Enterprises with broadband access in the European Union and selected CEE 
countries in 2003-2013 on the basis of data from Eurostat (2014). 9 
                                                 




It is also crucial to look at internet diffusion among different population segments. 
First I will look at regular internet use among men and women in Slovenia and Estonia. The 
regular internet use is a measure which tells us how often people actually use internet even if 
they may have a good access at work and home and they may report to the statistical office 
that they use internet. The Eurostat defines regular use in the following way: “Regular use: at 
least once a week (i.e. every day or almost every day or at least once a week but not every 
day) on average within the last 3 months before the survey. Use includes all locations and 
methods of access and any purpose (private or work/business related).”(Eurostat 2015). 
 
Figure 4.6: Regular use of internet in Estonia and Slovenia by males and females in 2004-
2014 on the basis of data from Eurostat (2015)10 
 
                                                 
10 More detailed data is in Appendix D. 
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The  Figure 4.6 demonstrates clearly that regular use in Estonia is exceeds 80 percent 
among females and males in 2014. At the same time in Slovenia, the use is below 70 percent  
and on similar level among males and females. Regular internet use among Estonian females 
and males has been always higher from 2004 to 2014 than among Slovenian females and 
males. Quite interestingly, use among males used to be higher in Slovenia from 2004 to 2013 
than among females. However, it reached the same level in 2014 but not because of increase 
in the internet use among Slovenian females but because decline among Slovenian males. 
This may represent some kind of statistical discrepancy stemming from particular 
characteristics from one year. If the long term trend is considered, then it is clear that regular 
internet use among both females and males has been equal in Estonia and it is higher than in 
Slovenia. Slovenians use internet less regularly and the males are more regular users than 
females.   
Well educated and young people are regular internet users in almost every country. 
There are no significant differences between well educated and young regular users in Estonia 
and Slovenia.  However, the diffusion process also depends whether laggards start using 
internet on a regular basis, which implies that suppliers of internet services also offer services 
that are accessible for differnet population segments. Figure 4.7 looks first at individuals 
between 25 to 54 years old but with low formal education. It also compares regular internet 
use among 55-74 years old with low formal education as well as internet use among 65 to 74 
years old  It turns out that people with low formal education and senior citizens are more avid 
internet users in Estonia than in Slovenia. This also explains the difference between regular 
use among Estonian females and males in comparison with Slovenian males and females. In 
Estonia, people in the bottom of education pyramid and in the top of education pyramid are 
more regular uses of internet than in Slovenia. In 2006, 30 percent of Estonians aged 25 to 54 
years with low formal education used internet while only 11 percent of same population 
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segment did so. By 2014, the internet use among the same group in Estonia had grown to 81 
percent while reached 39 percent in Slovenia. The use among individuals aged 55 to 74 was in 
Estonia 21 percent while in Slovenia it was 10 percent. Here, the same pattern has persisted 
since 2009 (when the data is available for comparison). In Estonia, 41 percent of  65-74 years 
old used internet regularly in 2014 while in Slovenia only 21 percent did so in the same year. 
In 2007 the internet use was 11 percent among the same group in Estonia and 6 percent in 
Slovenia.  
 
Figure 4.7: Regular use of internet in Estonia and Slovenia among users with low formal 
education and 65 to 74 years old in 2004-2014 on the basis of data from Eurostat (2015).11  
 
                                                 
11 More detailed data is in Appendix D. 
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One additional way to measure distributional factors in the diffusion is is to consider 
urban and rural populations in the access to internet. The figure 4.8 indicates urban and rural 
households with  internet access at home. It is obvious that there are not differences between 
Estonia and Slovenia as well as the EU average in 2012.  
 
Figure 4.8: Households with internet access at home in rural and urban areas in Estonia, 
Slovenia and the European Union 2004-2013 on the basis of data from Eurostat (2014).12 
 
Roughly 80 percent of urban populations have internet access at home while 70 
percent of rural households have access. At the same time the dynamic picture is more telling. 
In Estonia, the growth of internet access in rural areas has been greater because the starting 
point was much lower  - only 25 percent of Estonian rural households had internet access at 
                                                 
12 More detailed data is available in Appendix 9. 
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home in 2004 while over 40 percent of households had internet access in the cities. There was 
no divide among city-rural lines in Slovenia at the same year. In other words, the gap between 
rural and urban households has been getting smaller in Estonia while it has been growing 
bigger in Slovenia between 2004 and 2013.  
This is again remarkable in the context of population density. Estonia is significantly 
sparsely populated than Slovenia. In 2012 Estonia had 30.5 inhabitants per square kilometer 
while Slovenia had 102.2 inhabitants per square kilometer. It must be also noted that Slovenia 
is mountaineous while Estonia is flat. The former makes it more difficult to provide internet 
connectivity in remote areas, while the latter makes it easier. However, there are other factors 
that balance the topographical factors. As was pointed out Slovenia’s population density is 
three times bigger than Estonia’s population density. Also, Slovenian government owns a 
majority stake in the incumbent telecom company which makes it possible to direct 
investments to the areas which are underserved by telecom service providers.  
The distribution of households with internet access by income allows to understand 
how the internet is diffused among different social and economic groups within country and 
between countries (Figure 4.9). This data is quite telling both on static and dynamic 
comparison. First, Estonia has much greater share of households with income in the first 
quartile than Slovenia, respectively 56 percent and 41 percent in 2012. At the same time both 
countries had same level of internet use with 24-25 percent in this income group in 2008. In 
other words, Estonia has more than doubled the internet use among poorest households in 6 
years while the progress has been much more modest in Slovenia. The richest households in 
the fourth quartile have higher access at home in Slovenia (99 percent) than in Estonia (89 




Estonia had higher share of households with internet access in both second and third 
quartile than Slovenia in 2013 as well as 2008. In the third quartile differences ranges 
between 5-10 percent depending on the year and Slovenia has narrowed the gap. However, in 
the second quartile Estonia had already 61 percent of households vs Slovenia’s 39 percent in 
2008 and respective shares have increased to 84 and 74 percent in 2013. Slovenia has 
narrowed the gap, but Estonia still has 10  percent more households with internet access in 
2013.  
 
Figure 4.9: The distribution of households with internet access at home by income levels in 
Estonia and Slovenia on the basis of  data from Eurostat (2014).13 
 
                                                 
13 More detailed data is available in the Appendix D.  
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The bottom line is that internet access is and has been more evenly distributed among 
Estonian households with different income levels than Slovenia’s households. Estonia has 
also managed to increase the share of households with internet access among the poorest 
households while in Slovenia the growth has been much more modest.  
 
4.2.2 Supply-Side Indicators 
The previous indicators have been primarily demand driven. Obviously, they are also 
affected by supply, i.e. if there is no supply of internet in rural areas, then it cannot be 
demanded. However, final decision is ultimately with those who demand internet.  Now it is 
crucial to include two indicators of supply, which also highlight not just quantity but also 
quality of internet connectivity. 
 
Figure 4.10: Broadband penetration rate in the European Union and selected CEE countries in 
2005-2011 on the basis of Eurostat (2014). 14 
                                                 
14 The data is available for years 2005 to 2011 and not after that. More detailed information is provided in 




First one is broadband penetration rate, which is expressed in percentages and it is 
calculated as the number of broadband access lines divided to population, multiplied by 100 
(Figure 4.10). Obviously, more broadband access lines improve the quality of internet 
connection. By this measure, Estonia has been ahead of the EU average as well as any other 
country in the years from 2004 to 2011 (Figure 4.10). Even though, Estonia’s penetration rate 
27 percent is only slightly higher than Slovenia’s 24 percent in 2011. However, Estonia’s 
broadband penetration rate was 8 percent in 2004 while Slovenia’s was four percent which 
was the second highest in the CEE countries. This indicates that Estonia was able to supply 
better quality internet connectivity earlier and people were able to use it for a longer time 
period than in Slovenia. 
As users have started increasingly to exploit internet on their mobile devices, it is 
crucial to look at mobile broadband coverage as a supply-side factor (Figure 4.11). Even 
though  74 percent of Slovenia’s population had access to mobile broadband and 62 percent 
did in Estonia in 2008, Estonia passed Slovenia already in 2009 and in 2010 mobile 
broadband was available for 90 percent of Estonian population  which is same as the EU 




Figure 4.11: Mobile broadband coverage in Estonia, EU and Slovenia in 2008-2010 on the 
basis of data from Eurostat (2014).15 
 
Since the Eurostat did not collect data after 2010 on 3G mobile broadband coverage as 
a percentage of population and started to collect data only on advanced 3G mobile broadband 
coverage as a percentage of households, then the Figure 4.12 complements Figure 4.11 with 
years from 2011 to 2013. Figure 4.12 shows the comparison between Estonia and Slovenia 
and benchmarks it against the EU average. The data shows that Estonia was relative laggard 
in 2011 with 87 percent of households covered against Slovenia’s 97 but by 2013 both 
                                                 




countries had reached almost 100 percent coverage in households. 
 
Figure 4.12: Advanced (3G) mobile broadband coverage in Estonia, EU and Slovenia in 
2011-2013 on the basis of data from Eurostat (2014).16 
 
This Estonia’s superiority in delivering higher quality internet connectivity is further 
bolstered by comparing download and upload speeds in Estonia and Slovenia. As Figure 13 
indicates, the Estonian download speeds have been higher on most years between 2008 and 
2014. The upload speeds have been roughly the same in the same time period but in 2013 the 
Estonian upload speed is about two times faster than Slovenia’s upload speed. To sum up. the 
internet diffusion was measured and compared in Estonia and Slovenia on the basis of eleven 
indicators which are summarized in the Table 3 below. Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 are 
presented as one indicator as they both measure internet users per 100 inhabitant. Figure 4.1 
                                                 




was used to provide more context to understand where Estonia and Slovenia are based in a 
global comparison. Figures 4.11 and 4.12 are also presented as one indicator in the Table 4.1. 
They both measure mobile broadband coverage and as this technology is changing rapidly, 
the Eurostat has started to collect different data differently for more recent years
 
Figure 4.13: Download and upload speeds in Estonia and Slovenia 2008-2014 on the basis of 
data from Ookla (2014). 17 
 
Table 4.1 presents results in the form of all years when data is available and a snapshot 
of last year with available data. In the ‘Over All Years’ column of Table 3, Estonia performs 
better in 7 out of the 11 variables listed.  In the ‘Last Available Year’ column, I list the 
country who scored better for that year for each indicator.   In this column, Estonia 
outperforms Solvenia in 10 out of 11 variables. Slovenia only outperforms Estonia in the 
‘enterprises with broadband access’ category. However, since Estonia was able to catch up 
                                                 
17 More detailed data is provided in Appendix D.  
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with Slovenia over time and has better outcome in 10 variables out of 11 in the end, then it 
can be concluded that dynamic performance measure in terms of growth rate of Estonia has 
also been considerably better than Slovenia’s.  Only in category enterprises with fixed 
broadband access Slovenia is better in  dynamic (over all years) and static (last available year) 
performance.  
Table 4.1:  Comparison of internet diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia on the basis of static and 
dynamic variables. 
Indicator Over all years Last available year 
Figure 1 and 2: Internet 
users per 100 inhabitants  
Estonia Estonia 
Figure 3: Households with 
internet access at home  
Slovenia Estonia 
Figure 4: Households with 
broadband access 
Estonia  Estonia 
Figure 5: Enterprises with 
fixed broadband access 
Slovenia Slovenia 
Figure 6: Females and males 
regularly using internet 
Estonia Estonia 
Figure 7: Individuals with 
low formal education and 
senior citizens regularly 
using internet  
Estonia Estonia 
Figure 8: Households with 
internet access in areas with 
low and high population 
density 
Slovenia Estonia 
Figure 9: Households with 
internet access by income 
Estonia  Estonia 
Figure 10: Broadband 
penetration rate 
Estonia Estonia 
Figure 11 and 12: Mobile 
broadband coverage 
Slovenia Estonia 
Figure 13: Download and 
upload speeds 




However, it must be noted that variance between Estonia and Slovenia on following 
indicators; households with access to internet at home, households with access to broadband, 
enterprises with access fixed broadband and households with access to internet in rural and 
urban areas is relatively small. Neverthelesss, these eleven indicators suggest that Estonia has 
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been able to diffuse better quality internet than Slovenia by giving its users more time to 
experience with it. In addition, Estonia has been able to diffuse internet more among different 
demographic and socio-economic groups and has a less constraints on the supply side than 
Slovenia. Particularly remarkable is higher regular use of internet among older people, people 
with low levels of education and income in comparison with Slovenia. In other words, there 
are significant differences between Estonia and Slovenia by measuring both extensity and 
intensity of internet diffusion. The next part of this section offers a description of some crucial 
factors in understanding these differences.  
 
4.3 Internet Diffusion and National Wealth 
The literature review in Chapter Two outlined a hypothesis which several studies have 
failed to reject that internet diffusion is correlated with nation’s wealth. This correlation 
seems to suggest a certain causality that wealthier countries have higher degree of internet 
diffusion than less wealthier countries. This may be so dependening on the sample and 
specific conceptualization of internet diffusion. However, this is not clearly the case with 
Estonia and Slovenia. Both countries have similar or higher levels of internet diffusion 
depending on the variable used than the average of countries of the European Union and the 
OECD, but they have and have had considerably lower per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP) at purchasing power parity (PPP) than the OECD and EU average, as indicated in 
Figure 4.14. Furthermore, Estonia used to be two times poorer in 1993 than Slovenia and was 
still about one fifth poorer than Slovenia in 2012. Figure 4.14 shows that GDP at PPP in the 
2005 constant international dollars for Estonia, Slovenia, OECD members and EU average.  
Furthermore, if the comparison is made with all the CEE countries that joined the EU 
in 2004 and 2007, then it is obvious that Estonia had one of the lowest per capita GDP at PPP 
in this group in 1993. It has one of the highest in 2012 but its is still significantly lower than 
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that of Slovenia and the Czech Republic. Countries with relatively similar levels of per capita 
GDP such as Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Hungary have quite different outcomes in 
internet diffusion. 
 
Figure 4.14: Gross Domestic Product per capita at Purchasing Power Parity in Estonia, 
Slovenia, EU and OECD 1993-2012 on the basis of data from World Bank (2013).18 
 
Most importantly, despite of  being significantly poorer Estonia actually has either 
achieved the better outcome on the basis of eight internet diffusion indicators than Slovenia. 
Estonia’s outcome in internet diffusion is particularly remarkable in comparison with 
Slovenia across different socio-economic groups despite of differences in the per capita GDP. 
In other words, an average Estonian is considerably poorer than an average Slovenian but the 
average Estonian is more avid internet user than the average Slovenian. One plausible 
                                                 
18 More detailed data is in Appendix D.  
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explanation could be that Estonia has greater degree of income equality than Slovenia and the 
distribution of internet access among different households just reflects it. Quite puzzlingly, 
the opposite is true. Estonia is significantly more unequal than Slovenia and than the average 
of European Union as well as members states that joined in the EU in 2004 and 2007. 
 
Figure 4.15: Gross Domestic Product per capita at Purchasing Power Parity in Estonia, 
Slovenia and selected CEE countries in 1993-2012 on the basis of World Bank (2013).19  
 
Estonia’s gini coefficient has been decreasing from the peak of 0.37 in 2004 to 0.33 in 
2013 but Slovenia’s gini has stayed at stable 0.24 percent during the same time period (Figure 
4.16). In other words, the use of internet  has increased among poorest socio-economic groups 
in Estonia despite of the fact that their income is smaller in both absolute and relative terms 
                                                 
19 More detailed data is in Appendix D. 
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than similar groups in Slovenia. 
 
Figure 4.16: Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income in Estonia, Slovenia, European 
Union and new member states of the European Union in 2000-2012 on the basis of data from 
Eurostat (2013). 20 
 
Thus per capita GDP cannot be a variable that would explain why Estonian internet 
users have enjoyed better quality internet connectivity for a longer time period and why 
internet use is more evenly spread among Estonian internet users with different income levels 
than Slovenian users. Most importantly, the the national wealth hypothesis would suggest that 
Slovenians should not only have higher and better quality internet connectivity than Estonia 
but also the diffusion of internet should be more equal among users with different income 
levels. Particularly so as Slovenia’s gini coefficient suggest that income equality is much 
greater than in Estonia. As we saw above, the opposite is true. Internet diffusion in Estonia is 
much more egataliarian than in Slovenia. Most importantly, socio-economic groups with 
lower income in Estonia use internet more than in Slovenia.  
                                                 




4.4 Institutional changes in Estonia and Slovenia 
 
One factor that emerged in the literature review (Chapter Two) as an explanation for 
understanding differences in the internet diffusion were institutions defined as formal and 
informal rules of the game. Hence, institutional factors have to be considered in understanding 
the differences between Estonia and Slovenia. This section offers an overview of formal 
institutions and their changes. Obviously, some insights from the literature review do not offer 
much explanatory power. It is evident without much deliberation that political regime type 
whether democracy or dictatorhip cannot explain differences between Estonia and Slovenia, 
since both countries have been democracies since the early 1990s. Both countries joined the 
European Union in 2004 and have adopted same detailed EU rulebook which covers 
significant part of their domestic formal institutions. Therefore the consideration of formal 
institutions has to be unpacked further.. Even though the EU is considered the most legalized 
international organization in the world, and its role in shaping the domestic rules goes beyond 
of what the international relations scholars usually expect of international organizations, the 
implementation of its formal rules in different member countries still varies significantly.   
The literature review discussed the work by Dasgupta et al (2001), Fink et al (2003) 
and Guillen and Suarez (2005), and reveals that the institutions that may matter most for the 
availability of high quality internet connectivity are the rules governing the telecom sector. 
The OECD has been collecting data on the restrictiveness of telecom sector regulation, i.e 
how open the sector has been to competition. One of the key findings by Dasgupta et al 
(2001), Fink et al (2003) and Guillen and Suarez (2005) was that telecom sector liberalization 
and increased competition benefits the availability of telecom services.  The data in Table 4.2 
shows clearly that Estonia has one of the least restrictive regulatory regimes among the 
OECD countries while Slovenia has the most restrictive regulatory regime right after the 
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Luxembourg.  Estonia scored 1 out of 6 point scale in 2008 and had almost reduced by half its 
ranking on restrictivness index in 2013 (Lower the number less restrictive, i.e. more 
competitive,  is the telecom sector). At the same time, Slovenia scored 2 out of 6 in 2013 and 
the reduction in the ranking had been minimal in comparison with 2008. The OECD and EU 
average score has been 1 out of 6 in both years.  In other words, not only had Estonia low 
degree of restriveness in 2008 it also managed to reduce it significantly while Slovenia’s 
ranking stay constantly high indicating high degree of restrictiveness.  
 
Table 4.2: Restrictivness of telecom sector regulations and regulatory protection of 
incumbents in Estonia and Slovenia in comparison with the OECD average 2008 and 2013.  
 
Indicator/Unit Estonia Slovenia OECD average 
Restrictiveness of 
telecom sector 
regulations in 2008 









regulations in 2013 









incumbents in 2008 









incumbents in 2008 








Source: Author on the basis of data from the OECD (2014) 
 
Similarly, Slovenia has higher protection of incumbent companies in the marketplace, 
including telecom companies (Table 4.2). The level of protection was 1 out of 3 in Estonia in 
2008 and it was decreased to 0.75 in 2013. The lower number means that government 
regulations protect less incumbents and encourage competition. At the same time the 
Slovenia’s protection of incumbent companies has stayed over 1 in both years and is slightly 
                                                 
21 Numbers in this table are approximations.  
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higher than the EU average but slightly lower than the OECD average which is heavily 
inlfuenced by extreme outliers such as Mexico and Israel.  
The telecom sector regulations and protections influence internet diffusion because in 
restrictive markets where incumbents are protected entry of new services and new competitors 
is difficult, if not impossible. Lack of competition allows incumbents to charge higher prices 
for internet diffusion which reduces demand. It makes it also difficult to offer new services 
because incumbent may discriminate against new entrants. At the same time, the incumbent 
companies may lack incentives to provide new services because they do not face competitive 
pressures. In other words, restrictive regulatory regime and protection of incumbent 
companies in the marketplace does not allow the process of entrepreneurial discovery to take 
place. The importance of entrpereneurial discovery and reduction of institutional barriers on 
supply-side was emphasized in sections 2.4 and 2.5 in Chapter Two.  
Obviously, such comparisons on the basis of OECD data are just a snapshot in 2008 
and 2013 and do not offer sufficient levels of detail to understand the differences. Hence, the 
next part of this chapter describes formal institutions and their changes in Estonia and 
Slovenia in a greater detail. It starts with the discussion on Estonia which is followed by 
overview on Slovenia. The ideas concerning formal institutions and their impact on internet 
diffusion were first developed in my Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy thesis at the 
Fletcher School at Tufts University (Kitsing 2004). The following sections build on the thesis.  
 
 
4.4.1 General Background of Institutional Changes in Estonia 
 
Before we take a detailed look at the telecom sector regulation it is important to 
consider broader institutional context and its evolution in Estonia.  It may seem obvious to 
informed reader but it is crucial to keep in mind that Estonia was once one of the republics in 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the years 1940-1991. If we place the use of 
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internet per 100 inhabitants in the context of all former USSR member states, then the number 
of internet users in Estonia is highly remarkable as Figure 19 demonstrates. Certainly, it must 
be kept in mind that in many ways Estonia was one of the most developed members of the 
USSR but nevertheless, the progress is quite stunning in comparison. With some former 
members of USSR there is eight time difference in internet users per 100 people. Even more 
wealthy parts of former USSR such as Russian Federation have only half of its population 
online in 2012. The dynamic picture also shows clearly that Estonia was quick to adopt 
internet use in the second half of the 1990 while even its close neighbors Latvia and Lithuania 
with similar level of economic development lagged behind. 
 
Figure 4.17:  Internet users per 100 people in the former republics of the USSR on the basis of 
United Nations (2014).22  
 
                                                 




In order to understand Estonia’s quick adoption of internet, it is crucial to understand 
the general institutional changes as well as specific changes concerning telecom and ICT 
sectors that took place in the country. Formal institutional changes in Estonia were rapid and 
radical in the 1990s (Laar 1996; Freytag 2003; Sorg and Vensel 1999).  Significant highlights 
include corporate and personal income tax reform, which introduced a flat tax rate of 26 
percent in the early 1990s (Feldmann and Sally 2001, 7; Freytag 2003, 11). As of 1999, 
reinvested corporate profits are not subject to income tax. The currency board system was 
boldly introduced in 1992 – against the advice of the IMF (Iwaskiw 1996, 41; Sally and 
Feldmann 2001, 6). Government spending as a percentage of GDP was reduced to less than 
40 percent, and has remained at that level (Freytag 2003, 11). State subsidies were eliminated 
(Feldmann and Sally 2001, 7). Large-scale privatization started in 1992, and most enterprises 
were sold by 1995. Since 1993, it has been constitutionally stipulated that the general central 
government budget must be balanced (Freytag 2003, 9). Import quotas (a main form of trade 
protection until 1993) and significant tariffs were completely abolished in 1993. By 1997 
Estonia had switched to completely unilateral free trade with zero percent tariffs on all 
imports (Feldmann and Sally 2001). Previous restricitions put on foreigners wanting  to buy 
domestic firms and real estate were also lifted. These institutional changes combined to create 
one of the most favorable foreign investment climates in Central and Eastern Europe.  
The basic ingredients for the implementation of the rule of law were set out in the 
early 1990s. The bankruptcy law took effect in 1992 and the system of courts was improved 
to exercise and enforce contractual rights (Laar 1996, 98).  Certainly, the institutional changes 
implemented by Estonia in the 1990s could not immediately introduce institutions as complex 
and sophisticated as those in Western Europe. Nevertheless, the Competition Act of 1998 was 
already in line with EU legislation, except in the area of merger control. The Estonian 
Competition Law became fully compatible with the EU legislation in 2001 (Freytag 2003, 
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13).  Nonetheless, the quite simple economic system in Estonia and a lack of sophisticated 
institutions managed to create sufficient conditions for outstanding economic performance in 
the 1990s.  
Once the economic recovery took off, it was also able to bear the high costs of 
institutional convergence with the laws of the European Union; Estonia joined the EU in 
2004.  Prior to the obligation of complying with the EU’s conditionality, the radical changes 
in the rules of the game were actually effective and sustained despite political fragility. The 
most important reforms were the result of bottom-up policy initiatives – not imposed in a top-
down fashion by international organizations (Feldmann and Sally 2001). There was little 
disagreement about the substantial nature of the reforms among the major political parties 
(Tallo 1995). The party views differed mainly in their assessment of the recent past and 
regarding issues of nationality (Tallo 1995). These converging attitudes and beliefs of 
politicians made it easier to carry out the changes in the formal institutions.    
 
4.4.2 Institutional Changes in the Estonian Telecom Sector 
Having looked at general changes in the institutional framework, it is now fitting to 
give attention to the changes in the rules of the game governing telecommunications and 
information technology. In 1992, the Estonian government signed a concession agreement 
with Telia and Sonera of Sweden and Finland, respectively (now TeliaSonera). Both 
companies acquired half of 49 percent of shares in the incumbent telephone company. A 
monopoly on fixed-line telephone calls was bestowed on the incumbent, Eesti Telekom, until 
the end of 2000 (WTO 1999, 11-12). In 1997 the company, which had by then been 
restructured into Eesti Telekom, offered 24 percent of the government’s 51-percent stake 
through initial public offering (IPO) to domestic and international investors.  The government 
118 
 
remained a holder of a 27-percent stake in the telecom company until 2010 when the Estonian 
government exited from the company.  
An independent regulator of the telecom sector was set up in 1998. Nevertheless, the 
EU still raised concerns in 2002 over potential conflicts of interests stemming from the fact 
that the telecom regulator is under the administrative authority of the Ministry of Economy 
and Communications (Commission of the European Communities 2002, 90). The Ministry of 
Economy and Communications did not represent state interests as a shareholder in Eesti 
Telekom (the incumbent company regulated by the independent telecom regulator) and the 
ownership rights were transferred to the Ministry of Finance in 2000. This created an 
additional layer for avoiding the potential conflict of interests. Nonetheless,  both ministries 
represent the same government in the end. Obviously, the conflict of interest or potential 
conflict of interest was finally resolved with the government exit from the incumbent in 2010. 
However, the regulator of the market – the Competition Authority – still remains as an agency 
of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications and its independence has not 
increased over time.  
The provision of leased lines and alternative infrastructure use was partially liberalized 
before the end of 2000. Estonia had a free market for data transmissions, Internet service 
providers (ISPs) and backbone service providers before the end of the monopoly on voice 
services (ESIS 1999). The key commitment concerning the EU was to lift all limitations on 
market access and national treatment by January 1, 2003, thereby ending the monopoly on  
fixed-line telephony services. However, Estonia adopted its new Telecommunications Act in 
February 2000, which lifted the limits on market access and national treatment in the 
telecommunications market by January 1, 2001 (Commission of the European Communities 
2002, 89-90).  
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Obviously, the development of telecom sector also depends on the general 
development of information and communication techologies sector. This is not just about 
infrastructure but variety of products and services that are necessary for infrastructure as well 
as the use of infrastructure. It can be clearly said that a key institution in development of ICT 
sector in Estonia has been market since the early 1990s and in the telecom sector, the market 
has driven developments since early 2000. The Estonian ICT market and telecom market 
appears to work relatively well with several competitors in all sectors and decreasing prices 
for end customers. There is effective competition in more segments of the industry than in 
almost all other EU member states. As the section on internet diffusion highlighted, high 
quality internet services are widely available for all segments of society. Mobile phone 
penetration is significant with approximately 135%. Mobile payments are widespread in 
Estonia, primarily due to effective co-operation between stakeholders. For instance, mobile 
parking (paying for parking with your mobile phone) was introduced in Estonia already in 
2003 and, by 2012, 85 percent of those parking in capital city of Tallinn used this method. In 
addition, m-payments are a popular method of payment for covering the costs for certain 
types of services, e.g. for playing and paying for lotto, buying electronic bus tickets.  
There have not been any significant competition concerns in ICT and/or telecom 
markets since Estonia joined the EU in 2004. As competition in the ICT market and telecom 
market has been effective, no special measures have been taken to encourage innovation 
through means of competition policy. Interviews reveal that vigorous competition, market 
forces and competitive pressure necessitate companies to stay innovative in order to stay 
competitive (Interviews 16 and 19). Supervision on competition in the market is exercised by 
the Estonian Competition Authority under the Competition Act and the Electronic 
Communications Act. The World Economic Forum has given Estonia a relatively high rank of 
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25 in its network readiness index in 2009, where important component indirectly and directly 
is competition (World Economic Forum 2010).  
 All of this is not to suggest that there are no improvements to be made. If Estonia is 
compared with its wealthier Nordic neighbors (Figure 4.18), where over 90 percent of 
population use internet, then obviously there is still potential progress to be made in 
increasing the use of internet among its population.  
 
Figure 4.18: Internet users in Estonia, Nordic countries, high income OECD members, high 
income countries, high income non-OECD and upper middle income countries on the basis of 
data from United Nations (2014).23 
 
Of course, the Nordic countries are exceptional in comparison with OECD and high 
income OECD countries, which on average have same level of internet use as Estonia. 
Estonia has 2-3 times lower per capita GDP  (depending how it is measured) than the poorest 
                                                 




Nordic country and significantly different instutional development. However, Estonian 
policy-makers often compare the performance of Estonia with its Nordic neighbours, 
particularly with Finland. This comparison is more aspirational rather than analytical but it 
does give a different perspective and aspirational comparisons matter because they feed back 
into policy-makers mind-set and their framing of policy-issues 
Even though Estonia has a higher percentage of internet users than the average of EU 
27 member countries, the question of digital divide is still relevant particularly in the 
aspirational context of Nordic neighbors and the Estonian government rhetoric that access to 
internet is a basic human right. Despite the human right status of internet access, the extensity 
and intensity of internet use differs among different social groups and regions.  The 
competition in offering broadband services in bigger cities is tough and the communications 
operators have replaced the connections using the out-dated technologies with the fibreoptic 
networks. The basic networks of almost all the major communications operators in cities are 
based on the fibre-optic connections. The fibre-optic networks in cities are expanded 
gradually and in the coming years all the residential houses and office buildings will be 
equipped with next-generation broadband. Although the investments made by the 
communications operators in next-generation broadband are significant, the high 
concentration of customers makes it profitable (Interviews 16 and 19). 
There is virtually no competition in rural areas because the market is small and 
unconcentrated. Due to this, broadband is much less available and its quality remarkably 
lower than in cities and at the same time the fees are much higher. The construction of next-
generation broadband networks in rural areas is, for the communications operators, 
economically not profitable and therefore the investments for business purposes in these areas 
are not very likely to be made. Hence, Estonia has reached a phase where internet connections 
in rural areas are less available and their quality much lower than in cities but in spite of that 
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the communications operators develop next-generation broadband only in bigger cities. The 
Internet services is offered in rural areas, however, only through the out-dated technologies, 
and due to the lack of investments, these connections will become useless in some years time 
as they do not enable the new information society services to be used. If this trend continues, 
the digital divide between cities and rural areas will widen even further and ever more people 
and businesses will be living and operating in cities with proper ICT infrastructure (Interviews 
16 and 19). 
The government and telecom companies aim to tackle the gap between rural and urban 
areas with the broadband project EstWin, which aims at ensuring internet connection with 
speed up to 100Mbps for all by 2015, also contributes to the improvement of information 
technology diffusion throughout the country (Interviews 16 and 19). EstWin was launched by 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications and some member companies of 
Estonian Information Technology and Communications association (EMT, Elion, Elisa, 
Ericsson, Eltel, Levira, Tele 2, Televõrgu AS), which set up the Estonian Broadband 
Development Foundation for this purpose in 2009.  The EU Commission approved state aid 
status for the project in 2010. EstWin aims to build a network of fibre optical cables in 
Estonia by 2015 where 98 % of households, organizations and companies have to be within 
1.5 km radius of the backbone network connection (Interviews 16 and 19). National 
Government is involved in investing in backbone network while providing connection for so-
called last mile is the responsibility of telecom operators. Estwin will build a network with a 
length of 6000 km and with 1400 network connection points. The government finished 1200 
km of the backbone network by the end of 2011. The cost of the project is 100 million euros – 
most of which is financed through EU structural funds.  However, according to the industry 
estimates, Estonia needs to invest at about 300 million euros to cover the country fully with 
broadband connections (Estonian Association of Information Technology and 
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Communications 2009). Nevertheless, this is more recent initiative which has further 
encouraged internet diffusion with inflow of the EU funds. Most importantly, Estonian 
internet users and household access to broadband was already greater than most other 
countries in the CEE in 2004 when they joined the EU. Hence, institutional changes in the 
1990s and early 2000s were crucial for the take-off of internet diffusion. 
The key benefit of institutional changes in the Estonian telecom sector was relatively 
low internet access costs in the early years of internet diffusion and this trend has continued. 
In order to understand the importance of institutional changes in this sector,  a brief 
comparison with Latvia, Slovenia and Slovakia can be made. Latvia is especially relevant for  
Estonia as the general institutional changes in Latvia were not so different from Estonia but 
the variance in institutional changes governing telecom sector was significant. It is obvious 
that rent-seeking by the incumbent undermined the effectiveness of generally liberal formal 
rules in Latvia. Latvia had the highest internet access costs in Europe in 2001. Slovakia’s 
costs were high at peak times in comparison with Estonia and Slovenia. Estonia’s dial-up 
internet costs were lower in absolute terms than in Slovenia but higher when adjusted for 
purchasing power parity because as I have pointed out Estonia was then and still is 
significantly poorer country than Slovenia.  
Table 4.3 Dial-up internet access cost per hour in 2001 (approximation in euros)  
 Estonia Latvia Slovakia Slovenia 
Peak  1,3 4,2 1.8 1,5 
Peak at PPS24 2,9 8,8 5,0 2,1 
Off peak at PPS 2,2 3,5 1,9 1,9 
 
Source: Author on the basis of data from EU (2002).  
                                                 
24 PPS refers to Purchasing Power Standard. According to eEurope+2003 Report (2002), “Purchasing Power 
Parities are obtained as a weighted average of relative price ratios regarding a homogeneous basket of goods and 




Liberalization of their telecom sectors in Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia was a result of 
EU pressure rather than domestic interests. Even though Latvia and Slovakia both established 
a market liberal formal rule-set governing their economies, the timing of the institutional 
changes and interactions between informal and formal institutions channeled the actions of 
agents in different directions than in Estonia. The Latvian government signed a concession 
agreement with the incumbent telecom company in 1994, which made changes in the rules 
extremely difficult before the agreement expired in 2013. Also, in Latvia the monopoly over 
services was more excessive than in Estonia. In addition to fixed lines, leased lines and 
alternative infrastructure were also under the monopoly provisions in Latvia. Once Latvia 
liberalized the telecom sector in the beginning of 2003, per capita Internet diffusion increased 
significantly.  In Slovakia the monopoly power of the incumbent was strengthened by 
informal rules that encouraged corruption as well as protection of domestic industries in the 
early years of internet diffusion. The informal rules of the game kept potential challenges to 
the incumbent’s monopoly power at bay - even though the formal institutions governing the 
economy were fairly liberal. In other words, prohibitive costs resulting from excessive 
monopoly did not create incentives for the creation of innovative services that would have 
attracted users. As there were not many users, the potential positive network externalities and 
increasing returns were limited. The users preferred substitutes to the internet. Consequently, 
strong interest groups backing the liberalization did not emerge (Kitsing 2008; E-User 2005; 
Interviews 16 and 19).  
 The comparison of internet access prices is easier in the early years of internet 
diffusion. However, it is much more difficult once extensity and intensity of internet use has 
spread all across the society because of high variety of bundled and unbundled services that 
different companies in different markets offer. The OECD working group on broadband 
metrics spent years in discussing how to compare the broadband access prices and what data 
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to use. The difference in data and data collection method make this extremely difficult task 
and the results may be very different from reality. Most importantly, the comparison of 
nominal prices and/or adjusted for purchasing power parity is based on the assumption that 
users of internet have constant objectively measured preferences. But they do not. The users 
assign different relatively values to the internet use in different context. In some countries 
and/or some settings users are willing to pay more for a similar service than in other settings 
and other countries. Thus the preferences of the users and constantly changing and value of 
internet use depends on the context. Hence, what really matters is not the actual absolute cost 
of internet access but perceived relative cost of internet access, which is heavily context-
dependent. Instead of trying to measure actual costs in different countries and offer some 
comparison, it is more fruitful to rely on survey data which indicates how important the costs 
are for the users. In order to understand the internet diffusion, it is crucial not only to focus on 
users but also non-users.  
Figure 4.19 compares different households with internet connectivity in Estonia and 
different households without broadband connecivity because the internet access costs are too 
high.  In 2005, 36 percent of household without internet connectivity at home reported that 
they cannot access internet because access costs are too high. In 2013, the percentage of such 
households had fallen to 11. Among the households with dependent children only 4 percent 
reported in 2011 that access costs are too high and that’s why they are without internet 
connectivity at home. In 2005 32 percent of such households thought so. Among the 





Figure 4.19: Different households with broadband connectivity and without broadband 
connectivity because high access costs in Estonia in 2004-2013 on the basis of data from 
Eurostat (2014).25  
 
As I have pointed out, the internet is network good and access costs are only one 
aspect of decision to get internet connectivity at home. The equipment costs have to be 
factored in as well. The similar trends persists also among households without internet 
connectivity because equipment costs are too high. The following figure 4.20 indicates that  
In 2005, 39 percent of households without internet connectivity said that equipment costs are 
too high. By 2013, the percentage had been reduced to 14. Among households with children 
                                                 




the percentage was 33 in 2005 and 3 in 2012 while among households without children the 
respective percentages were 41 in 2005 and 21 in 2012.  
 
Figure 4.20: Different households with internet connectivity and households without internet 
connectivity because equipment costs are too high on the basis of data from Eurostat (2014).26 
 
 
Households with children show faster adoption rates of internet and for them both 
access and equipment costs are less of the concern than for households without children. 
Obviously, households without children tend to be older and hence the age may be objective 
reason for not having internet access at home. However, previously I  showed that even older 
people and people with low formal education in Estonia are eager to use internet in regular 
                                                 
26 Detailed data is available in Appendix D.  
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basis in Estonia – particularly in comparison with Slovenia. Most importantly, Figures 4.19 
and 4.20 present indicators, which points out the subjectivity of preferences among 
households concerning internet access. Households with children value internet access more 
and they are willing to pay for it even when households without children consider internet 
access  at home too expensive because of access and equipment costs. Increasingly, most 
households in Estonia do not see the access and equipment costs an issue. This trend 
continued throughout economic recession which led to cumulative drop 20 percent to GDP in 
2008-2009 and there has not been significant growth in real wages.  
 
4.4.3 Overview of Institutional Changes in Slovenia 
 
As the section on Estonia emphasized that the liberalization and regulation of the telecom 
sector, then this section discusses the role of these factors in Slovenia. It starts by outlining 
the general institutional changes in Slovenia, which is followed by the discussion on telecom 
sector and developments in the Slovenian ICT sector.  
In the 1990s Slovenia experienced the smoothest political, social and economic 
transitions seen in Central and Eastern Europe. The country took a step-by-step approach to 
economic restructuring by starting with stabilization instead of facing stabilization, 
liberalization, complete re-orientation of international trade and other reforms all at the same 
time. This approach was made possible in Slovenia thanks to an important difference between 
Yugoslavia and other socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe; the difference was  
found in its industrial and economic policy (Gray 1999, 104). The Yugoslav system 
emphasized the importance of “self-management” of industries; the state did not own 
manufacturing industries, nor did it dictate what factories produced. Workers played a 
considerable role in the decision-making process of each company. Even if Yugoslavia 
remained a one-party state, its economic system was decentralized. All of this was especially 
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beneficial for Slovenia, where factories exported products to Western Europe and were often 
in direct contact with their customers in the West (Gray 1999, 104). Technology transfer was 
facilitated in socialist Slovenia by rules governing trade relations (Gray 1999, 104, 106).  
In the 1990s, trade barriers were liberalized incrementally, but further reductions were 
required for entering the EU. Slovenia’s simple average applied MFN tariff rate was almost 
11 percent in 2001 (WTO 2002). Some significant trade restrictions were in place. Slovenia 
imposed taxes on exports, but had them removed by the late 1990s. In addition to the strict 
trade policy measures, the government used financial means, such as subsidies and capital 
controls in the 1990s, in order to offset the negative impact of import competition in the 
sectors that suffered most in the process of reforming trade policy (WTO 2002). 
In general terms, Slovenia pursued relatively protectionist and targeted policies 
regarding FDI, which is also visible from the data on protection of incumbents provided in the 
OECD figures in the beginning of section 4.4 of this paper.  Instead of opening entry for all 
investors on an equal basis, the government discriminated against foreign investors in the 
privatization process and attempted to meddle with direct financial incentives instead of 
following rules of fair play (WTO 2002, ix, x, 13, and 26). Protectionism in the 1990s was 
expressed in a discriminatory privatization process that preferred domestic investors to 
foreigners, pervasive capital account restrictions, and a hesitant process of liberalization in the 
service sector (WTO 2002, ix, x, 13, and 26). Moderate protectionism has not disappeared 
from the Slovenian economy as this has been brought out by research by various international 
organizations (OECD 2014; European Commission 2015).  
 
4.4.4. Institutional Changes in the Slovenian Telecom Sector 
In the 1990s protectionist rules against foreign investment were used to minimize the 
negative distributional effects of economic change, and influenced the restructuring of the 
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telecom sector (OECD 2002, 11). The share of inward FDI in the category of postal and 
telecom services increased from 0 percent in 1994 to 0.4 percent in 2000. (OECD 2002, 11). 
Seventy-four percent of shares of the incumbent telecom company, Telekom Slovenije, are 
owned by the state; 13 percent of shares are owned by workers, the rest are state-owned, 
domestic investment funds. In addition, two employee representatives are also members of the 
board, as is typical of Slovenian companies. Ironically, the privatization of the incumbent 
telecom was agenda already in 2003, when I carried out first set of interviews in Slovenia. 
Interviews with supervisory board members and regulators in 2012 confirmed that it was still 
in the agenda but privatization plans are primarily driven by the EU pressure and resisted by 
the local politicians. By the beginning of 2014, Slovenia set concrete plans to privatize the 
telecom company because of constant EU pressure and economic difficulties which led 
government to look for additional sources of revenue.  However, the European Commission 
still expressed its concern over the slow path of privatization in Spring 2015 (European 
Commission 2015).  
As far as the sector regulation is concerned, then the Act of Telecommunications was 
adopted in May 1997, and it provided legal framework for establishing key principles of EU 
legislation. However, Slovenia was extremely slow in implementing the legislation. More 
specifically, insufficient resources in providing regulatory functions were apparent. The state 
preferred to spend money on infrastructure development rather than providing fair rules in the 
market. In the 1990s Slovenia had formally liberalized the market in data transmissions, but in 
reality, the market was still held by a monopoly (WTO 1995, 16, ESIS 1999).  ISP services 
were partially liberalized but licenses were required, thereby increasing the cost of entry. 
Leased lines and alternative infrastructure use were partially liberalized (ESIS 1999).  The 
Competition Protection Office (CPO) initiated two investigations into Telekom Slovenije’s 
alleged abuses of dominant market position, which concerned non-transparent pricing 
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practices of leased lines in 1999 (Commission of the European Communities 2001). Most 
importantly, the opening of the telecom market in the fixed line telephony services has been 
constantly postponed both formally and informally. The market opening has been subject to 
constant pressure by the EU, which demanded the candidate countries to open their telecom 
markets by the end of 2002.  The government had planned to open the market by the end of 
2000. Slovenia formally ended the monopoly in fixed lines over voice telephony by the 
Telecommunications Act, which was not adopted until April 2001. The act legislated a 
transition period in the market opening in areas of leased lines, the local loop, number 
portability, and cost-based accounting mechanism for operators with significant market power 
until 2002 (Commission of the European Communities 2001, 67-69). Hence, the market was 
not opened until mid-2002, and the new competitive environment did not ensue informally 
even in 2002.  
By the end of 2000 Slovenia had not established a separate regulatory authority in the 
telecom sector. Tariff rebalancing, liberalization of voice telephony and alternative networks 
for the provision of telecom services did not reflect the EU Telecom Acquis requirements. 
The regulator, the Telecommications and Broadcasting Authority, was set up in 2001. Several 
provisions of the 2001 Telecommunications Act concerning the work of the regulator did not 
allow this agency to function with full independence. The role of the executive in nominating 
the director and approving statutes and the involvement of operators in the 
Telecommunication Council, which oversees the work of the regulator, can lead to substantial 
conflicts of interests. This observation  was supported by the  European Commission’s 
assessment in 2003, which stated that Slovenia still had to strengthen the regulator in order to 
make the agency truly independent (Commission of the European Communities 2003, 35-36). 
Furthermore, the Slovenia’s ineffective implementation of anti-trust aspects of its competition 
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law in meeting the EU standards was highlighted by the report of European Commission on 
the progress of EU applicant countries in November 2003  .  
The need to solve the issues with the governance of the telecom sector was a part of 
the rationale that led to the creation of the Ministry of Information Society in 2001 was 
emphasized by the minister in the interview in 2003. The decision to create a special ministry 
grew out of the recognition that a more concentrated effort was needed to coordinate the 
government’s ICT priorities. The existing relationships between the Ministry of 
Communication and the incumbent telecom company did not encourage reform of the telecom 
sector. However, as the former minister and now computer science professor explained in 
2012, the ministry did not have sufficient power to tackle the vested interests involved in the 
telecom sector. The Ministry of Information Society lasted only for three years as it was shut 
down in November 2004, and its functions were distributed among other ministries (E-User 
2005; Interviews 10-11). In the early 2000s, the development of ICT was one of key priorities 
of Slovenian government and Slovenia was seen as a model for other countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. This was the main purpose why I was in initially interested in Slovenia and 
conducted first set of interviews in 2003. However, the impression from interviews conducted 
in 2012 is that ICT development has not been a priority in the second half of 2000. ICT 
experts were clearly unsatisfied with government’s lack of interest (Interviews 10-11). Even 
though Slovenian telecom regulations and regulator meets the criteria of EU laws and 
regulations, then the state ownership of incumbent has distortive impact on the telecom 
market and discourage innovation (European Commission 2015; Interviews 10-11).  
Overall, this story demonstrates that Slovenia has been very reluctant reformer of the 
telecom sector and there has been consistent refusal to accept more liberal rule-set imposed by 
the EU. The anger at EU pressure was also a main theme at one of the interviews with a 
former high level government official responsible for the EU integration when I first 
133 
 
interviewed him in 2003 official and now the supervisory board member of incumbent 
telecom company. This has not been only the case in the telecom but also in the banking 
sector where the key player is owned by the government. As will be discussed in Chapter Five 
this is an important factor in discouraging entrepreneurial discovery in exploiting the benefits 
of internet in banking.   
Nevertheless, the internet diffusion in Slovenia has been significantly greater than in 
other former member countries of Yugoslavia. Certainly, such comparison is not very telling 
because most ex-Yugoslav countries were in war with each other throught the 1990s when 
Slovenia developed and prospered. Furthermore, Slovenia’s own aspirational reference point 
is not the former Yugoslavia but countries in the north and west such as Austria, Switzerland 
and Germany. 
  
Figure 4.21: Internet users per 100 people in Slovenia and selected European countries, 
OECD, high-income OECD, high-income nonOECD, high income countries and upper-
middle income countries in 1990-2012 on the basis of data from United Nations (2014).27 
                                                 




The data in Figure 4.21 shows that percentage of internet users in Slovenia has caught 
up with the OECD average over the years. Slovenia has higher percentage of users than Italy 
and Croatia and upper-middle income countries. However, high-income countries tend to 
have about 10 percent more users as do Austria, Germany and Switzerland. The one way how 
the nature of telecom sector affects people is through internet access costs. In 2005, 19 
percent of Slovenian households reported that they cannot have interent access because access 
costs are too high (Figure 4.22). In 2013, 12 percent of Slovenian households told so in the 
survey. For households with children access costs were not an important issue while for the 
households without children it was more significant.  
 
Figure 4.22: Slovenian households with internet access and without internet access because 
access costs are too high on the basis of data from Eurostat (2014) .28 
 
                                                 




The households without internet connectivity because of high equipment costs show a 
similar pattern in Slovenia. In 2005, 21 percent of households without access gave the 
equipment cost as a reason. By 2013, it had fallen to 13 percent. Among the households with 
children the equipment costs have been smaller issue while among households without 
children it is somewhat bigger concern than on average (Figure 4.23).  
 
Figure 4.23: Slovenian households with internet access and without internet access because 
equipment costs are too high on the basis of data from Eurostat (2014).29 
 
 
Overall, the decrease in people who say that access or equipment costs are too high is 
quite small considering that both costs have been falling. However, the percentage of people 
                                                 
29 More detailed data is appendix D. 
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was small to begin with. Hence, it cannot be concluded that the perception among the people 
concerning internet costs is significant reason for not getting online. There is dynamic 
variance with Estonia where decreases among households have been more significant in 
Estonia. There is not nominal variance but there is real variance considering the both Estonian 
average income and that of poorest households significantly lower than in Slovenia.  
  
Figure 4.24: Slovenian households with internet access and without internet access because 
access is not needed on the basis of data from Eurostat (2014).30 
 
More significant factor in Slovenia is the fact that 20 percent of households without 
internet connectivity told in 2013 that they don’t need the access because content may not be 
useful or other reasons (Figure 4.24). This percentage stood at 30 percent in 2005 but it is still 
significant. It is even more important reason given by households without children while 
                                                 
30 More detailed data is in Appendix D. 
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households with children do not consider it important. This would suggest that many 
households have internet access because of children’s needs. 
 
4.4.5 Conclusion on Institutional Changes in Estonia and Slovenia 
The formal institutions governing Slovenia’s telecom sector are more restrictive than 
in Estonia despite of the fact that both countries have adopted same EU legislation. Yet the 
difference with Estonia in term of Internet access costs is very small - Slovenia, like Estonia, 
had relatively low Internet access costs in the early years. The largest difference between 
conditions in Estonia and Slovenia regards broader formal institutions and its approach to 
liberalization of telecom market. The overall institutional rule-set suggests that Slovenia is 
closest to the model of social democratic corporatism (see Olson 1982 and Garrett 1998 for 
discussion of social democratic corporatism). This observation suggests that the negative 
externalities of the incumbent telecom company’s monopoly as well as costs of protectionist 
rules governing telecom sector are widely socialized. Slovenia is run like a partnership with 
highly-centralized bargaining between interests groups. Indeed, the ownership structure and 
control of the telecom company indicate a high degree of socialization. At the same time, 
Estonia relied more on liberalization of telecom markets which implied greater competition 
and lower barriers for entry. As was discussed through sections 2.4 and 2.5 supply-side 
constraints are important factor in internet diffusion and lower supply side constraints have 
facilitated process of entrepreneurial discovery and utilization of decentralized knowledge of 
entrepreneurs.  
As the telecom sector regulation and related institutional changes looked primarily on 
supply side factors, then the comparison of Estonia and Slovenia must also consider demand. 
Obviously demand is affected by income but as Slovenia is considerably wealthier and 
egalitarian than Estonia, then this factor cannot claim much importance. As the literature 
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review has emphasized the role of knowledge as one factor affecting the diffusion of 
innovations such as internet, then the next part of this chapter looks at the skills of internet 
users in Estonia and Slovenia. It starts by discussing Estonia, which is followed by 
elaboration on ICT skills in Slovenia.  
 
4.5 ICT Skills in Estonia and Slovenia 
As some perspectives in the literature review emphasized the importance of human 
capital, particularly skills, then this part will highlight human capital in Estonia and Slovenia. 
As both countries are highly developed and with literacy rates, then it focuses specifically on 
ICT skills. 
 
4.5.1 ICT Skills in Estonia 
In general, the Estonian government purused relatively noninterventionist and not 
sector specific policies in 1990s but development of ICT skills did receive specific attention 
from policy-makers.  Estonia’s public sector did support the launch of the Tiigrihüppe 
(Tiger’s Leap) program in 1997, which provided information technology to many schools 
(Tiigrihüppe Sihtasutus 1999). The idea was generated and actively supported by Toomas 
Hendrik Ilves, the Estonian ambassador to the United States and Foreign Minister in the 
1990s and Estonian President in 2006-2016. As many interviews pointed out, the most 
important element of promotion of ICT skills has not been funds but the emphasis of many 
politicians and experts on the importance of ICT. This has received a considerable attention in 
the public. In this sense, such government programs have served more as a propaganda tool 
and rhetoric. This is pointed out not to undermine the importance but to emphasize the 
importance of rhetoric as it has been crucial in changing public perception. Here again is 
important to recall the discussion of variety of perspectives in section 2.3 and 2.4 of Chapter 
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Two that nature of internet is epistemological and its use in specific context depends also on 
skills of users.  
 Most importantly, the private sector came along with such initiatives by providing 
both technology and emphasizing the importance of skills. Compared to earlier years of 
internet diffusion, when the main emphasis was on ensuring internet connections and take-up 
in general, projects and programmes aimed at increasing technology diffusion became 
gradually more targeted. Even self-interested behavior by banks in encouraging the use of 
internet banking is educational as customer service people had to guide and advice very 
different population segments how to use sophisticated online services.  But private sector 
went further. In 2001, the largest banks, IT and telecom companies  launched the Vaata 
Maailma SA (Look @ World Foundation).  The foundation has trained 10 percent of Estonian 
adult population in computer skills. They have set up 442 public access internet points. They 
launched an e-school portal, which is used by most schools in Estonia for submitting grades  
and feedback for students.  Their project “Ole kaasas!” (Come Along! in English) operated 
from 2009 to 2011 by helping 100 000 people to familiarize with the use of internet based 
services and  was primarily aimed at people living in rural areas, people with lower education 
and wage levels, and older generation(Interviews 19-20, 28 and 32).. In addition, in the 
framework of “Ole kaasas”  a  new initiative was organized entitled “Uus algus” (New 
Beginning in English) in order to fix up old computers with the help of volunteers and donate 
them to those in need. All of this has run in parallel with programs of public sector. For 
instance, the aim of the programme “Raising Public Awareness about the Information 
Society”  is to increase the skills and knowledge of the general public as well as to enhance 
the competence in the field of IT and information society of public servants. The program is 
funded by EU structural funds (Interviews 19-20, 28 and 32).  
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 As Figure 4.25 demonstrates the lack of skills has become gradually a smaller factor 
given by households as a reason by not having internet access at home. In 2005, 26 percent of 
households gave lack of skills as a reason for not having internet access at home. In 2013, 14 
percent of households surveyd said so. Here again, the households with children are less 
likely to give lack of skills as a reason for not having internet access. In 2005, 31 percent of 
households without dependent children said that lack of skills is a reason for not having 
internet at home while in 2013 19 percent of surveyed households did so.  
 
 
Figure 4.25: Households with internet connectivity and households without internet 
connectivity at home because of lack of skills and because of privacy and security concerns 
on the basis of data from Eurostat (2014). 31 
 
 
                                                 




Quite, tellingly privacy and security concerns have never been an issue for Estonian 
households. Throughout the years from 2005 to 2013 only two percent of households have 
reported that this is the reason for not having the internet access at home. Even the 
cyberattacks against Estonia in 2007, which cut the entire country off the global internet 
networks for several weeks,  did not change this view. Nevertheless, Estonians were able to 
use the internet within country. People outside of Estonia could not access Estonian sites. This 
confirms further that people care primarily about the local content, not international content, 
even if the internet is often seen primarily as a global phenomena.  
 
4.5.2 ICT Skills in Slovenia 
Slovenia started to focus on IT-related research and education in the mid-1970s. In the 
early 1980s, secondary schools began installing mainframe computers. In the 1990s, the 
government also launched specific projects to increase Internet diffusion at schools, public 
libraries, and research institutions (E-User 2005). The government has also made interactive 
online services available starting in 2002, but two-way transaction capabilities remain 
constrained (E-User 2005).  The strategies for information society and e-government were 
adopted in 2003.  
Development of local ICT services was facilitated by the existence of the local 
technology industry, particularly companies such as IskraDelta. Siemens established a joint 
venture with Iskratel in 1989. Slovenia’s early ICT orientation in education allowed fairly 
sophisticated technology companies to grow and integrate with Western clusters (Biegelbauer 
et al 2001). Slovenian companies hold relatively high positions in the value chains of Western 
multinationals. Many multinational corporations (Siemens, Cisco, and Microsoft) have 
invested in Slovenia or have partnered with Slovenian companies in the 1990s. In addition, 
the country has a wide range of medium-sized hardware and software companies. However, 
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as the data has shown above the internet is widely diffused in enterprises but has not reached 
all population segments equally despite the egalitarian social democratic corporatist nature of 
the country. There are still signifigants segments in population who do not have internet 
access because of lack of skills. Figure 4. 26 shows that in 2005 21 percent of household 
without internet connectity at home gave lack of skills as a reason. It was reduced to 15 
percent in 2013 but among the households without dependent children the percentage has 
stayed the same over 20 percent throughout the same period.  
 
Figure 4.26: Slovenian households with internet access and without internet access because 
lack of skills and because of privacy and security concerns on the basis of data from Eurostat 
(2014).32 
 
                                                 
32 More detailed data is in Appendix D. 
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Interestingly, Slovenians are increasingly worried about the privacy and security 
concerns as higher percentage of households reports this factor as  a reason for not having 
internet access at home in 2013 than in 2005.  
There is no significant variance in the ICT skills between Estonia and Slovenia. It was 
a bigger issue in Estonia in 2005 but percentage has been reduced to the Slovenian level or 
below depending on the group. There are some differences concerning the privacy and 
security concerns which is increasingly seen a bigger issue among Slovenians than Estonians. 
This is also reflected by the fact that Estonian internet users are more avid participants in 
social networks than Slovenian users. This holds in general and across different demographic 
groups on the basis of Eurostat data.  
 
4.6 Conclusion  
This chapter demonstrated that there is significant variance in the internet diffusion between 
Estonia and Slovenia when measured by both eleven indicators. Estonian internet users have 
been able to use better quality and higher speed internet for longer time period than Slovenian 
users. The more regular use, better supply of internet and demand for more sophisticated 
services have interacted more favorably in the Estonian case and contributed to both better 
intensity and extensity of internet diffusion. Most importantly, poorer, older and people with 
low education levels in Estonia are more regular internet than in Slovenia.  
 The comparative analysis of previous chapter also shows clearly that the national 
wealth cannot explain the variance between internet diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia. 
Estonia has been and is considerable poorer than Slovenia as the data on per capita GDP 
demonstrated. Furthermore, Estonia is considerably less equal than Slovenia as the data on the 
gini coefficient demonstrated. In spite of lower per capita GDP and higher inequality, internet 
has diffused more among Estonian population and among different population segments by 
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income in Estonia than in Slovenia. Estonian households in the first quartile of income 
distribution are more avid users of internet than Slovenian households in the first quartile. 
This is particularly remarkable given that the Estonain households in the first quartile of 
income distribution are in relative and absolute terms poorer than Slovenian households. The 
data also shows, for instance, that poorer Estonian households are more avid users of online 
social networks than Slovenian households in the same income distribution quartile (Eurostat 
2014). Thus, the propositions based on wealth and/or distribution of wealth as an explanation 
for the internet diffusion can be rejected as a crucial factor in the variance between internet 
diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia.  
Therefore, the attention must be turned to institutions and particularly institutional 
changes have created preconditions for internet diffusion. Before outlining the key critical 
junctures in the institutional environment of Estonia and Slovenia the basic theoretical 
premises from synthesis of literature must be recalled: institutions matter because the 
institutional framework conditions the incentive structure of agents (North 1990; Denzau and 
North 1994, 15). Certainly, institutions as the rules of game do not do anything, but agents do 
within institutional context. However, agents are influenced by the transaction costs. As 
transaction costs for any undertaking depend on the institutions themselves, then agents’ 
calculations of costs and benefits of any action is dependent on the institutional context 
(North 1990; Coase 1937). In this sense, agents are not perfectly rational, but their rationality 
is constrained by institutions. This “bounded rationality” (Simon 1955) or “adaptive 
rationality” (Mueller 1986) of agents is fundamental for understanding the role they play in 
the spread of internet diffusion.  As there are many substitutes for the Internet and the 
adoption of internet depends also on many complements to this technology, then the limited 
individual rationality of agents may or may not lead them to adoption of the Internet and/or 
undertakings that encourage internet diffusion. The actions of semi-rationally individual 
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agents may lead to socially suboptimal or optimal outcomes depending on the institutions that 
govern the supply conditions of the internet. Most importantly, the outcomes in terms of 
internet diffusion should be understood as not intended but unintended consequence of actions 
by rational agents. As was emphasized by Pierson in the literature review the social reality is 
full outcomes which are result of human action but not deliberate design. In other words, it is 
not possible explain the internet diffusion rates by insisting that forward-looking rational 
agents acted purposefully set to achieve the rate on this particular level. Rather, rational 
agents acting on the basis of their self-interests and short-term time horizons unintentionally 
contributed to the particular outcome. In many ways the diffusion process may be accidental 
where path-dependence on particular decisions made in the past matters more than rational 
calculation of costs and benefits of any planned action. This also implies that institutions and 
their design, accidental or not, cannot determine a particular outcome in the internet diffusion. 
The link between technology diffusion and internet is not deterministic and linear. Rather, 
institutions condition agents to see spectrum of alternatives but the process of deciding, which 
alternatives to pursue and to which final outcomes these alternatives can lead is 
overdetermined. There are too many variables to establish causality between institutions and 
technology diffusion however well it is modeled or not. Path-dependence works in curious 
ways. Estonia’s decision to liberalize the telecom sector in the late 1990s created necessary 
but not sufficient conditions for entrance of new players in the telecom sector (which will be 
studied further in Chapter Five). However, Slovenia’s inability to increase competition is a 
result of lock-in by vested interests which in turn increased the power of incumbents at the 
expense of potential competitors.  As section 2.6 pointed out path-dependence does not imply 
inevitability. There are real alternatives available when choices are made. For instance, 
Slovenia could have increased competition earlier.  However, previous choices will affect 
outcomes and sequence of events (Pierson 2004, 20).  Path-dependence does not rely on 
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causal independence through time but it allows narrowing down the set of choices and show 
how decisions are linked through time (Pierson 2004, 52).  
When one would have compared Estonia and Slovenia in the early 2000s, then it was 
obvious that both countries had similar levels of internet users per 100 inhabitants and the 
lowest Internet access costs in Europe (EU 2002). But to say both countries got the prices 
right for internet connectivity is not an explanation, rather a restatement of the puzzle. 
Particularly, as this dissertation has argued the prices reflect subjective individual preferences 
vis-à-vis relative prices of other goods. As the chapter demonstrated by the static indicators a 
smaller percentage of Estonian households see the costs of internet access and equipment as a 
barrier for not connecting to internet than in Slovenia 2013. At the same time, the Estonian 
households are poorer and income is more unevenly distributed than in Slovenia. 
Furthermore, the dynamic indicator shows that the change in the perception of Estonian 
households concerning the costs has been significantly greater as the costs were seen as 
significant barrier by higher percentage of households in Estonia than in Slovenia in 2005.  
The institutional changes in telecom sector have benefited supply and demand for 
internet by affecting prices and relative meaning of the prices. Estonia made simple and 
straightforward institutional changes to open the telecom sector for competition in the 1990s 
and early 2000s. Estonia opened an alternative infrastructure and leased lines to competition 
when in Slovenia and in other CEE countries, they were protected by the national 
government. This move suggests that many private sector agents were able to undermine the 
power of monopoly over the provision of internet services. This diversity in the early years is 
captured by Kitsing (2008) and Kitsing and Howard (2009) on internet hosts which can be 
seen as indicator of supply conditions. Estonia had in the time period of 2001-2004 more 
internet hosts than any other CEE country and 2-3 times more than Slovenia depending on the 
concrete year.  As was discussed in the synthesis of literature in Chapter Two, scholars such 
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as Mokyr (1990) suggested supply conditions are crucial than demand for understanding the 
technology diffusion.    
Estonia also abolished the monopoly on fixed-line telephone services two years before 
the same was done in Slovenia. The timing of these changes of formal institutions (two years 
before the deadline stipulated by the EU telecom acquis and the WTO Basic Telecom 
Agreement) and the effectiveness of their implementation suggest powerful domestic interests 
backed the reform: the liberalization was not imposed in the top-down fashion by some 
outside agent such as the EU, as was the case with Slovenia which struggles with the EU 
telecom regulation.  The bottom-up liberalization of the rules governing the telecom sector is 
consistent with the zeitgeist shown in Estonia’s rule-making in the economic sphere (see 
Feldmann and Sally 2001).  
Often scholars studying the EU regulations proceed as the EU is a federal state akin to 
that of the United States. Similarly, as interviews showed lobbyists seem to think that 
regulatory decisions are simply made in Brussels and there is no need to look beyond it 
(Interviews). Hence, telecom regulations and particularly effective regulations on the ground 
are simply imposed on Estonia and Slovenia. Thinking that that rules are written in Brussels 
and simply followed in national capitals represents a line of thinking reflects a profound 
failure to grasp the nature of EU. Obviously, the EU is much more than simply a regional 
international organization but it is not a Westphalian state either. Even though, the EU has 
been given a vast authority over the economic regulation it is far from becoming in any way 
similar to the US federal government. First, the EU directives however detailed and uniform 
may they seem in print have to be implement by national authorities. Second, there is on-
going resistance to increase regulatory powers of the EU over that of national authorities.  
As Oxford scholar Jan Zielonka has pointed out there are competing sources of 
authority in the EU with overlapping jurisdiction resulting in “maze Europe” (Zielonka 2006). 
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This implies that EU is not something in between an international organization and 
Westphalian state, which develops in the direction of the latter. Rather, it is something 
completely different which the state-centric approaches are not capable of grasping. 
According to Zielonka EU’s model is closest to that of Neomedieval Empire – not to that of 
Westphalian state (Zielonka 2006).  Most importantly, telecommunication regulations as 
expressed in the EU Telecom Acquis seem at first sight highly uniform and detailed. 
However, as the research has demonstrated these uniform rules are often implemented 
differently in different the EU member states (Tenbuecken 2006). For instance, the 
independence of telecom regulator has considerable variance across the EU countries despite 
the perceived uniformity of telecom regulations on this issue.  
Hence, the decisions made in Estonia and Slovenia matter to great extent before the 
countries joined the EU in 2004 and after that. Interviews and data from the EU and OECD 
suggests that the regulatory capture by narrow vested interests is greater in Slovenia than by 
Estonia which has had consequences for the delivery of high quality and high speed internet. 
Nevertheless, the collective action literature highlights the difficulties in promoting general 
diffused interests against small groups with concentrated interests (Olson 1965, 22-52). This 
framework applies neatly to the technological change where benefits are diffuse but costs are 
concentrated (Mokyr 1990, 256). Obviously, the incumbent telecom company is more 
effective in lobbying – whether it is privatized or publicly owned – than consumers are. 
However, in the case of transition economies the timing of reforms matters and explains also 
why Estonian government was able to promote diffused general interests without ending up in 
the excessive regulatory capture. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to what Joseph 
Schumpeter called “[a] creative destruction” (Schumpeter 1975, 81-86). It was a period of 
“extraordinary politics,” in the words of former Polish finance minister and current governor 
of the Central Bank of Poland, Leszek Balcerowics, as he described the utilization of the 
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window of opportunity by radical reformers who enjoyed strong public support (Balcerowics 
1995, 4, 145-165). Most importantly, vested interests were not present or simply ignored in 
the decision-making process of government in this time-period of radical reforms. As the time 
passed by and costs of reforms accumulated, political rationality changed. The vested interests 
gained considerable influence.  
In the demand side analysis, yhe comparison of ICT skills does not show that there are 
considerable differences between Estonia and Slovenia. At the same time, intsitutional 
differences were greater. Slovenia has tried to encourage telecom sector development through 
top-down state directed policies and protected incumbent companies. Estonia has been 
liberalizer of telecom market and facilitated the process of entrepreneurial discovery.  
The nature of social democratic corporatism in Slovenia would suggest in theory that 
broad set of interests are taken abroad in decision-making by government but as it has been 
discussed above the interests of incumbent telecom company prevailed. Hence, it is not 
surprising that despite a strong promotion of IT for decades and toying with strategies for 
promoting information technology, the provision of government services in Slovenia has not 
gone as smoothly as in Estonia. This implies that all the costs of negative externalities have 
not really been socialized in Slovenia. Internet diffusion in Slovenia is driven by the IT 
industry and other companies that are well integrated in the value-chains of Western clusters. 
The data on broadband take-up by enterprises demonstrates that Slovenia was quicker to 
adopt broadband than Estonia. However, the provision of government and domestic private 
sector services to ordinary citizens lags behind those offered in Estonia. However, Slovenia’s 
long-term emphasis on IT education and its strong IT sector suggest that informal institutions 
have at least to some degree compensated any shortcomings concerning government rule-









The main purpose of this dissertation is to explain how internet diffuses in different 
contexts. The research strategy emphasizes the importance of “thick description” in achieving 
this goal. This approach allows capturing interactions of informal and formal institutions as 
well as agency in a more detailed manner. Chapter 4 discussed key differences between 
Estonia and Slovenia higlighting that internet diffusion is greater in Estonia than Slovenia. 
This is so when both static and dynamic aspects of diffusion are taken into account. It also 
emerged that formal rules of the game encouraged greater openness and competition in 
Estonia. Now it is time to move to the next step in research strategy and provide case studies 
within Estonia which allow demonstrating how the process of entrepreneurial discovery and 
institutional framework has played a role in contributing to the emergence of internet ventures 
and services which have created reasons for the regular use of internet in Estonia.  
The approach in this chapter can be described as relying on positive cases. Essentially, 
it focuses primarily on key entrepreneurial venture (both public and private), online 
identification methods, internet banking and internet voting which all can be described as 
“success”. Nevertheless, their success is mutually dependent and capture well the importance 
of network effects affecting internet diffusion which was described in the section 2.6 of 
Chapter Two. First, the availability of internet banking has made the use of internet in Estonia 
more valuable. Second, internet banking introduced online identification methods, which were 
exploited by government and created a culture which made it easier to introduce online 
identification methods by government and internet voting. Third, internet voting is not 
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necessary for the emergence of internet banking and online identification methods but in the 
Estonian context it is hard to see how internet voting could have emerged without internet 
banking and online identification methods.   
Ultimately this chapter offers a narrative how emergence of online identification 
methods in Estonia, not just ID card, contributed to the path-dependent process where both 
private sector and government organizations started to supply more services online and 
availability of these services encouraged the use and diffusion of internet.  I will start by 
discussing internet banking and related online identification methods, which is followed by a 
narrative on the Estonian ID card and I conclude by offering a detailed overview of internet 
voting. The latter is the most unique development underlining the emergence of online 
identification culture in Estonia.  
 
5.2 Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Emergence of Digital Economy 
Throughout the interviews I conducted in Slovenia in June 2012 I asked local experts 
how they saw the differences in developments in the diffusion of internet and related 
technologies in Estonia and Slovenia. Since I had also conducted interviews in Slovenia in 
January 2003,  it allowed me an opportunity for a comparison over time. In addition, some of 
the experts I interviewed were the same in 2012 and 2003.   The main difference that was 
emphasized between Estonia and Slovenia is the existence of sophisticated online 
identification method in the form of an identification card (ID card) in Estonia and lack of 
such an ID card in Slovenia. A former Slovenian government minister and current computer 
science professor at a major university pointed out explicitly that the introduction of the ID 
card has made the use of internet in Estonia qualitatively different from Slovenia. Privacy 
concerns and bureaucratic inertia had made launch of similar system in Slovenia of combining 
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physical identity card with digital and online identification method impossible (Interviews 
11).    
Obviously, the ID card is not just unique innovation when Estonia is compared to Slovenia, it 
is unique innovation when Estonia is compared to the most countries in the world. However, 
there are countries such as Belgium, which has fairly similar ID card (Martens 2010).  
Estonian ID card allows user to access both private and public sector services online such as 
banking, voting, paying taxes buying bus tickets and so on. In all other countries people need 
different identification methods for accessing different services. The nature of ID card will be 
discussed will be discussed extensively in the following sections of this chapter. However, 
interviews with Slovenian experts revealed a widely spread tendency to see the development 
of online identification methods as a purely government project and overemphasize the 
importance of ID card while ignoring developments which took place before the introduction 
of ID card by the government (Interviews 11). This overemphasis on ID card is also found in 
several reports on Estonian e-government (Maaten and Hall 2008; Ernsdorff and Berbec 
2007; Dutta 2006). Ernsdorff and Berbec’s understanding of ID card is simplistic and naïve as 
they write that government introduced them in 2002, made it mandatory and all citizens will 
have it by 2006 (Ernsdorff and Berbec 2006, 173).  Even if this is true, then it does not mean 
that they will use them online and that by 2007 ID card played important role in online 
transactions -  actually opposite is true as shown by Martens (2010).  For Maaten and Hall 
writing in 2008 “the widespread use of national ID card”… is one of the factors “why I-voting 
has been success in Estonia” (Maaten and Hall 2008, 32).  
National ID card was widespread in 2008 but this does not automatically mean that it 
was widely used in online environments in 2008 as it will be demonstrated below. If this is a 
question of emphasis and interpretation, then Dutta writing in the World Economic Forum 
Network Readiness Report states bluntly the following: “Thanks to the use of electronic ID 
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cards as a safe way to access private data, citizens can declare their taxes online” (Dutta 2006, 
84). First, Estonians were able to declare their taxes online already in 2000 – two years before 
ID card was introduced in 2002. The ID card started to be used more widely in online 
environments in the late 2000s. Dutta writes in 2006 when as will be reported below and has 
been reported by others (see Martens (2010), for instance) ID card was not even sufficiently 
diffused in Estonia to be a major contributor for online tax declaration.  Second, the use of ID 
card is not necessary for declaring taxes online. It was and is only one option. Even in 2015, a 
brief visit to the website of Estonian Tax Authority reveals that their online services can be 
accessed by the following methods: 1) ID card, 2) Mobile ID, 3) internet banks (links to six 
banks are provided) and 4) user ID issued by tax authority (this information is available in 
English at the website of Tax Auhtority at http://www.emta.ee/index.php?id=29761). The 
option three  -access by internet banks-  also means actually at least three options because 
banks can be accessed by the use of ID card, Mobile ID as well as older identification 
methods used by banks since 1996. All of this will be discussed more in detail below but the 
key point here is to emphasize that reports on Estonian ID cards often lack of context and 
understanding of a specific development trajectory of online identification methods in 
Estonia. Most importantly, they often talk about developments about Estonia in general terms 
and are not able to distinguish between the respective roles of private and public sector agents 
in launching these initiatives.   
Furthermore, there is even more profound principal point that needs to be made 
concerning the introduction of ID card and role of government in the development of digital 
economy. The ID card and a numerous related Estonian government initiatives have received 
significant attention by scholars, then it should be kept in mind that in free and democratic 
societies most citizens do not interact with government online and offline very often. People 
primarily use services provided by private sector such as banking. Their adoption of internet 
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depends on services and content provided primarily by private and less on public sector. For 
more sophisticated interactive services it is necessary to create reliable online identification 
tools. The existence of such tools encourage further use of internet and increases demand for 
high quality connectivity. Hence, the involvement of the Estonian public sector in 
encouraging wider use of internet is not comparable with the developments that ensued in the 
private sector.   The following sections will point out some key developments that took place 
in private sector and how these various initiatives intertwined with government policy. It 
starts by mapping out emergence of new internet business in Estonia – some of them gained 
global significance and then focuses on internet banking.  
 
5.2.1 Skype: An Estonian Company 
 One of the most well-known ICT companies that emerged in Estonia is Skype, which 
was founded by Niklas Zennström, Janus Friis, Jaan Tallinn, Priit Kasesalu, Ahti Heinla and 
Toivo Annus in Tallinn in 2003. Skype was acquired by EBay for 2.6 billion dollars in 2005 
(Skype Technologies 2009). In 2009 Ebay sold 65 % of Skype to venture capital firms 
Andreessen Horowitz, Silver Lake and Canadian Investment Plan Pension Board for 1.9 
billion dollars valuing the company at 2.75 billion dollars. Microsoft acquired Skype for 8.5 
billion dollars in 2011 (Skype Technologies 2009; Skype Technologies 2014;  Tiits and 
Kalvet 2012). In 2015, Skype was listed by UK investment banking group GP Bullhound as 
the most valuable European technology company in Europe in so-called billion dollar club 
(Ahmed 2015). Skype’s valuation at 8.5 billion dollars exceeds considerably club’s average of 
three billion dollars.  
Estonian founders of Skype had excellent technical skills. They had developed 
computer games already when they were high schools students and sold one successfully in 
the early 1990s. Tallinn graduated with BSc in theoretical physics from the University of 
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Tartu in 1996, while others studied computer science. Nevertheless, the technical skills are 
not sufficient for developing world class software. Success of Skype can be described as 
accidental. When Skype was founded, it was obviously not clear to the founders as in many 
start-ups and outsiders that one day it will be worth of billions of dollars. In the early 2000s, 
many Estonian IT and telecom analysts were still underestimating the role Skype might play 
in changing the traditional telecom landscape. And then overnight, millions of dollars poured 
into the country and Skype has become a part of eBay. All of this was a big surprise 
(Interviews 14 and 16).  
Two Skype founders Zennström and Friis moved to Estonia from Sweden and 
Denmark respectively already in the 1990s. They placed an ad in English in an Estonian 
newspaper in 1999 with catchy slogan: “Supermodels not wanted. We want your brain” 
(Kitsing 2005). This ad attracted several Estonian programmers with whom Zennström and 
Friis created a portal called www.everyday.com, which does not exist anymore. This was 
followed by peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing company Kazaa in 2000, which made them 
famous and fugitive together with Estonian programmers from the US legal system. Kazaa  
was actually developed first by Tallinn and other programmers and then sold to Zennström 
and Friis. In 2001, Kazaa was sold to Australian based Sharman Networks in order to avoid 
law suits by US based music and movie industry (Pasick 2006). Zennstöm, Friis, Kasesalu 
and Tallinn could not travel to the United States and had to avoid situations where they could 
be served legal papers for years. In 2003, Kazaa was most downloaded computer program in 
the world with 315 million copies residing in computers (Roth 2004).  However, once Skype 
founders made hundreds of millions for selling Skype to eBay they also settled lawsuits with 




This background makes it obvious that the process of entrepreneurial discovery behind 
both Kazaa and Skype was messy and it had nothing to do with Estonian government policy – 
other than government stayed out and open economic environment enabled such activities to 
take place. It is difficult if not impossible to establish causality between the success of Skype 
and numerous social, legal, economic, political, individual and other variables. However, it 
can be said with certainty that Skype was a result of entrepreneurial discovery process. It did 
not emerge as a result of government intervention in creating innovative companies or 
because of top-down social engineering. Economic openness and Estonian government efforts 
in liberalizing telecom market as discussed in previous chapter probably contributed to its 
birth but this cannot be claimed with certainty. The broad institutional framework might have 
been necessary for its birth and perhaps attracting its founders from Scandinavia to Estonia 
but it was certainly not sufficient condition.   
The early years of Skype are well capture by Fortune magazine, which opened its 
article titled “Catch Us If You Can” on Skype in 2004 with the following paragraph:  
“Near the center of the walled medieval district of Estonia's capital, Tallinn, sits the 
NoKu bar. It's almost impossible to find, on a cobblestone street behind a pair of old, 
unmarked wooden doors that unlock only with a magnetic keycard, and up a set of 
rickety stairs. In Estonian, "NoKu" is an acronym for "young culture"; the private club 
is full of twentysomethings in jeans, drinking local Saku Original beer to rock music. 
The bar's name has another meaning: Read as one word, it's slang for "penis." Both the 
hidden nature and the cheeky attitude of the place fit perfectly with the company I'm 
here to meet. Almost a dozen computer programmers and engineers are gathered 
around a large wooden table in the back of the bar on this bitterly cold mid-December 
night. They work for a startup called Skype, which produces software that allows 
people to make free, incredibly clear voice calls from their PC to any other PC in the 
world.“ (Roth 2004) 
 
This description makes it difficult to believe that the venture was sold for 2.6 billion 
US dollars one year later. However, in the section 2.3 of the dissertation I highlighted  
perspectives on startup communities (Feld 2012) and creative classes (Florida 2005), which 
all emphasize the process of entrepreneurial discovery in explaining diffusion of technologies 
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such as internet as well as broader outcomes in innovation. These approaches emphasize the 
role of entrepreneurs and their agency in ecosystems and deemphasize the role of old-
fashioned top-down national or regional public policy in shaping diffusion of technologies. 
The description of early years of Skype above fits particularly well with Florida’s concept of 
creative classes where both bohemians and computer programmers are included in the 
creative class. Existence of creative class helps to encourage economic development through 
innovation (Florida 2005).  
Technologically, Kazaa has obvious connection with Skype as both businesses relied 
on peer-to-peer (P2P). It cannot be claimed that the team invented peer-to-peer technology33, 
however. Entrepreneurs behind Kazaa were good at turning earlier inventions into innovation 
and building entire business model around it. Skype team's previous undertaking, Kazaa, had 
often been called the new Napster. Napster was a Californian peer-to-peer file sharing service 
which was founded in 1999 and ended up in legal difficulties because of copyright 
infringement in 2001.  
However, the Napster comparison to some extent misses an important technological 
difference. While Napster utilized client-server structure for some tasks, Kazaa relied entirely 
on P2P technology and it was located outside of the United States . Naturally, the 
technological difference as well as geographical location of service provider translates into 
crucial legal and economic implications. In the case of Kazaa, it was more difficult to hold the 
distributors of file-sharing program responsible for illegal downloading of files. Due to the 
use of server-client structure for some tasks by Napster, documentation of its direct 
involvement in illegal file-sharing was easier (Kitsing 2005; Tambur 2013). 
                                                 
33 Peer-to-peer is a distributed application architecture which distributes processes among peers, i.e. participants 
in the network. It does not require central coordination by servers and stable hosts as peers make resources such 
as bandwith and processing power available for other peers. Peers are both suppliers and consumers of the 




 Unlike many other VoIP service providers, Skype (like the file-sharing program 
Kazaa) relies entirely on peer-to-peer technology. P2P technology creates important 
technological advantages compared to the traditional server-client model. The Skype directory 
is entirely decentralized and distributed among network nodes. This in turn implies that Skype 
can increase its scale rapidly without added investments for expensive and centralized 
infrastructure. Essentially, Skype excels in exploiting the decentralized nature of internet 
(Kitsing 2005).  
This technological aspect explains why P2P VoIP is economically superior to server-
client VoIP as well as to traditional telephony. Economic superiority has a tremendous effect 
on the competitive rivalry in the telecom market. Skype has a lower cost structure, thereby 
enabling lower prices in comparison with non-P2P VoIP and traditional phone services. It is 
also easier to scale Skype's subscribers, because Skype does not need to invest in additional 
infrastructure for accommodating new users - a necessary investment for non-P2P centralized 
VoIP service providers and, obviously, traditional telephony companies. Hence, Skype grew 
rapidly because of its technological and thus economic superiority.  
In the beginning Skype grew rapidly in Estonia and their main engineering and 
development center is still bases in Tallinn, Estonia. At peak Skype employed over 400 
workers in Tallinn. However, this has been slightly declining recently. It is not reflected yet in 
companies financial statements but in the second half of 2014 Microsoft restructured Skype 
business in Estonia, which means that employees were laid off and some of the same 
employees will continue working for Skype as contractors.  Table 5.1 gives overview of main 
financial indicators of Skype operations in Estonia as a comparison of financial year 2008 and 
2013/2014 (Skype has changed its financial year from full year in 2008 to two half years of 
one full year in 2013 and 2014). As Table 5.1 shows labor costs are 64 % of revenue in 2008 
and 57 % in 2013/2014. Hence, there has not been significant change in the proportion and it 
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remains most important cost of the company. Number of employees has grown from 318 to 
415 but sales revenue and profitability has more than doubled. Monthly labor cost per 
employee in 2008 was about 3400 euros, which means gross salary of approximately 2500 
euros. Monthly labor cost per employee was about 5000 euros in 2013/2014, which translates 
into average monthly gross salary of 3700 euros (after social insurance taxes but inclusive of 
income tax). The average salary in Estonia was at the same time 1000 euros and in the ICT 
sector close to 1600 euros (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications 2015). This 
increase in salaries during the time period including economic recession in 2008 and 2009 
where most salaries did not grow or stagnated, signals that Skype has difficulties in finding 
qualified employees.  
Table 5.1: Indicators of Skype operations in Estonia.  
Indicator/Period 01.01.2008-31.12. 2008 07.01.2013-30.06.2014 
Number of employees/ 
average monthly gross 
salary34  
318/2500 415/3700 
Labor costs 13.1 million euros 24.8 million 
Sales revenue 20.5 million euros 44.2 million euros 
Source of sales revenue EU 100 % US  100 % 
EBIT35 1.7 million euros 3.7 million euros 
Return on Equity (ROE) 39 % 14,4 % 
Source: Author on the basis of Skype Technologies (2009) and (2014). 
                                                 
34 The average monthly gross salary is calculation by the author on the basis of data provided in annual reports 
(Skype Technologies 2009 and 2014). It is an approximation..  
 
35 Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT) is an indicator of company profitability. It is calculated by 
subtracting expenses from revenue but not including interest and corporate tax payments on profit. It is also 
known as „operating profit“, „operating income“ or „operating earnings“. 
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All sales revenue comes from transactions within group. In 2008, revenue source was 
European Union but in 2013/2014 it has changed to the United States. ROE as a measure of 
efficiency has decreased from 39 % in 2008 to 14.4 percent in the 2013/2014 financial year.  
Already in 2009 Skype’s annual report reflected natural limits for potential expansion 
in Estonia by pointing out that the main barrier for growth in Estonia stems from the lack of 
qualified software engineers (Skype Technologies 2009, 3). It was also emphasized in an 
interview with a former Skype top manager in Estonia in 2011 who also expressed concerns 
about Estonian immigration policies and overall low levels of social tolerance for inflow of 
international workers (Interviews 14).  In order to deal with the small pool of labor in Estonia,  
Skype also established engineering centers in Prague as well as offices in Stockholm, Sweden, 
London, UK, Luxembourg, Silicon Valley as well as various locations in South America and 
Asia (Tiits and Kalvet 2012). The relative importance of Tallinn for Skype operations has 
been declined over time as company expanded overseas and increased its staff to 1600. 
However, 400 employees in Tallinn out of 1600 is still quite significant 25 percent of total 
workers at Skype.  It would be unrealistic to assume that company with global presence 
would recruit only in Estonia because it would make it difficult to attract sufficient number of 
talented people.  
Partially, limited labor pool stems from the fact that Estonia is a small country of 1.3 
million inhabitants and it does not have sufficient number of qualified workers. The size of 
labor market is roughly 600 000 people. ICT sector employs 20 000 people (without 
manufacturing of electronics). Through interviews with various IT companies in Estonia and 
government officials it is also clear that supply of IT workers does not meet the demand. It is 
also difficult to attract workers from overseas because of strict immigration regulations for 
non-EU citizens as well as unwillingness of some potential recruits to move to Estonia 
(Interviews 14, 23, 24). In section 2.4, I highlighted stylized facts on the basis of smart 
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specialization literature, which emphasized that innovation and entrepreneurship tends to be 
widely spread in more densely populated areas and ICT can actually increase the differences 
between core and non-core regions. Tallinn, Estonia, with 400 000 inhabitants is certainly not 
densely populated and is not a core region. 
Hence, factoring in the locational disadvantages, it can be considered a success that 
Skype has maintain substantial presence in Estonia from 2005 to 2015 when it has become a 
global player. Obviously other factors can help. Other stylized facts in section 2.4 pointed out 
that sectorial diversity and high number of internationally connected multinational companies 
tend to benefit entrepreneurship and innovation while innovation tends to be lower when a 
small number of large firms dominate the economy. Estonia scores well on all these accounts. 
As chapter 4 highlighted it has had open trade and foreign direct investment regime – 
particularly in comparison with Slovenia. It has diverse manufacturing base. 52 percent of 
Estonian exports were produced by 100 companies in Estonia in 25 different sectors in 2013 
(Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, 2015). There is a strong presence of 
multinational companies such as Ericsson and ABB in Estonia. Successful Estonian 
manufacturing companies are well integrated into global value chains of multinationals.    
Obviously, Skype has joined the ranks of multinationals which operate in Estonia. 
Estonians consider Skype an Estonian company and it is often used by country’s officials for 
marketing purposes. At the same time, one of the main founders of Skype, Niklas Zennström, 
usually does not even mention Estonia when he discusses Skype. He usually refers to Skype 
as Swedish company.  For instance, Zennström wrote in the Financial Times in 2015: “When 
we founded Skype, our aim was never build the best peer-to-peer communication service in 
Sweden” (Zennström 2015) The fact that Zennström does not mention Estonia in his public 
statements refers to a locational disadvantage because Estonia is considered a periphery and is 
not well known as a country. Even more importantly, GP Bullhound report on Europe’s most 
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valuable technology companies considers Skype to be Swedish and Transferwise, a financial 
technology company founded by two Estonians, one of them former Skype employee, to be 
UK company (Ahmed 2015). Transferwise has headquarters in London but significant 
presence in Tallinn, Estonia. The fact that two companies with significant presence in Estonia 
and involvement of Estonian entrepreneurs are in the list of 13 most valuable technology 
companies in Europe is quite remarkable and reveals that entrepreneurial discovery process 
works quite smoothly in Estonia. But at the same time, the same entrepreneurs prefer to 
present their companies as Swedish and British and usual coverage in financial press does not 
even mention Estonia in relation to these companies, reveals that Estonia comes with 
locational a disadvantage.  Usually, Estonians tend to see Skype and Transferwise as Estonian 
companies and may overemphasize the Estonian connection.  
However, at least in these two cases the connection to Estonia and its entrepreneurial 
ecosystem is strong. For instance, a scholarly piece on e-government has even suggested that 
Hotmail originates from Estonia (Ernsdorff and Berbec 2007, 171). This is a clear 
misrepresentation which has also been replicated in numerous publications. The first backer 
of Hotmail was Steve Jurvetson from Silicon Valley venture capital firm Draper Fisher. 
Jurvetson whose parents are immigrated from Estonia to the United States after the World 
War II. Hence, the Estonian connection is loosely indirect at best and certainly Hotmail did 
not originate from Estonia.  
To sum up, the case of Skype illustrates the opportunities that emerged in the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem of Estonia in the 1990s and 2000s. Certainly, Skype created more 
reasons for Estonians to use internet and even more importantly, the success of Estonian 
based company increased the visibility of internet and related technologies among Estonian 
public. However, for the diffusion of internet among different socio-economic groups the 
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developments in banking sector were even more important. The next section explores the 
emergence of internet banking.  
  
5.2.2 Internet Banking as a Critical Juncture in the Emergence of Digital Economy 
The importance of entrepreneurial discovery in bringing new innovative products and 
services to the market and by doing so encouraging the use of internet refers more than just 
the birth of numerous of IT companies such as Kazaa and Skype. The liberal economic 
regime and sound financial policies benefited the birth of the banking sector, which became 
an influential IT innovator by introducing Internet banking in 1996 (Lustsik 2003, 24). The 
internet banks were introduced by Estonian banks Hansapank and Ühispank, which were 
owned by Estonians. However, both banks were taken over by Swedish banking groups 
Swedbank and SEB in the late 1990s. However, interviews confirmed that in many ways 
Estonian internet banking solutions were superior to Swedish internet banking solutions and 
Swedish banking groups actually learned from the Estonian experience (Interviews 28 and 
32). It other words, reverse technology transfer took place – usually it is assumed that superior 
technology is transferred from economically more advanced to economically less advanced 
countries. 
Estonian new banks in the 1990s were effectively start-ups because there were no old 
legacy banks. The Soviet banking system was undeveloped. To great extent it was cash-based 
system. The use of checks was not widespread. Hence, it was possible to start from blank 
sheet and avoid the same development trajectories that were experienced by more advanced 
countries. This provided a critical juncture because Estonian banks did not have to deal with 
legacy costs and path-dependencies of old banking systems. It was possible to move from 
cash-based system to internet banking without ever introducing checks and other old 
technologies. When a typical bank in the west such as Bank of America has essentially made 
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its check-book based system electronic and calls it internet banking, then the Estonian internet 
banking was from the beginning in term of speed and quality of service. Transfers could be 
made within the same day, within few hours instead of waiting at least 24 hours. It was cheap 
as most consumers using the service did not even qualify for credit-cards in 1996.   
The quality, security and simplicity of internet banking service attracted the majority 
of Internet users as its customers (Lustsik 2003, 27). In 2005, 35 percent of Estonian people 
used Internet banking. In 2013, the use of Internet banking was almost universal among 
internet users as it reached 73 percent of total population.  As the Figure 29 below shows 
clearly, Estonian lead in the internet banking is exceptional among the CEE countries that 
joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 as well as in comparison with EU average. In 2004, the use of 
Internet banking in Slovenia was four times smaller than in Estonia and in 2013 it was almost 
2.5 times smaller. Slovenia has not just been a laggard in comparison with Estonia but also in 
comparison with the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia. Only 4-5 percent of 
internet users used internet banking in Romania and Bulgaria in 2013. The huge variance of 
outcomes quite remarkable in the context of Chapter Two, which emphasized the 
epistemological nature of technology and role of local context in internet diffusion. Even 
various internet banking solutions have been available for 20 years, these solutions have not 
diffused evenly to countries characterized by relatively similar socio-economic development 
(as countries which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 are).  
For those unfamiliar with the Estonian context, the emphasis on internet banking may 
seem unusual. However, the quick uptake of internet banking provides another critical 
juncture for the spread of internet and particularly high speed and high quality internet 
because the service would not be useable without it. The internet banking was introduced 
when the internet diffusion was still making baby steps in Estonia. Thus, it provided crucial 
reason for getting online – particularly as banks encouraged their customers to use this option 
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in order to cut costs and provide more efficient service. Already in 2002, internet banking 
classified as the third most important reason for Internet use among Estonian population, 
behind communicating  via email (76 percent) and using search engines (62 percent) (Lustsik 
2003, 27).  
 
Figure 5.1: Individuals using Internet for Internet banking in selected CEE countries and EU 
on the basis of data from Eurostat (2014). 36 
 
It is also important to keep in mind that most people do not need to interact and make 
transactions with government often. At the same time, the use of banking services can be a 
daily or weekly necessity.  According to Alexa.com data on top sites in Estonia in 2015, the 
government portal eesti.ee, a gateway to different government online services, is ranked 113 
among top sites in Estonia (Figure 5.2). At the same time, the website of the largest bank by 
market share in Estonia swedbank.ee was ranked 8 and second largest bank seb.ee was ranked 
                                                 
36 Detailed data is available in Appendix D. 
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16 among top websites. The websites of smaller banks  lhv.ee was ranked 62 and Nordea.com 
was ranked 110. In other words, even small banks beat the government central portal in 
attracting users. To be totally objective, it has to be mentioned that the website of capital city 
Tallinn.ee was ranked 49 and rik.ee,  which provides online access to land, property and 
enterprise registers, was ranked 65 (Alexa, 2015). Figure 30 provides historical traffic trends 
showing that websites of two largest banks www.swedbank.ee and www.seb.ee have 
considerably higher global rank by attracting number of visitors than three most popular 
public sector websites www.tallinn.ee, www.rik.ee and www.eesti.ee. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Top government and bank websites in Estonia from January 15 to June 15 
in 2015 on the basis of  global traffic rank with data from Alexa (2015). 
 
This indicates two trends. First, many users go directly to subwebsites of government 
services rather than access them through government portal. Second, the websites of large 
banks attract considerably more users than any government service. The data collected by 
Alexa is based on monthly traffic rank which is combination of average daily visitors and 
page views over past month. Certainly, monthly data may not be representative of broader 
trends and some websites may experience considerable volatility of visits on monthly basis. 
Nevertheless, all this websites are well established in Estonia and have loyal visitors. We can 
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assume that most visitors have to access their banking and government services with certain 
regularity and are not likely to change their bank or government often. Hence, it can be 
describe as a path-dependent process where initial decision to use particular bank and its 
internet banking services will lead to the regular use of their services. For the sake of 
understanding the importance of internet banking plays in Estonia Figure 5.3 compares top 
government and bank websites on the basis of global traffic rank with Slovenia.  Slovenia’s 
result are opposite to Estonia’s. Slovenian government portal has almost as high rank as most 
popular bank website in Estonia while most popular bank website in Slovenia lags 
significantly behind top bank website in Estonia  by global ranking – nlb.si global rank is 
56.306 in comparison with largest Estonian bank swedbank.ee’s ranking of 14.324.  
 
Figure 5.3: Top government and bank websites in Estonia compared to top bank and 
government websites in Slovenia from January 15 to June 15 in 2015 on the basis of global 
traffic rank with data from Alexa (2015). 
 
It must be kept in mind that Estonian population is 1.3 million while Slovenia’s 
population is 2 million and in absolute terms Slovenia has higher number of internet users as 
well as regular bank customers. Hence, one would expect Slovenian websites to be more 
popular by global ranking than Estonia’s websites. To illustrate this key difference further 
between Estonia and Slovenia, then it must be pointed out that the Slovenian government 
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portal gov.si is ranked number 11 among top websites in Slovenia on the basis on monthly 
data. Slovenia’s largest bank nlb.si is ranked 56 in among top websites in Slovenia.  
Furthermore, often scholars fail to grasp the Estonian context where internet banking 
is not just about providing one service but providing a platform for many services.  Many 
state agencies started to use the identification verification offered by internet banking, thereby 
enabling  government services online. Estonian Tax Authority developed a new software 
solution in cooperation with companies Sema Group Belgium and AboBase Systems and  
started to offer an option to declare taxes online already in 2000. The availability of bank-
based online identification system allowed them to do so. In fact, in online banking 
environments it is possible to enter directly to Tax Authorities webpage and declare taxes 
online. In 2014 95 percent of people declared their taxes online.  
According to Aivar Sõerd, General Director of Estonian Tax Authority from 1999 to 
2003, the implementation of online services cost to taxpayers only 85 000 euros (Sõerd 2015). 
“Cooperation with banks led to considerable cost savings,”37 wrote Sõerd in the leading 
Estonian daily (Sõerd 2015). Sõerd emphasized that “two largest bank at that time Hanspank 
and Ühispank offered to government an opportunity to rely on their bank portals for logging 
into the (tax authority online) environment” (Sõerd 2015). It is obvious from Sõerd’s 
comments that the main focus was on cost saving and control. Since identification tools were 
made available by the banks, then the tax authority relied on them. Questions whether the use 
of private sector identification methods is acceptable or not in providing government services 
were not discussed. It was implemented as a tax authority service project and it did not require 
any special legislation and wider discussion in the government. Again, functional focus on 
implementing a concrete project by specific government department without consideration of 
broader issues and without general government strategy fits neatly into what Kitsing (2011) 
                                                 
37 Direct quotes from Sõerd (2015) are translated by the author from Estonian into English. 
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called “success without strategy” in discussing the development of Estonian e-government. It 
is also a prime example of what this dissertation in the section 2.5 discussed as an 
entrepreneurial discovery process.  
Let me recall the dissertation defines entrepreneurs very broadly: policy makers, 
public universities and research institutes can be entrepreneurial and part of the process. In 
many ways development of online services by Estonian Tax Authority is also consistent with 
Mazzucato’s concept of “entrepreneurial state” or what Crouch calls “institutional 
entrepreneurs” (Crouch 2005). Mazzucato emphasizes that different public sector bodies can 
contribute towards innovation outcomes. It does not have to be central government and 
centralized top-down policy-making (Mazzucato 2011).   
Aivar Sõerd of Tax Authority and his employees acted as entrepreneurs by making tax 
declarations accessible online to public and minimizing costs in doing so. According to Sõerd 
(2015), the project was implemented in two phases: a pilot took place in 1999 and in 2000 full 
services made available for individuals and companies. 12 000 people used the Tax Authority 
online services which consisted of submitting and correcting income and value-added tax 
declarations, make inquiries about tax liabilities and other transactions. Sõerd argues that in 
principle the online services of Tax Authority have remained the same from 2000 to 2015 and 
it should serve as a model for optimization of othe government services. Again, his focus is 
on optimization and for him public sector “is by nature a large organization which offers 
public services”(Sõerd 2015).   Again, focus is on functionality and tax services are seen as 
any other service available in the private sector.  
Similarly, many private companies offered services which were accessible through 
banks making basically banks verifiers of online identities. Essentially, this is a service which 
is provide by five major banks to third parties (Martens 2010). The authentication methods 
offered by banks are following: 1) password cards containing 24 one time passwords or 2) 
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PIN calculators which are offline card readers with a keypad. Customer has to enter his bank 
card into reader which generates a PIN code which has to be entered when accessing bank 
online. The system introduced by Estonian banks was more sophisticated than the system 
used by many American or Western banks today, for example, where only password and 
username is required. This system introduced already in 1996, is still in use – even as its role 
has been gradually decreasing making ways for newer identification methods such as ID card 
and mobile ID. By 2009, one million bank password cards were issued, 50 000 pin calculators 
were in use and about one million government ID cards were issued (Martens 2010). What is 
the relative role of bank based ID in comparison with government issued ID card in online 
environments cannot be verified because the data is not available publicly. However, the 
leading authentication expert Tarvi Martens wrote in an article in 2010 that bank based ID 
system is still more widely used accounting for 80 percent of all online transactions than 
government issued IDs (Martens 2010).    
The bottom line is that emergence of internet banking benefited directly provision of 
e-government services. Since 2000 Estonians have been able to file their taxes online, using 
the identification system offered by electronic banking services. The study on use of 
government online services conducted in 2002 already indicated then that the 48 percent of 
Estonian Internet users pay for e-government services through the internet banking (Krull 
2003, 58). Other ways of using e-government services were less exploited by the people. 
Hence, the Internet banking demonstrates that changes in the formal rules provided incentives 
for self-interested agents through the process of entrepreneurial discovery to find innovative 
solutions that encouraged Internet use.  
The contribution of political leaders and that of the IT community in the public sector 
has been primarily in the form of rule-making and provision of services based on private 
sector developments. In other words, rule-making specific to the electronic government has 
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answering demands in the marketplace and/or seeking to provide services in the areas where 
transaction costs were lowest. As has been documented by Kitsing (2011), the provision of 
online government services was not universal and even. Some agencies were truly innovative 
such as Tax Authority, while other lagged behind such as Labor Market Agency. In this sense, 
the provision of government services online can be also seen as a process of entrepreneurial 
discovery in the broadest sense.  
This is well characterized by X-Road system that forms the backbone of Estonian e-
government. The X-Road system was outlined in the Master of Science thesis of Arne Asper 
in 2001, a programmer working for small Estonian IT firm Cybernetica employing about 100 
people (Interviews 20 and 29). The distributed nature of X-Road makes it more secure than 
centralized system and allows to exploit the benefits what was called “stupid network” by 
Icenberg (1998) in the literature review. The X-Road can route queries with different 
databases in the public and private sector as demonstrated in the Figure 5.4. As systems are 
technologically different, then they have to use adopters to send and receive information 
through X-Road. Each computer system uses its own secure server for encryption to protect 
sensitive data. The following Figure 5.4 illustrates the X-Road system demonstrating how 
public sector registries, telecom and energy companies, banks, government portal as well as 
electronic ID infrastructure are all connected through a decentralized network.  
Essentially, Cybernetica created similarly decentralized system for Estonian 
government that Kazaa did for file-sharing and Skype for phone calls exploiting the benefits 
of internet as a distributed network. Most importantly, it has been cost-effective. Both Taavi 
Kotka, undersecretary for information technology at the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Communications and Oliver Väärtnõu, CEO of Cybernetica confirm that the cost of X-Road 
has been up to 67 million dollars over lifetime, including all maintenance costs, salaries, 
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investments and all other costs (Bershidsky 2015). Usually, countries spend more than that 




Figure 5.4: Estonian Information System based on X-Road adopted from the State 
Information Agency (2015). 
 
The bottom-line is that the emergence of government online services did not result 
from a top-down centralized approach rather it was based on de-centralized approach where 
some agencies were eager to launch new services while others were not. Some were more 
eager to exploit online identification methods and opportunities offered by X-Road. Kitsing 
(2011) has labelled it “success without strategy”. As in private sector new services were 
provided by experimenting policy entrepreneurs and some of them turned out to be 
successful. More online services created additional reasons for using the internet. It must be 
emphasized that the X-road connected private sector agents such as banks with government 
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databases which made it possible for both sectors to cooperate and offer services online. The 
next part will discuss how the cooperation between private and public sector played out in the 
case of ID cards and their use in a digital environment.  
 
5.3 From Private to Public: ID Cards 
One of these examples of successful policies is Estonian ID card. In 2002, the 
government introduced electronic identification cards that can be used as identification 
method for online transactions. One reason why the government introduced ID cards in 2002 
was to provide a more secure and sophisticated substitute for online identification method 
provided by the internet banking where cards with numerical codes were used. The work for 
ID card project started already in 1997 but it took three years to prepare draft law called 
Digital Signature Act. The decision to go ahead with the project and deliver the cards to all 
citizens as one of the last decisions of Prime Minister Mart Laar’s government in October 
2001 (Martens 2010).  
The decision led to establishment of private company AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus by 
two largest banks and telecom operators in 2001. The company was essentially the 
certification center for ID card and in the center of network of apps and businesses built 
around it. In the early years ID card received considerable public criticism and there was 
initial outrage over investment of 20 million euros in the project (Martens 2010, 224). 
Martens (2010) emphasizes that initially government agencies were not active promoters of 
ID card but gradually they started to promote and procure new generation software for their 
use. Since important private sector playes were behind the project by becoming shareholders 
in the company responsible for certification process, then the ID card gradually took off and 
public attitude became for   “This unique setup of private and public cooperation with strong 
players enabled to build a uniform platform,“ writes Martens (2010, 226). There were also 
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attempts to challenge the monopoly of Sertifitseerimiskeskus by Cybernetica who launched 
alternative tools based on different standards in 2002. However, this competition ended in 
2008 when uniform standard prevailed.  
Even though it was made obligatory to have the ID card, they did not become widely 
used immediately in online environments (E-User, 2005; Martens 2010).  As was emphasized 
above the previous simple identification method provided by internet banking remained the 
primary form of online identification. Even though government had issued a half million ID-
cards by March 2005 (Estonian population is 1.3 million) and reached 1 million by 2009, the 
new identification method did not gain immediately considerable following in the online 
environments (E-User, 2005; Martens 2010). People use these cards primarily offline – ID 
card is a regular identification card with chip that allows it to be used also online. The bank-
issued online identification cards have been used in parallel and before the ID card as an 
identification method for government provided online services. Overall, only 25 000 ID card 
owners used their cards online in 2006 – four years after the launch. In 2009 the number of 
online users of ID card had increased ten-fold to about 250 000 (Rudi 2009). Between 2012 
and 2002, 500,000 people had authenticated themselves electronically with the ID card at 
least once. Total number of authentications reached 131 million, which makes 260 
authentication per average user in this 10 year period. Out of these 131 million transactions 78 
million have been digital signatures, which implies that 156 digital signatures have been given 
by average user. Obviously, this is just indicator of abstract averages. In reality, some people 
are heavy users, some light users and some do not use ID card at all electronically.  In 2011, 
86 percent of Estonian citizens had ID card but only 40 percent of the ID card holders used 
the digital options of the card – either to authenticate their identity online or to give digital 
signature (State Information Agency 2015). This implies that most citizens use ID card offline 
as a regular ID. Ownership of ID card is mandatory by law. However, law does not specify 
175 
 
any penalties for not owning the ID card and nobody has not been penalized for not owning 
the card. Ownership of ID card can make life more convenient. For example, the card can be 
used as a substitute for a passport for travelling within the European Union.   
In 2009, Estonian government also introduced the mobile phone based identification 
method called mobile ID.  The mobile ID does not imply that people can transact on any 
mobile phone. Rather it is a mobile phone based identification method alternative to ID card, 
which allows conduct transactions in online environments using smart phone as a substitute 
for ID card. Prerequisite for activating mobile ID is existence of ID card. It also requires a 
special Mobile ID compatible SIM-card in the mobile phone which is provided by all mobile 
operators in Estonia. The cost of changing regular SIM-card to Mobile ID compatible SIM 
card is about 12 dollars. However, the use of Mobile ID has not become as widespread as the 
use of ID card. It is a newer innovation and primarily used by early adopters. As of October 
2012, 30,000 people had Mobile ID and about 80 percent of them actually used it. By October 
2014, the number of users had reached 50,000 and 1.8 million transactions were conducted by 
Mobile ID per month. 75 percent of these transactions were banking transactions. The use of 
Mobile ID as a substitute for ID card is encouraged by the spread of smart phones and tablets. 
ID card cannot be used with smart phones and tablets because of lack of ID card reader. 
Mobile ID can be used by both (State Information Agency 2015).  
Over time, the online identification methods provided by banks and ID card have 
become of prerequisite for using most Estonian government online services as well as services 
provided by private companies. It is possible to speak of “forced digitalization” as many 
government services are not easily available without the ID card or the use of other online 
identification methods. Offline services are still there but their users face significantly higher 
transaction costs than users of online services. For instance, it has basically become very 
complicated to submit documents to Business Registry unless ID card and online channels are 
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used (personal observation). However, some government officials responsible for the 
digitalization efforts in the Estonian government still complained in interviews that a 
significant share of online service users rely on bank-based old identification methods and do 
not use ID card online (Interviews 20).  
Nevertheless, the increasing availability of secure online services and innovations such 
as ID card have created additional reasons to use internet.  As the following figure 5.5 
suggest, over the years less and less Estonian households are without internet access at home 
because access is not needed.  
 
Figure 5.5: Estonian households with internet connectivity at home and without internet 
connectivity at home because access is not needed 2004-2013 on the basis of Eurostat 
(2014).38 
                                                 




In 2005, survey results show that 28 percent of households without internet 
connectivity at home said that they don’t need it while in 2013 the percentage of such 
households was decreased to 11 percent. 36 percent of households without children said so in 
2005 and 15 percent in 2013.  
It is also important to note that the spread of ID card adds to the cost of internet use.  
The use of ID card requires a purchase of ID card reader or a computer with ID card reader.  
But it is not sufficiently significant or at least perceived not significant as it has not been a 
major barrier for its adoption. Cheaper versions of the reader can be purchased for slightly 
less than $10 dollars.  More expensive versions can cost $40-50 dollars. The ID-card itself 
costs slightly more than $20 dollars (personal observation and calculation). While the reader 
is required for online interactions, the ID-card can be used as a regular identification 
document within Estonia and it serves as a substitute for passport for traveling within the 28- 
countries of the European Union.  
In recent years banks have actively supported the use of ID cards in internet banking 
by lowering the amount of daily transactions that can be made by old internet bank 
identification method and price discriminating in transaction fees. In addition to private 
sector, ID cards have become widely used by municipalities and other organizations. 
However, these are more recent developments, which build on the initial success of internet 
banking. From the perspective of long-term evolution the Internet banking was more 
fundamental in explaining the early take up of internet and its more recent initiatives such as 
the ID-card have helped to diffuse the use of internet further.  
But the cost of ID-card and its reader represent only the tip of the iceberg. Any 
analysis of costs has to go beyond it and consider entire process of its use. Obviously, some 




transactions such as banking or voting are relatively simple and less complicated than 
conducting transactions with government in some other online environments such as the 
business register. Hence, the complexity and costs of using ID card in online environments 
may vary depending on a particular service.  The following is a  description of simplified 
process to illustrate how the ID card can be used. The user starts by inserting the ID-card into 
card reader and opening the webpage for transaction such as bank, tax authority or some other 
service provider. Then the voter verifies his/her identity using the first four-digit personal 
identification number (PIN1) of ID-card. This number is given to user when the card is issued 
together with PIN 2 and PUK code. Both PIN codes are used also for all online transactions 
with the ID card that require digital signature. After entering the first PIN number the server 
checks whether the user is eligible by using the data from the register.  
Once the eligibility is verified, the user can fill in data for transaction and can click on 
to complete the transaction.   This decision has to be confirmed by inserting digital signature 
in the form of second five-digit PIN code (PIN 2). Certainly, user may experience difficulties 
in this otherwise straightforward process. User have different levels of sophistication in using 
internet, they have different computer skill levels, their computers may be configured 
differently and they may use software that is not always compatible with the ID card reader. 
The practice in Estonia has shown that cheaper ID-card readers may be sometimes quite 
unreliable and at least in the early years of experiment it did not work properly with some 
browsers (such as Firefox and Google Chrome). When new versions of browsers and 
operating systems are released, they may not be always compatible with the ID card software. 
Hence, the technology may create additional barrier for using online services for some 
individuals rather than to move the barriers. It creates uncertainty as this way of completing 
transactions may not always be reliable. The next part discusses the use of ID card and mobile 
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ID in the internet voting. Other online identification methods cannot be used in the internet 
voting.  
 
5.4 Internet Voting39 
Internet voting is the most well-known government initiative to engage public in 
democratic process in Estonia. It is also an example of policy entrepreneurship in Estonia. 
The internet voting started as an small experiment in the 2005 municipal elections and now 
one third of votes are submitted this way.  As Estonia is the only country in the world where 
citizens have voted online in the municipal, national and European elections, then the internet 
voting in Estonia has received a considerable scholarly attention (Alvarez et al., 2009; 
Bochsler, 2010). Particularly, the 2007 parliamentary elections have been scrutinized from 
various angles. Similarly, this initiative was emphasized by interviews as an unique 
phenomena which demonstrates how sophisticated can be the use of internet in Estonia. 
Obviously, the internet voting cannot be a major driver of internet adoption. However, it 
demonstrates the interaction of institutions and internet at the very core of democracy. 
Increasing availability of secure, high speed and good quality internet makes voting online 
possible. This leads to the institutional changes, which give an additional reason for the use of 
internet. Hence, this section offers an overview of last eight elections, highlights key elements 
of voting process and discusses the reasons for internet voting in Estonia.  
 
5.4.1 Ten Years of Internet Voting Experiment  
The possibility to vote online was first used in October 2005 when almost two percent 
of all voters (Table 5.2), which translates into one percent of the electorate, used this 
opportunity in the municipal elections as the following table demonstrates. This experiment 
                                                 
39 An earlier version of this section has been presented in various conferences and published by ACM in the 
conference proceedings (Kitsing 2014). 
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was followed the parliamentary elections in April 2007 where about 5 percent of casted votes 
were submitted online. The European Parliament Elections in 2009 saw close to 15 percent of 
votes were submitted online. In the municipal elections in October 2009 almost 16 percent of 
the votes were casted online. The parliamentary elections of 2011 achieved a record where 
over 24 percent of votes were submitted online. The municipal elections of 2013 saw 
somewhat lower turnout of internet voters – slightly over 21 percent. However, the latter 
should be compared with the municipal elections where obviously it is the best turnout of 
internet voters as well as offline voters among the last three municipal elections. In the 2014 
European Parliament and 2015 National Parliament elections one third of all votes were 
submitted online. The latter is particularly remarkable as it broke all the previous records -
176,491 people participated in the internet voting and overall turnout was 64 percent.  This 
outcome is higher than in any elections between 2005 and 2015.  
 
Table 5.2: Turnout and Internet Voting in the Estonian Elections (2005-2015). 
 
Type of elections Date E-votes 









Municipal elections October 
2005 
1.8 47.4 0.9 
National Parliament April 2007 5.4 62  3.4 
European Parliament June 2009 14.7 43.9 6.5 
Municipal elections October 
2009 
15.7 60.6 9.5 
National Parliament March 2011 24.3 63.5 15.4 
Municipal elections October 
2013 
21.2 58 12.3 
European Parliament May 2014 31.3 36.5 11.4 
National Parliament March 2015 30.5 64.2 19.6 
Source:  Composed by the author on the basis of data from the Estonian Electoral 




The core idea behind the Estonian internet voting system is that the provision of these 
online channels for voting removes another barrier by making voting more “convenient” 
(Alvarez et al 2009, 502). Proponents of remote electronic voting in Estonia, however, often 
extend their argument beyond convenience and insist that this type of voting will increase 
turnout in elections. Electronic voting will reduce transaction costs and enhance efficiency in 
the voting process. Citizens find it easier to cast their vote and they face lower costs of voting 
(Interviews 20). 
Of course, benefits of electronic voting such as reduced transaction costs are only one 
side of the coin. On the other side, the electronic voting has also potential costs – e.g. reduced 
civic engagement, privacy and security concerns. Indeed, these costs are not just technical or 
emerge from a particular civic republican and/or communitarian theoretical perspective.  
Starting with the consideration of instrumental facts, internet voting reduces some transaction 
costs for voting while it does increase some other costs. From a purely practical point of view, 
voters do not simply need access to the computer but the use of the national ID card is 
required as well. The use of ID card requires a purchase of ID-card reader or a computer with 
an ID card reader.  Since most people use banking services often, then it has created habit to 
make transactions online, which in turn, has made adoption of ID card and internet voting 
easier. This allows understanding the role of ID-card in the elections. Naturally, it follows that 
one of the main reasons for low participation in online voting in the municipal elections of fall 
2005 is simply the fact that the online use of ID card was not wide spread. Many people did 
not use ID card for online transactions because they used old identification techniques 
(Martens 2010). As the following table 5.3 shows, 61 percent of all internet voters were first 
online ID card users in the 2005 elections. In the 2007 elections the first time online users of 
ID-card users made up 39 percent. Subsequently, the percentage of first time online ID card 
users in the European elections dropped to 19 and in the municipal elections to 18.5. 
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Similarly, voters were able to use mobile ID instead of ID card in the last four elections. The 
data shows that in 2011 election only 1.9 percent of internet voters used mobile ID while in 
2013 the percentage had increased to 8.6 percent. 11 percent of voters used Mobile ID in 2014 
and 12 percent did so in 2015. 
   
Table 5.3: Characteristics of internet voting in the Estonian elections (2005-2015). 
 




















users (% of 





Municipal 2005  N/A 3 7.2 N/A 61 
National Parliament 
2007 
2 / 51 3 17.6 N/A 39 
European Parliament 
2009 
3/ 66 7 45.4 N/A 19 
Municipal 2009 2.8 / 66 7 44 N/A 18.5 
National Parliament 
2011 
3.9 / 105 7 56.4 1.9 N/A 
Municipal 2013 4.2  / 105 7 50.5 8.6 N/A 
European Parliament 
2014 
3.7 / 98 7 59.2 11.0 N/A 
National Parliament 
2015 
5.71/116 7 59.6 12.2 N/A 
Source:  Compiled by the author on the basis of data from the Estonian Electoral Commission 
(2015) and Kitsing (2014). 
 
In sum, the role of ID card and mobile ID demonstrate that internet voting is a typical 
adoption process as described by Rogers (1995), where early adopters proved ID card as well 
as mobile ID a reliable way to submit votes and conduct transactions online. As a result 
increasingly higher percentage of voters have started to rely on these methods. It cannot be 
argued that internet voting caused people to use more ID cards and this led to wider use of 
sophisticated online services, which all contributed to the use of internet. Rather, as 
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individuals gained more experience in using internet and ID card online, then they become 
more comfortable in voting online as well.  But certainly the fact that in the first elections 
significant percentage of citizens used their cards first time online also gave some early 
adopters more experience and allowed them to experiment with the ID card in online 
environments. 
Coming back to costs and benefits, it is obvious that the adoption of ID card and its 
reader did represent significant costs in the early voting experiments in 2005 and 2007. 
However, it does not represent significant costs for the considerable proportion of voters 
anymore as they have adopted this technology already as consumers in using internet banking 
and other services. Even institutionally, the process has changed. Internet voting is spread 
over 7 days since 2009. It used to be three days in 2005 and 2007. If the voter changes its 
mind, then there is a possibility of electronic re-vote: e-voters can cast their votes again 
electronically and in that case, their previous votes will be deleted. As far as privacy and 
security are concerned, then at the vote count, the voter's digital signature is removed. The 
members of the National Electoral Committee can together open the anonymous internet 
votes and count them. 
One way of tackling these challenges is to vote early and not to leave it for the last 
minute. If any technical difficulties occur, there is sufficient time to solve these problems or 
vote in the traditional way at the ballot box. Table 5.3 shows that in the first two elections the 
share of internet votes as a percentage of all pre-election day votes ranged between 7 and 18 
percent. At the same time, in the last six elections it ranged between 44 and 60 percent. The 7-
day internet voting period has it made easier for voters to submit their votes and half of the 
voter prefer to do it early rather than on the last day. This is one way for tackling potential 
uncertainty which technology may sometimes cause. It also reduces the symbolic importance 
of election day and makes voting as a result more transactional.  
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Table 5.3 shows also that the percentage of internet votes by Estonians abroad is 
miniscule in comparison with votes submitted in Estonia. In 2015 only close to 6 percent of 
internet votes were submitted abroad. Over the years only 2-6 percent of internet votes have 
been submitted outside of Estonia. Even though,  number of countries from where Estonians 
submit their voters has increased from 51 in 2007 to 116 in 2015, internet voting is still a 
domestic matter as 94 percent of votes are submitted by residents of Estonia.  
This fact alone brings attention back to the importance of context for explaining the 
nature of internet voting. It seems that this method of voting would serve best the Estonians 
outside Estonia and would allow increasing turnout by making voting for them possible. 
However, the expat community has not been eager to pick up internet voting and it really 
gathers primarily for domestic audience who could without major difficulties vote also in the 
traditional voting booth.  
 
5.4.2 Internet Voting and Digital Divide 
The qualities of ID card reader, computer hardware and software as well as skill-level 
in using these technologies are important factors whether internet voting makes voting more 
easier to citizens or not. The role of resources and knowledge, of course, raise the issue of 
digital divide  and its effects on internet voting in Estonia (Bochsler 2010, 4-6). The digital 
divide is when certain social groups have resources, skills and knowledge for utilization of 
information and communication technologies while other social groups lack these necessary 
preconditions for internet use. A digital divide may exist between countries and regions as 
well as within regions, countries, cities, towns and villages (Norris 2001). Thus it relates back 
to the very topic of this dissertation on how internet diffuses differently in different countries, 
geographic areas and among different social groups.  The segments of society with a lower 
income, and insufficient computer skills are less likely to cast their votes online than wealthier 
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and better educated citizens. Particularly so by considering that a considerable amount of 
internet voters are urban and the distance to voting booths is smaller in urban locations than in 
the countryside. The votes of residents of two largest cities – Tallinn and Tartu – have 
amounted to 40-50 percent of all internet votes in the elections between 2005 and 2015. By 
attempting to see the impact of internet voting on educational and economic criteria the 
distribution of votes between cities and rural areas can be used as a proxy. More than half of 
the votes were submitted in capital city of Tallinn and its surrounding Harju county in 2013, 
where the GDP per capita is highest in Estonia and people have the best education.  However, 
if one considers that 60 per cent of Estonian GDP is generated in this region, then the 
distribution of votes does not seem distortive. If the second largest city Tartu and its 
surrounding county is added to the picture, then over 60 percent of internet votes were 
submitted in the two largest metropolitan areas (Estonian Electoral Commission 2015).   
The same pattern has persisted in 2015 when almost 60 percent of internet votes were 
submitted in the two largest metropolitan areas. At the same time, voters in quite urbanized 
and industrialized but primarily Russian-speaking county of Ida-Virumaa in the north-east 
Estonia counted only four percent of internet votes in 2013. The same pattern persisted in 
2015. As non-citizen residents can vote in the municipal elections, then this low turnout 
cannot be explained by ineligibility. Rather, the internet voting has not been adopted among 
Russian speaking population to the extent it has spread among Estonian speakers (Estonian 
Electoral Commission 2015). 
In addition to geographical distribution, one additional way to measure the impact of 
digital divide is to examine the age structure of internet voters. 18-34 year olds made up 43 
percent of all internet voters in 2005 and 44 percent in 2007. After that their share has been 
dropping and reached 36 percent in 2011. At the same time the share of over 55 year old 
voters was 15 percent in 2005 but has increased to 21 percent in 2011. The share of internet 
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voters between 35 and 54 has stayed more or less constant in all 10 elections with slightly 
more than 40 percent (Estonian Electoral Commission 2015). This does not indicate a 
significant divide considering that young are always eager to adopt new technologies while 
older generations tend take a more conservative view. The dynamic comparison shows that 
the older generation is actually following the young in the adoption process. The data on 
distributional impact of internet voting on different sexes is showing the same pattern. In 
2005, 54 percent of internet voters were male and 46 percent were female. Their roles had 
been reversed by 2011 as 54 percent of internet voters were female and 46 percent were male 
(Estonian Electoral Commission 2015). 
Additionally, the distributional impact can be analyzed by considering the influence of 
internet voting on political parties. Parties representing less fortunate segments of population 
were skeptical about the internet voting, while center-right parties were the main champions 
of the internet voting initiatives (Drechsler, 2006). However, Alvarez et al (2009) argue that 
the results of Estonian internet voting have not introduced socio-economic and political bias 
when controlling for other variables (Alvarez et al, 502). Nevertheless, their own data about 
the 2007 elections shows that only 9.1 percent of internet voters voted for the Center Party, 
which received 26.1 percent of overall votes. The Center Party is a populist, left of center 
political party, which represents older, Russian-speaking and economically challenged 
segments of Estonian population than other main parties. Naturally, it might be that the 
supporters of this party have lower levels of computer skills and this is the reason for lower 
share of internet votes. Nevertheless, seeing skills as more important explanatory variable 
than socio-economic status is just a restatement of the argument. 
It is clear that there is an uneven distribution of internet voting along the party lines 
(Table 5.4). For instance, Reform Party received 35 percent of internet votes while its total 
score was 28 percent of votes. Similarly, the Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit (IRL) received 27 
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percent of internet votes in comparison with 18 percent of total votes.  In other words, two 
main center-right parties received a total of 63 percent of internet votes while their share of 
total votes was 46 percent.  Both of these parties were actively pushing for the 
implementation of remote electronic voting and the results show clearly they have bigger 
share of internet votes than other main parties. Similar pattern has been persistent also in all 
other elections between 2005 and 2014 (Estonian Electoral Commission 2015).  
  
Table 5.4:  Distribution of internet votes among political parties in the Estonian elections  - 




Reform   IRL  Center Social 
democrats 
Greens 
Municipal 2005  33  18 + 
1040 
9 10 N/A 
National Parliament 
2007 
35 27 9 13 11 
European Parliament 
200941 
20 17 11 10 3 
Municipal 2009 25 23 15 11 2 
National Parliament 
2011 
37 25 10 18 4 
Municipal 2013 22 26 9 15 N/A 
European Parliament 
201442 
32 19 6 15 N/A 
Source:  Composed by the author on the basis of data from the Estonian Electoral 
Commission (2015) and Kitsing (2014). 
 
One way how the Center Party has tried to minimize their lower share was by setting 
up special internet voting booths in Tallinn, a capital city of Estonia whose municipal 
                                                 
40 The IRL was two separate parties in 2005. Isamaliit (IL) got 18 percent of votes and Res Publica (RP) 10 
percent of votes. In the next elections both parties had jooned forces and were running as  one party - Isamaa ja 
Res Publica Liit (IRL).  
 
41 Independent candidate Indrek Tarand received 32 percent of all internet votes. More than any  political party 
in these elections. 




government they control. Even though such actions were not technically violation of electoral 
law as long as it was not done directly by political party but by city government or other 
organizations, such booths do raise the question of privacy and introduce additional political 
biases into the voting system. Ironically, it turns the whole idea of internet voting on its head 
as the process reminds more of traditional voting. Instead voting in their home or office, 
people will go to special internet voting booth to cast their vote. Nevertheless, such internet 
voting booths may be good at promoting civic engagement and offering an opportunity for 
people without home computer to cast their ballot online. 
The previous discussion showed that the electorate of center-right parties used more 
internet voting than center-left parties. However, the crucial question is whether these gains 
came by increasing turnout or simply substituting internet voting for ballot-box.  Alvarez et al 
(2009) argue on the basis of data from the 2007 parliamentary elections that online voting 
mobilized “more casual voters” (Alvarez et al, 502). They found that 11 per cent of online 
voters probably would not have or for sure would not have voted without this option (Alvarez 
et al 2009, 502). Similarly, Vassil (2007) found that 14 percent of internet voters would not 
have voted in the 2007 parliamentary elections by other ways than internet (Vassil 2007, 41). 
Both of these studies relied on survey data, which is of limited nature and cannot properly 
estimate substitution effects. In a methodologically more sophisticated approach, Bochsler 
(2010) estimated the magnitude of substitution effect and found that the internet voting in 
2007 elections did not lead to increased turnout, but attracted the same social groups who 
usually vote (Bochsler 2010, 18).  This is also consistent with more qualitative preliminary 
conclusion drawn from the early experiments in the 2005 municipal elections is that it did not 
increase participation in the election but was used as an alternative method to cast one’s vote 
(Drechsler 2006).  
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The internet voting does not necessarily increase participation in the elections. In 
democracies, adult citizens can vote but large minorities or even majorities choose not to 
exercise this right even if the transaction costs are low. Similarly, internet voting may 
decrease transaction costs but does not necessarily increase participation. In many cases, it 
may simply serve as a substitute for citizens already actively engaged in political 
participation. Nevertheless, the last results of municipal elections were correlated with 
increased participation. The turnout is unusually high for a municipal election, which seems to 
suggest that internet voting might have contributed for the increased participation. However, 
online voters made up almost 15 percent of voters also in the European Parliament elections, 
where the turnout was close to 44 percent in 2009 and overall turnout was 37 percent in 2014 . 
Of course, there are other factors at play such as economic issues and dissatisfaction with 
particular municipal governments in explaining the high turnout. Most importantly, the 
elections results are overdetermined and correlations do not imply causation.  
My results of analysis of internet voting across several elections in Estonia indicates 
that political parties misunderstand the nature of internet voting by thinking it creates winners 
and losers. Center Party has been actively campaigning against internet voting but this is 
based on misunderstanding. Internet voting does not reduce their total share of votes as it does 
not increase turnout. In 2014, the city government of Tallinn, a capital of Estonia, 
commissioned a study by American and European internet security experts, who argued that 
internet voting is not secure and Estonia should abandon this practice (Springall et al 2014).  
Since the city government of Tallinn is controlled by the Center Party, then by the supporters 
of internet voting it is seen as a political attempt to delegitimize the internet voting. It can be 
argued that the Center Party engages in rational behavior with the objective to abolish internet 
voting. The Center Party perceives that internet voting benefits other parties at the expense of 
its potential electorate. But their rationality is bounded by asymmetric information. This has 
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led them to learn wrong lessons andbelieve something which is not necessarily the case. 
However, it can be seen as entrepreneurial discovery process where agents are bounded by 
institutional complexity. The Center Party aims at eliminating internet voting because they see 
it as threatening their interest and they believe that they lose votes as a result.  
 
5.4.3 Internet Voting and Path-Dependency 
Constantly increasing number of Estonians has used opportunities to vote online in the 
last ten elections. This follows the logic of diffusion of innovations. Early adopters showed 
the way and more and more people follow their lead. The data shows that older people and 
more women are using online voting option, which reveals that this method of voting is 
becoming more widespread and ordinary voters may simply use it as a substitute for offline 
options.  This is in line with the data that shows that internet has become a more widely used 
among different segments of Estonian society. Internet voting has not been the main cause for 
the wider use of internet but it has certainly given at least one additional reason, if not 
symbolic reason, for getting online.  
The discussion of internet voting has indicated the role played by online identification 
methods in encouraging the widespread use of internet and sophisticated online services. 
Section 2.6 emphasized that internet is a network good where its use depends on applications 
connected to the network. Once Estonian started to use ID card in online banking transactions, 
it also made easier for them to use it for internet voting. ID card and internet voting are both 
applications which broaden the options for internet users. The internet voting would not have 
been possible without the adoption of government issued ID cards by increasingly greater 
segments of Estonian society. As the ID card can be used in multiple offline and online 
environment, its widespread use in using both online services provided by public and private 
sectors has contributed to the internet voting turnout. Internet voting is primarily used by 
191 
 
residents of Estonia, not by expats and institutional changes to increase voting period from 
three to seven days have encouraged adoption of internet voting.  
Furthermore, section 2.6 emphasized the importance of path-dependency in 
technology diffusion. Network goods are often characterized by path-dependency because of 
increasing returns associated with their diffusion. It was not certain in 2002 when ID cards 
were introduced that they will be a success. As it was highlighted above there was rivalry 
among different players. Similarly it was not certain that internet voting will be  a success in 
2005 when it was introduced. Similarly, it is not certain whether these technological solutions 
are superior to alternative options. However, choices were made within the constraints. As a 
result the spread of internet voting is a path-dependent process, where early adoption of online 
identification methods for internet banking has contributed to the use of ID cards, which in 
turn have made internet voting more widely spread. Obviously, the path-dependence may also 
imply that individuals accustomed to traditional methods of voting may be reluctant to adopt 
new innovative methods of voting – even if these methods will save their time. Hence, it 
seems unrealistic to assume that majority of voters will start voting online soon. Particularly, 
as it has been pointed out above that significant segments of society still do not use ID card 
online, not to mention Mobile ID.  Internet voting is not possible without the use of ID card or 
Mobile ID (Mobile ID use requires the existence of ID card).   
Nevertheless, path-dependence may also imply that heavy users of sophisticated 
online services may find it less costly to use internet voting than offline alternative. Their 
previous choices in using internet and online identification methods have given them 
experience and trust in such methods, which can be transferred to internet voting. The reasons 
for internet voting cannot come from a calculative singular approach, where we assume 
perfect rationality and utility maximization.  Voters have many different identities and they 
have multitude of preferences. Some voters may be encouraged to vote simply because 
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remote electronic voting is available. This does not imply that they will vote next time. For 
many others the availability of internet voting is not even necessary (not to mention 
sufficient) condition for submitting their vote.  Hence, we should assume “bounded 
rationality” instead of perfect rationality, when approaching theoretically and analyzing 
empirically the role of internet voting.  Internet voting might be a good substitute for offline 
alternatives for some people but certainly not for everybody. It is difficult to see how the 
internet voting contributes to increased turnout on the basis of Estonian experience and 
inadequate evidence. Hence, the instrumentalist case that making voting convenient will 
contribute to increased turnout does not hold on the grounds of instrumentalist logic. As it 
was demonstrated above descriptive data does not allow inferring that turnout has increased 
because of internet voting. Share of internet voting of total votes has increased but turnout has 
fluctuated between 34.5 and 64.2 percent depending on election in the last 10 years.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Radical change in the rules of the game led to the entrepreneurial discovery process 
and emergence of many new agents, such as banks, who became heavy internet users and 
promoters of their own interests in Estonia. The positive externalities of private sector internet 
use spilled over to other parts of life, including civic engagement. Indeed, the story of internet 
banking development suggests that the incentive structures of public and private sector agents 
were consistent with each other, and thus led to the use of internet banking technology in 
interactive transactions with government as well (such as filing taxes). This mutual re-
enforcement made it possible to exploit the positive network externalities of the internet yet 
further by both private and public sector agents. Users benefited from increasing returns as 
more users joined the network. This weakened the position of substitutes (e.g., walking to the 
local bank branch office or submitting income tax returns by regular mail) by replacing them 
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with the demand for Internet.   Most importantly, it was rational for the banks to cooperate 
with government because it allows reaping benefits from the Internet as a network good. 
Essentially, banks such as Hansapank (it was renamed Swedbank in 2008) became hubs in the 
network. Clients are able to access services of government agencies as well as other services 
provided by private sector with a few mouse clicks while being logged onto the online 
banking environment. Citizens accessing government agencies are directed to the websites of 
banks if it was necessary to identify his or her identity. It was rational for government 
agencies to rely on this solution and cooperation because it was efficient, secure, simple and 
kept costs minimal. It has been rational for the banks to cooperate with government because it 
allows reaping benefits from the Internet as a network good.  
Even though, the government ID card initiated a change from privately driven online 
identification methods to publicly driven methods, it was essential for banks to be part of ID 
card project and allow its use instead of creating their own identification system. In this sense, 
the behavior of Estonian banks is completely different from many other banks in the world, 
who are usually eager to create their own identification systems. The use of game theory can 
help to illustrate these fundamental differences. Essentially, Estonian banks play the 
coordination game such as the battle of sexes with the government while alternative option is 
to play prisoner’s dilemma. In the game of battle of sexes both players are better off 
coordinating their activities with each other. Multiple equilibrium are possible – (3, 4) or (4, 
3) (Figure 5.6). The outcome depends on the relative bargaining position of different parties. 
At the particular juncture from 1996 to 2005, the outcome is closer to the preferred position of 
banks rather than that of government (4,3). However, it is still beneficial for them to 
cooperate rather than not to cooperate. Banks benefit from the network externalities and 
government from the platform to provide services to the citizens.  The lack of coordination  
and creating incompatible public and private platforms would result much worse outcome for 
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both parties  (1, 2) or (2, 1) (Figure 5.6). However, the ID card project increases the 
bargaining position of government and new equilibria emerges (3,4). Banks gradually start 
shifting from their old identification methods to new one.  
 
 Private: internet 
bank based 
identification 
Public: ID card 
based 
identification 
Private: internet bank 
based identification 
4, 3 2, 1 
Public: ID card based 
identification 
1, 2 3,4 
 
    Payoffs: (Banks, Government) 
    Note: 4 is the highest payoff. 1 is the lowest payoff.  
Figure 5.6: Coordination game between Estonian government and banks . 
 
It is still beneficial for them to cooperate with government because alternative option 
of setting up own identification methods which are incompatible would lead to worse payoffs. 
Hence, the strategies of government and banks have been incentive-compatible in the time 
period of 1996-2013.  In the terms of game theory, government and banks could have played 
the cooperation game of prisoner’s dilemma during the throughout the same time period. In 
ideal world, they could reach optimal outcome in terms of equilibrium (3,3) but instead they 
play repeated game of one-shot prisoner’s dilemma with suboptimal Nash equilibrium (2,2) 
(Figure 5.7).   
 Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate 3, 3 4, 1 
Defect 1, 4 2,2 
 
                            Payoffs: (Banks, Government) 




Win-lose payoffs in the scale of (1,4) or (4,1) are not characteristic to this game 
(Figure 5.7) because rational decision based on assumption that other side acts rationally as 
well. Banks would see cooperation on government driven solution as a loss and government 
would see cooperation on bank driven solution as a loss.  
Of course, this is a stylized narrative based on analogies of two games. It is also based 
on perception of players as identified through interviews rather than the calculations of actual 
payoffs. In this sense, it serves illustrative purposes in order to highlight key points. Reality is 
certainly much more complex and interests of all banks and  government agencies are not 
perfectly aligned as the chapter on Estonia and previously Kitsing (2011) has  highlighted that 
different government agencies have used the possibilities of online identification platforms by 
banks in a diverse way.   
The empirical analysis in Chapter Four followed the discussion of perspectives in 
section 2.1 which emphasized the importance of formal institutions, particularly changes in 
telecom policy as well as income and skills. From the comparative analysis it emerged that 
competition and openness in telecom sector reduces supply side constraints for internet 
diffusion. This section brought in additional factors emphasizing the process of 
entrepreneurial discovery in banking and in certain agencies of Estonian public sector, which 
has been crucial for encouraging the use of internet for a variety of purposes.  
My analysis of the development of internet banking in Estonia demonstrates that 
changes in the formal rules provided incentives for self-interested agents to find innovative 
solutions through the process of entrepreneurial discovery. Leading banks started to offer 
online banking in 2000 and cooperate with government and telecom companies to launch ID 
card project in 2002. This made internet voting possible in 2005. These new innovations of 
online identification and internet voting encouraged internet use in Estonia. The government’s 
contribution to Internet diffusion was primarily in the form of rule-making and policy 
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entrepreneurship. Government enabled entrepreneurs in private and public sector to take 
initiative. Most outstanding example of this policy entrepreneurship is internet voting, which 
has been unique not only in the European context but also in the world because it is used in 
local, national and European elections and it relies on the use of ID card. The emergence of 
internet voting, for instance, is reaction to increasing use of internet in society rather than 
factor that led to increased use. Hence, changing the specific rules governing electoral process 
can be seen more in terms of political propaganda to show the enthusiasm of Estonian 
government about internet. Since people have voted in the elections eight times between 2005 
and 2015, it can hardly count as a reason to get internet access. Nevertheless, it does 
contribute to sophistication of internet use.  Open and liberal institutional framework which 
has encouraged the entrepreneurial discovery process has allowed both private and public 
sector to offer more sophisticated services to the public. This has contributed to heavier use of 
















INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY AND POLICY HETEORGENEITY 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The Chapter Five discussed experimentation in Estonia from 1991 to present with 
different ICT services in both private and public sectors. It emphasized the importance of 
entrepreneurial discovery process in both public and private sectors and path-dependency in 
delivering positive results. As all of these different projects such as internet banking, ID card 
and Skype were surrounded by uncertainty in their early stages of development, when nobody 
knew whether they will be widely adopted. However, in order to offer more balanced 
assessment this chapter aims to offer heterogeneous cases in addition to positive cases in the 
Chapter Five. In doing so it employs concepts of institutional complexity and policy 
heterogeneity. The section 2.2 draw attention to the institutional complexity, which by 
creating uncertainty may constrain entrepreneurial discovery process. If the Estonian Tax 
Authority would have faced complex legal requirements in both national and European level 
in 2000, then introduction of online tax services would have been difficult if not impossible. 
Also, if they would have faced hostile public opinion primarily focusing on security concerns 
of online tax declaration, then this project would not have been as successful as it is seen now. 
Let me re-call that institutional complexity refers to the interactions of formal such as 
government regulations and informal institutions such as habits and attitudes of people as well 
as interactions of formal institutions on different levels of government regulations such as 
local, national and European levels. This implies that broad rules governing macroeconomic 
environment may conflict with regulations on micro level. There is considerable literature on 
institutional complexity and one way to define it is “incompatible prescriptions from multiple 
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institutional logics” (Greenwood, Raynard et al. 2011, 317). Different institutions, their 
interactions, conflicts and institutional logics create institutional complexity. 
  Policy heterogeneity is closely linked with institutional complexity because 
institutional complexity reduces certainty and means ambiguity in rules governing our daily 
interactions. Policy making depends on both formal and informal rules. Broadly policy 
heterogeneity can be seen that public policies often have heterogeneous context and design. 
Starting with formal aspects, Knoepfel et al (2011) argue that if implementation of public 
policy falls under several ministries, or several departments within one ministry, then policy 
context is heterogeneous. If policy is implemented by one unit at the same ministry, then it is 
homogeneous. They give defense policy as an example of homogeneous administrative 
context while policies dealing with natural disasters are heterogeneous (Knoepfel et al 2011, 
186-187). For instance, introduction of online tax services was a project of one agency in 
Estonia. There was relatively little interaction with other agencies and the Tax Authority was 
able to rely on already on existing solution provided by internet banking as documented in 
Chapter 5. At the same time, the introduction of ID cards was considerably more 
heterogeneous policy-making case involving legislative, executive branches of government, 
several ministries within executive branch as well as private sector agents such as leading 
retail banks and telecom companies (Martens 2010).  
Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine completely homogeneous policy context. 
Hence, it is a question of degree of heterogeneity and homogeneity. Most importantly, ICT 
policies have high degree of heterogeneity by administrative context as well as design. ICT is 
by nature horizontal dependent on physical infrastructure as well as humans skills in different 
administrative units and in society as well. For instance, the successful implementation of 
online tax declaration depends on existing infrastructure, available identification methods and 
many other factors, which are not directly under control of Tax Authority. Knoepfel et al 
199 
 
(2011) approach seems also narrow considering nature of public policy implementation in 
general and ICT policies in particular.  Even if policy context and design is homogeneous, 
then the impact of public policies can be heterogeneous. This may stem from unintended 
consequences, interactions of government regulations with informal rules as discussed under 
institutional complexity. In international economics policy heterogeneity is used to highlight 
regulatory differences between countries (Kox and Lejour 2005). However, there might be 
also regulatory differences within countries or among the group of countries such as EU as 
discussed in section 2.8, which formally have adopted same telecom regulations. It is a fact of 
life that regulations may conflict with each other and may be implemented differently by 
policymakers. True nature of policy heterogeneity is captured by Room (2011) who combines 
theories on complex adaptive systems, institutional analysis and policy analysis in his book 
“Complexity, Institutions and Public Policy”. He writes: 
 “The real world of policy-making may be so turbulent that there are few familiar 
patterns by reference to the regularities of the past, even fewer plausible ‘mental 
models’ or conjectures for the future. Public policy-makers may be able to reduce this 
uncertainty by actively shaping the future, rather than just attempting to predict it; 
however, even they are limited in the capacity and knowledge of which they dispose.” 
(Room 2011, 244). 
 
Room’s emphasis on limits of knowledge of policy-makers echoes Hayek’s 
understanding of limits of knowledge in centralized decision-making as it is discussed in the 
Section 2.8 of Chapter Two. According to Hayek (1945) considerable amount of useful 
knowledge is decentralized and tacit which implies it that it is difficult to centralize it without 
collected knowledge becoming useless. Room (2011) is somewhat more optimistic than 
Hayek about policy-makers abilities to shape the future and reduce some uncertainties but, 
nevertheless, their limits must be recognized. The concept of policy heterogeneity can be also 
seen in the context of smart specialization literature as discussed in the Section 2.4, which 
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argued that countries follow different development trajectories. This means that same or 
similar policies in different context may yield heterogeneous policy outcomes.  
This chapter will discuss the following cases to illustrate institutional complexity and 
policy heterogeneity. First, the ICT-specific policy making will be discussed in general. 
Second, it will be followed by analysis on EU-wide network neutrality legislation and 
Estonian policy contributions. As Chapter Four identified rule-making concerning telecom 
liberalization as a crucial factor in Estonia, then it will be important to see how Estonian 
public policy makers have been able to tackle more complex policy challenges. Third, 
government intervention in venture capital market with the aim of supporting ICT companies 
will be discussed. All of these cases are used to demonstrate policy heterogeneity and explore 
how institutional complexity  may lead to heterogeneous outcomes. These cases are offered in 
order to balance the understanding that the Estonian government has pursued homogeneous 
and centralized public policy to promote ICTs and their use in all segments of society.  
 
6.2 Innovation, ICT and Policy-Making in Estonia 
Let me start this section by recalling a quote from Paul Pierson’s book: “Every step 
and every movement of the multitude, even in what are termed enlightened ages, are made 
with equal blindness to the future ; and nations stumble upon establishments, which are, 
indeed, the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design.” (Pierson 
2004, 102). Chapters Four and Five argued that Estonia is quite different – at least in 
comparison with Slovenia and some other countries in the Central Eastern Europe. However, 
it is not different because Estonian policy-makers had particularly good vision and did not 
stumble upon establishments. Here as everywhere out there outcomes are result of human 




However, a posteriori rational reasoning that the good outcomes in internet diffusion 
and related technologies were result of some grand master plan is quite widespread in policy 
circles. If politicians do it, it is understandable because it is their job often to turn complexity 
into simplicity, research into soundbites, uncertainty into certainty and nonlinearity into 
linearity. Similarly, civil servants may have incentives to overemphasize their contributions 
and impact of public policies. Furthermore, simplified accounts of ICT developments and 
policies may simply be used as marketing tool in targeting international audiences with 
limited attention span. For instance, Estonian government’s marketing website www.e-
estonia.com states bluntly at the front page: “”e-Estonia” is a term that is commonly used to 
describe Estonia’s emergence as one of the most advanced e-societies in the world – an 
incredible success story that grew out of a partnership between a forward-thinking 
government, a proactive ICT sector and switched on, tech savvy population” (e-Estonia 
2015).active I 
The website goes further and claims that “interaction among government agencies, 
and between the government and citizens, has been completely transformed in e-Estonia, 
quickly making bureaucracy a thing of the past and making the running of all levels of 
government more efficient than ever before” (e-Estonia 2015). Even if this is understandably 
a marketing text, these are bold claims about complete transformation of citizen-government 
interaction, disappearance of bureaucracy and efficiency. The Chapter Two emphasized that 
transformational role of technology does not come without any costs and government ICT 
projects do fail. The discussion of institutional complexity and policy heterogeneity in the 
beginning of this Chapter should also remind us the trade-offs. As Room (2011) reminds us 
“the challenge of ensuring both security and transparent governance for these new 
institutional forms” is one key area of focus for scholarship in this field. In this context, these 
claims are particularly bold. Estonia claimed to have solved the challenges with gusto, while 
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leading experts and academics still spend sleepless nights thinking about them.  Even if seen 
as a pure marketing text, it should avoid overselling and overpromising establishments that 
are out of government control.  
Academic research tends to be more balanced but even there similar notions can be 
found (Ernsdorff and Berbec 2007). They write the following about Estonia:  
„…it is setting an example in terms of e-democracy throughout the European Union, 
being the first country in the world to enable all its citizens to vote over the Internet in 
political elections. But it was not just the EU membership that expanded the use of 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in Estonian society; it was 
mainly the strategic thinking within the government to implement e-democracy, good 
attention to detail and a positive attitude towards ICT policy, innovative thinking and 
the development of a legal framework, and the economic growth and the 
macroeconomic stability of the country. The progress made by Estonia in the field of 
information technology has led to the development of some of the most dynamic ICT 
companies in the world, placing Estonia on the world map with three major 
technological innovations: Kazaa (software that allows file sharing), Skype (Internet-
based free phone service) and Hotmail (free web-based e-mail) – all three originating 
from Estonia.“ (Ernsdorff and Berbec 2007, 171)  
 
Chapter Five already pointed out that the example of Hotmail is a mistake or 
simplistic interpretation of some Estonian government marketing text, which sometimes used 
Hotmail as an example of company funded by Steve Jurvetson, an American-Estonian venture 
capitalist in Silicon Valley. Most importantly, such accounts fail to account for institutional 
complexity and policy heterogeneity. If the EU membership is an important variable, then 
diverse outcomes in internet diffusion among different EU members cannot be explained. 
Ernsdorff and Berbec (2007).  It also fails to distinguish between private and public sector 
projects. Often the success of Skype is given as an example of successful ICT policy in 
Estonia or even a reason to increase government support for ICT sector. But as was discussed 
in previous chapter Skype was founded by Swedish and Estonian programmers who were 
fugitive from the US justice system for a while because of their previous project Kazaa 
allegedly infringed the copyrights of Hollywood music industry. Estonian government did not 
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give any support for the project. Once Skype had become a success story politicians started to 
exploit its success.  
 Most importantly, such mischaracterizations tend to rely on the following three 
misunderstandings.  First, Estonia is particularly innovative country. Second, ICT sector plays 
a large role in the Estonian economy and politics.   Third, Estonian success in ICT is result of 
well-coordinated public policy which in centralized top-down fashion has turned the country 
to “e-Estonia”. The latter claim can be found in simplified accounts written by international 
experts and scholars (Dutta 2006; Ernsdorff and Berbec 2007). Nevertheless, Estonian own 
policy-makers avoid emphasizing centralization and bring attention to the benefits of 
decentralization.  Even Estonian government’s marketing website states the following:  
“The e-Estonia digital society is made possible largely due to its infrastructure. Instead 
of developing a single, all-encompassing central system, Estonia created an open, 
decentralized system that links together various services and databases. The flexibility 
provided by this open set-up has allowed new components of the digital society to be 
developed and added through the years. It’s that power to expand that has allowed 
Estonia to grow into one of Europe’s success stories of the last decade.” (e-Estonia 
2015) 
 
If all or some of these claims were true, then obviously internet would be widely 
diffused. Simplified analytical accounts of internet developments are based on understanding 
of this stylized Estonian model can somehow be transferred to other countries. Estonian 
policy entrepreneurs want outside world to believe that Estonia is a great success story in the 
field of ICT, and naturally, they are interested in exporting some of the Estonian IT solutions 
such as X-Road and internet voting to other countries. The new example of this marketing 
strategy is Estonian e-Residence Program, which aims to make Estonian ID Card and online 
services accessible with the card such as company registration and banking available to 10 
million international residents (e-Estonia 2015). US President Barack Obama was one of the 
first foreign dignitaries to receive Estonian ID card when he visited Estonia in 2014. It cannot 
be confirmed whether he has used Estonian ID card or not in online environments. However, 
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he was quite convinced of achievements in the Estonian ICT sector and decided to dedicate a 
paragraph to it in a speech, which primarily focused on the security situation. Obama said the 
following about ICT development in Estonia in a speech in Tallinn on September 3, 2014:  
„ Look at the evidence. Here in Estonia, we see the success of free markets, 
integration with Europe, taking on tough reforms. You’ve become one of the most 
wired countries on Earth, a global leader in e-government and high-tech start-ups. The 
entrepreneurial spirit of the Estonian people has been unleashed. And your 
innovations, like Skype, are transforming the world.” (Hanrahan 2014) 
 
During the press conference on September 3, 2014, Obama went further and said that “I 
should have called the Estonians when we were setting up our healthcare website.” He 
pointed out that “With their digital IDs, Estonians can use their smartphones to get just about 
anything done online — from their children’s grades to their health records” (Hattem 2014). 
This actually is an overstatement and quite ironic because of delivery of Estonian healthcare 
records online can be hardly described as a success. The Estonian State Audit Office carried 
out analysis of electronic health initiatives in 2014 which concluded that most projects had 
failed. Government has spent five times more funds on these health initiatives than initially 
budgeted. The result is digital prescription, while all other components of electronic health 
services such as digital patient history, digital pictures and other services which would 
eliminate repetitive data collection and would make data available for all doctors 
electronically have failed (Riigikontroll 2014).  Reforming health care does not require only 
technological solutions but requires changes in the institutions. Obviously, the process of 
entrepreneurial discovery has not been able to deal with institutional complexity of health care 
information systems and it has resulted in policy failure. This experience, of course, does not 
make Estonia unique as the world is littered with policy failures in this field as health care 
information systems have many problems everywhere. The next section will tackle the role of 
innovation in Estonia. This is followed  by discussion of ICT sector in the Estonian economy 
and politics. The third issue concerning (de)centralization of decision-making will be 
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discussed last and has been already covered to some extent in Chapter 5 concerning online tax 
services and X-Road infrastructure.   
6.2.1 Estonia as an Average Innovator 
Each year European Union tries to measure innovation among its member states with 
the European Innovation Scoreboard.  The scoreboard is a result of EU attempts to develop 
indicators for measuring “knowledge economy” (Room 2011, 271). EU’s Lisbon agenda 
established a new process of “soft” governance, which extends beyond policy areas with a 
clear EU mandate. One method for such governance is constant benchmarking. This seems 
rather crude and simplistic once institutional complexity and policy heterogeneity but at least 
policy-makers in Estonia do pay attention to the European Innovation Scoreboard (personal 
observation, Interviews). The scoreboard uses a large number of indicators such as R&D 
activity, number of science graduates, patents, weight of high tech industries, innovation by 
Small and Medium Size enterprises and others. The detailed methodology is described  in the 
scoreboard (European Commission 2015, 79-90). As the following Table 6.1 demonstrates 
Estonia is slightly above the EU average, Slovenia and other CEE countries  in innovation in 
2009 but still has a significant room for advancement. It cannot be concluded that Estonia is 
particularly innovative in comparison with all other EU countries. However, it was more 
innovative than Central and Eastern European member states in 2009. However, if we look at 
more recent data in 2015, then Estonia has actually fallen in the ranking below the EU 
average and Slovenia is slightly more innovative than Estonia as shown in the Table 6.1 
above Estonia is not anymore among innovation followers but classified as a moderate 
innovator while Slovenia is still classified as innovation follower. In other words, Estonia’s 




Table 6.1: Position of Estonia and Slovenia in European Innovation Scoreboard. 
Indicator/Country Estonia Slovenia 
Position from highest to 
lowest/Below or above EU 






Position from highest to 








Source: Author on the basis of data from European Commission (2009; 2015) 
Estonia scores highly on indicators of knowledge-based innovation such as non-R&D 
innovation spending by firms. However, it does not score well in knowledge creation as 
measured through patents and R&D spending (European Commission 2015).  This drop in 
ranking happened in spite of the fact that total expenditure and private sector expenditure on 
research and development (R&D) had been increasing until 2012. As the following Figure 6.1 
demonstrates, total R&D expenditure was around 0.6 percent as a percentage of GDP in 1998 
but it increased to more than 2 percent in 2012 but declined to 1.7 percent in 2013. The main 
reason for increase is expenditure by private sector on R&D. This implies that public sector 
expenditure has not increased in relative terms in this time period. Hence, it challenges the 
notion that there has been a coordinated government intervention, which has made Estonia 
innovative over time. It also challenges the idea that R&D spending can rely only on private 
sector because as the Figure 6.1 shows this implies also volatility in the spending which 
makes it difficult to make investments in the long-term and risky projects with potential 
positive externalities. Private sector has incentives to underinvest in R&D because they 
cannot capture the positive externalities of innovation.  However, it must be noted that rapid 
increase in private sector R&D in 2011 in comparison is partially caused by investments of 
state owned energy company. This creates conceptual challenges in distinguishing between 
                                                 
43 Countries are classified int four categories: 1) Innovation leaders, 2) Innovation followers, 3) Moderate 
innovators and 4) Modest innovators 
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public and private spending as some private spending as classified by Statistics Estonia is 
actually public.  Figure 6.1 shows also a drop in total and private sector R&D spending  in 
2012 as well in 2013 in comparison with 2011 which is partially caused by investment of state 
energy company in 2011.    Nevertheless, the key trend remains the same. In 1998 private 
sector spent almost nothing on R&D and gradually it has become a bigger spender than the 
public sector.  
 
Figure 6.1: Research and development expenditure as a percentage of GDP in Estonia from 
1998 to 2013 adopted from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications (2015) on 
the basis of data from Statistics Estonia (2015) 
 
To conclude, Estonia is about average in innovation performance in the EU context. In 
recent years, its performance has actually got worse as the R&D spending as a percentage of 
GDP has declined and Estonia’s ranking in the EU innovation scoreboard has dropped. This 
brief overview at least partially challenged the myth that Estonia is particularly innovative 
country. However, it may be that these more general innovation trends are not representative 
of Estonia’s innovation in the fields of internet and ICTs. Hence, the next section will study 
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6.2.2 Innovation in ICT Sector 
Obviously, the EU innovation scoreboard and R&D expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP are imperfect measures to understand innovation. They provide abstract overview but 
lack details. Academic criticism of the innovation scoreboard has pointed out the some data 
on innovation performance is based on self-reporting which reduces measurement validity. 
Even more importantly, the scoreboard oversimplifies innovation which is “a complex 
process involving interactions at the level of enterprise between technological investment, 
organizational change, entrepreneurship and workforce development” (Room 2011, 275).  
Therefore, the innovation in the Estonian ICT sector may require more detailed attention.  
 
Figure 6.2: Intramural R&D expenditures of business sector by economic activity adopted 
from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications (2015) on the basis of data from   
Statistics Estonia (2015). 
Private sector R&D spending on ICT as a share of total spending has actually 
increased in the recent years. In 2011, ICT sector accounted for almost 18 percent of private 
sector R&D spending (including both software development and hardware such as 
manufacturing electronics). Figure 6.2 shows that by 2013, the share is at 32 percent where 































percent. However, the change in share is partially caused by decrease in R&D on oil 
production from shale oil, which also influenced total private sector R&D spending after 2011 
as I discussed above.  
However, a look at spending on R&D is still too general to understand and compare 
ICT sector innovation. Hence, even more detailed analysis is needed. The Eurostat conducts 
regular surveys on innovation called Community Innovation Survey (CIS) which serves as 
one input to the innovation scoreboard. However, since data collected is not fully utilized in 
the scoreboard, it also allows taking a more detailed look into innovation in specific sectors. 
Table 6.2 partially relies on CIS but also on data available from Statistics Estonia and 
Estonian Business Registry to compare ICT sector and subsectors with other important sectors 
in the Estonian economy. It uses NACE two-digit codes to classify these sectors.  It looks at 
level of innovation as a reflection in the value-added per employee (more innovative firms 
can pay higher salaries and have higher profits per employee) and R&D spending by the firm. 
It also  considers the concentration ratio of firms. Sectors with high concentration ratio have 
smaller number of firms and hence the number of innovative firms must be compared among 
sectors with similar concentration ratios. The most straightforward sector that falls under ICT 
is programming. Value-added in programming 30,000 euros per employee annually is higher 
than Estonia average which is slightly over 20,000 euros.   
However, logistics with similarly low concentration ratio of firms has value-added per 
employee at 44 000 euros and 78 innovative companies while programming has 72. Wood 
production with similarly low market concentration ratio had 145 innovative companies. 
However, logistics and wood production had non-existent R&D expenditure, but of course, it 
does not mean that companies in these sectors do not innovate. Their innovation is practice-
based rather than science-based.  
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Another ICT subsector, telecommunications, has similar market concentration ratio 
with chemical production, transport equipment, vehicles and electrical equipment ranging 
between 50-76 percent but the number of innovative firms is in telecom sector is 20 while in 
electrical equipment it is 27 and in chemical products it is 20 as well.  
 
Table 6.2: Value-added per employee, number of innovative firms, research and development 
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ratio – share of 
4 largest firms 






26,5 27 1,7 90,9 








28,0 27 1,2 63,9 
Logistics 44,1 78 0,0 14,2 
Production of 
wood products 





29,0 20 1,6 52,4 
Telecommu-
nication 
36,2 20 0,0 69,3 
Production of 
motor vehicles 
22,8 15 0,8 76,2  
Information 
services 
17,9 17 8,5 38,3   
Sources: Compiled by Author on the basis of Community Innovation Survey (2014), Statistics 
Estonia (2015) and Estonian Business Registry (2015). 
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Hence, telecom sector does not stand out as particularly innovative – even though its 
value-added is considerably higher than sectors mentioned above and higher than the Estonian 
average. Telecommunication does not have any R&D expenditure, while this is the case with 
chemical products.  
 If very loose definition of ICT can be applied, then production of computers and 
electronics as well as information services do not stand out by a large number of innovative 
firms. However, they have somewhat higher R&D expenditures than most other sectors but 
not high value-added per employee. In sum, it is not possible to conclude that ICT firms in 
Estonia are particularly innovative when compared with other sectors.  
The role of ICT firms can also be measured by looking at the share high tech exports 
of total exports of Estonia. Figure 6.3 compares high tech exports in Estonia with the Central 
and Eastern European countries and with the EU average. Estonian high tech exports account 
for 16.3 percent of total exports while the EU average is 15.6 percent in 2014. In other words, 
Estonian performance is about the EU average. At the same time Estonia also has higher share 
of high tech exports than any other Central and Eastern European country. For instance, 
Slovenia’s high tech exports are 5.3 percent of total exports in 2014. Only Hungary and the 
Czech Republic come close to Estonia with respective shares of 14.4 and 15.3 percent in 
2014. Even more remarkable is the dynamic performance. The share of Estonian high-tech 
exports used to be 7.8 percent in 2007 while the EU average was roughly the same and 
Hungary’s share exceeded 20 percent. Since 2010 Estonia has been catching up and going 
ahead of other countries. However, this outcome is explained by a single decision. Ericsson 
decided to open manufacturing plant in Estonia to produce RBS family mobile network 
stations. Since electronics is classified as high tech in Eurostat manuals, then this single 
decision impacted also macro level data. Ericsson share of total Estonian exports exceeds 10 
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percent as the Tallinn factory produces equipment for a half of the world.44 Obviously, if ICT 
would be defined very loosely and production of electronics would be included in the ICT, 
then the importance of ICT would be quite significant for the Estonian economy. However, 
this would be very loose definition.  
 
Figure 6.3: High tech exports as a percentage of total exports in the European Union and 
selected Central and Eastern European countries from 2007 to 2014 on the basis of Eurostat 
(2015).  
 
If ICT sector is defined more narrowly, the role of ICT sector as such is not as crucial 
for the Estonian economy as some accounts suggest. This definition would be more 
appropriate because exaggerated claims are not usually made about electronics manufacturing 
by large multinationals but about software development and start-up companies. Computer 
services account for 1.3 percent of total Estonian exports (including both service and product 
                                                 
44 Obviously, Statistics Estonia does not reveal data about single company. The calculation is made by the author 
on the basis of Business Registry (2015) data on Ericsson’s revenues and Statistics Estonia (2015) data on the 
total value of Estonian exports. 
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exports) and for 4.3 percent of Estonian services exports in the first 9 months of 2014 
(Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications 2015).  
This section demonstrated that Estonian ICT sector is not particularly innovative when 
compared with other key sectors of Estonian economy. Electronics manufacturing plays a 
considerable role in the Estonian exports, while software does not. Certainly, there are some 
innovative companies in ICT sector but their connection to real economy is not strong. 
Indeed, one way to read Figure 6.5 83.7 percent of Estonian exports of total exports are not 
high tech.  
Actually, some representatives of more traditional ICT companies told in the 
interviews that a few start-up companies receive considerable attention in Estonia while 
sector-wide problems are left unsolved. For instance, ICT related research at the universities 
often has little relevance for industry. Labor market for ICT workers is tight and attraction of 
new companies through government sponsored marketing campaigns makes it even tighter. 
At the same time, government strict immigration policy does not allow to recruit necessary 
number of new workers from outside of the EU (Interviews 30). At the same time, utilization 
of ICT in manufacturing sector has been low as well. At the same time, manufacturing sector 
is a real engine of Estonian exports and economy. Since innovation in ICT depends on the 
skills of workers, then the next section will tackle some of these issues more closely.  
 
6.2.3 Labor Market Constraints and ICT Skills 
Chapter Two emphasized that supply-side constraints matter more for internet 
diffusion than demand side constraints. This is so because demand for internet and related 
technologies is derived demand. There are many substitutes available. Chapter Five discussed 
Skype and showed that one important factor that constrained the growth of company in 
Estonia is a tight labor market where demand for professionals with good ICT skills exceeds 
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supply in Estonia. In other words, labor market and shortage of ICT professionals represents a 
serious supply side constraint in Estonia. It does not just affect ICT sector. If manufacturing 
sector or public sector would want to higher new ICT professionals, then they have to face the 
same issue. As a supply side constraint it limits internet diffusion in macro level as well as in 
specific sectors. It is also a case where demands of powerful agents have not been able to 
reduce institutional complexity and led to suboptimal policy outcomes. Hence, the mismatch 
between supply and demand for ICT professionals in the labor market is tackled in this 
chapter as a case to show that Estonian policy has not as homogeneous and innovative as it is 
often perceived. This issue was brought up in six interviews with government officials and 
representatives of ICT sectors (Interviews 19-21 and 23-24, 30). The discussion below is a 
summary of these interviews.  
  Let me recall that Chapter Four did not show that lack of ICT skills was an issue 
among general population when Estonia is compared with Slovenia. At least it is not a 
variable that explains a difference between outcomes in the internet diffusion in two 
countries.  Chapter Five discussed sophisticated services such as internet banking. Since the 
internet banking required increasingly sophisticated skills among different population 
segments, it also created broader, more enlightened self-interest among private sector agents 
and a path through which development of ICT education progressed. Banks together with ICT 
companies and government became also active promoter of ICT education and set-up specific 
foundations to carry out the projects. Hence, the creation of semi-public goods in the form of 
online identification methods led to need to create more semi-public goods in the form of ICT 
training and education in Estonia. Obviously, improvement of ICT skills benefited the wider 
diffusion of internet among different population segments as these path dependent activities 
were deployed.  
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However, ICT skills is not just about the skills among general public. General 
perception around in Estonia and in the world in crucial places such as Silicon Valley is that 
Estonian ICT professionals have excellent skills. Skype was founded by four Estonian 
programmers and two entrepreneurs from Nordic countries in Estonia. As Chapter Five 
pointed out Skype still has a significant presence in Estonia which implies that skilled ICT 
professionals are represented in a broader population than only among Skype six founders. 
Nevertheless, interviews with leading Estonian ICT companies clearly reveal there are two 
major challenges Estonia is faced with in the context of ICT skills: first, shortage of ICT 
specialists and, second, quality of ICT education in universities. Companies point out that 
Estonia needs to train thousands more IT specialists which is a significant increase because 
broadly the sector employees about 20,000 people in Estonia, including all employees, not 
just ICT professionals. Even companies such as Skype employ only 400 people in Estonia 
while majority of their employees are located outside. Most of hiring by Skype also takes 
place outside of Estonia and company has not expanded its staff in Estonia for years was 
articulated in Chapter Five.  
Hence, the ICT sector has been actively promoting in the last decade ICT education 
and loosening of immigration restrictions on countries outside  the European Union (within 
the EU there is a free movement of people). One entrepreneur even speaks of a need for 
Estonia to become like Singapore which would mean bringing in more ICT professionals 
from other countries. Both campaigns have not been very fruitful as the students consider IT 
somewhat boring and prefer to focus on social sciences. The attitudes of general population 
and population are not hospitable towards loosening the immigration restrictions because of 




Interviews also reveal that government agencies react differently to the industry 
demands. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications pushes for changes in 
immigration system while the Ministry of Interior is reluctant because of security 
consideration. Government officials are on defensive and through interviews tell that for 
popularization of ICT education the following steps have been taken: The number of IT 
students both in state-funded and private higher education institutions has been considerably 
increased. In addition, to increase the popularity of sciences among the young, the 
Association of Estonian IT and Telecommunications Companies (ITL) and the Ministry of 
Education and Research have launched a program for the popularization of sciences. They 
also mention that to boost interest in technology, general education system needs to be 
modernized as well.  
Officials also point out that in order to tackle the challenge of both the quality of ICT 
education and the limited number of IT specialists, an an international IT Academy was 
launched in Estonia. The IT Academy, was launched in cooperation with telecom and ICT 
businesses, government and two main and largest public universities University of Tartu and 
Tallinn University of Techonology in 2012.  In essence, it is a program for the engagement of 
best Estonian and foreign lecturers and students in learning process in ICT areas. Thus its not 
a new university but a program of collaboration among various public and private institutions 
for IT education.  Its work will be based primarily on the most competitive existing IT 
curricula in Estonian universities. The academy is managed by the Estonian Information 
Technology Foundation – a non-profit organisation founded by the Estonian Government, 
Tartu University, Tallinn Technical University, Estonian Telecom company and the 
Association of Estonian Information Technology and Telecommunications Companies. 
Again, this is an example of public-private partnership on how the development of ICT skills 
is being tackled. However, it started quite recently as a reaction to the tight supply of skilled 
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professionals in the labor market. Clearly, such program is not sufficient for solving labor 
market issues.  
Government officials also point out that with the inflow of EU structural funds started 
in 2004, there are also initiatives aimed at increasing professional ICT skills managed through 
Enterprise Estonia, a government agency distributing business support grants. The  program 
called “Involvement of highly-qualified staff” aims to facilitate the mobility of highly 
qualified people, including those in the ICT sector (Interviews 19-21). The program enables to 
involve R&D workers, engineers, designers, innovation managers or international marketing 
managers to carry out innovation projects helping to create new value for companies. The 
involvement of highly qualified competence can be used for product development, preparing 
the entering or enlargement to foreign markets, designing new business models.  Eligible 
costs under the mobility program are the salary costs and costs that are related to using 
recruitment agency services. The support rate of these costs is maximum of 50 percent. The 
maximum project support period is 3 years (Interviews 19-21). 
Government officials also say that within the Enterprise Estonia’s Knowledge and 
Skills Development Support scheme companies can apply for a grant to upgrade the 
knowledge and skills of their workers on work-related topics and to bring new knowledge into 
the enterprise (Interviews 19-21). The grant can be used for trainings, to involve a consultant 
outside of the company to come and help to improve the performance of the company, to do 
practical training in another company or to pass an qualification exam or to apply for a 
qualification standard.  
Ironically, availability of EU funds and ICT savvy nature of Estonian public sector did 
not reach labor markets services for many years. Earlier research on Estonian E-Government 
has indicated that the labor market services do not use the basic potential offered by ICT 
(Kitsing 2011).  However, more recent interviews revealed that the years 2010-2011 have 
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seen rapid developments in the field labor market and unemployment services (Interview 19-
20). The labor market information system EMPIS of the Estonian Unemployment Insurance 
Fund that earlier provided some simpler electronic employment related services, has been 
considerably developed and new modules have been added to it. Government officials pointed 
out in the interviews that a module for employment mediation allows to automatically match 
the existing job offers and the unemployed and sends information on suitable openings to the 
unemployed person’s mailbox. A self-service environment has been created for job-seekers. 
The self-service area enables job-seekers to browse job offers, create a CV, apply for jobs, 
view the applications they have submitted to the Unemployment Insurance Fund and the 
corresponding decisions, and notify the Unemployment Insurance Fund of changes in their 
personal details or of starting a job (Interviews 19-20).  
The interviews with both public sector officials and private sector representatives 
confirmed that  ICT skills are important factor for further development of innovation capacity 
in Estonia. As Estonia does not have large scientific institutions and research and 
development by companies is limited, then skills were considering crucial for further 
innovation in the area of ICT. The innovation in this area is practice based and traditional 
innovation indicators do not capture them well. More innovative products and services 
available online will increase the use of internet further.  However, as the Estonian population 
is ageing and Estonia is not a very attractive destination for international ICT professionals, 
then the mismatch between demand and supply of ICT professionals will continue. So far 
there is no sign that industry demands will be met by government in significantly relaxing 
immigration regulations (Interviews 19-21)..  
Obviously, in terms of skills both demand side of internet and supply should be 
considered because they are both important that new services and content can be created. This 
means that supply and demand interact as more and more it services benefit from user driven 
219 
 
innovation and it becomes difficult to distinguish between demand and supply as they both 
constantly interact. Hence, knowledge and skills that matter for internet diffusion are 
decentralized, dispersed and tacit – crucial elements in the process of entrepreneurial 
discovery.  However, the labor market constraints need to be tackled by multitude of agencies 
involved in immigration, education and labor market policies. In addition, formal rule-making 
interacts with informal rules such as attitudes of public about inflow of immigrants. This 
institutional complexity  has led to suboptimal policy outcomes in facilitating the process of 
entrepreneurial discovery as potential ICT entrepreneurs and professionals from all over the 
world cannot move easily to Estonia. 
 
6.2.4 ICT  Policy Making  
The chapter Four suggested that government rule-making in the telecom sector was 
consistent with overall economic framework in Estonia and institutional changes in the 
telecom provided a critical juncture for the supply of high speed and high quality internet. 
Chapter Five suggested that internet diffusion was further bolstered by public-private 
partnerships in the use of online identification methods. Now it is crucial to look at specific 
institutional changes concerning government use of ICT, which have benefited the internet 
diffusion in society.  
 As far as specific changes in the rules concerning the IT are concerned, the local IT 
community became crucial in forming government policies on IT spending, procurement, and 
use in the early 1990s. In 1993, a strategy paper by government officials, IT specialists, and 
scientists was prepared with the sole aim of establishing principles for the management of 
modern, well-functioning state information systems (Ott and Siil 2003). The existence of such 
a community stemmed  from the fact that Estonia had fairly advanced human capital in IT. 
Estonia began investing in its Institute of Cybernetics as early as the 1960s (Dyker 1996 915-
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916; Landler 2005). While similar institutes in other Soviet republics focused on math and 
engineering, the Estonian institute concentrated on computer programming (Roth 2004; Dutta 
2006).  
A special state information systems department of the central government was formed 
at state chancellery in 1993, and the central government budget included a single category 
entitled “Number 37” for all IT expenditures of the various government agencies (Ott and Siil 
2003). Government IT procurement was subsequently unified. Nevertheless, according to 
interviews, the management of Estonian Government IT system has been relatively de-
centralized throughout the decades. It has been so technologically as well as institutionally. 
Technologically it is based on de-centralized X-Road system which was discussed in Chapter 
Five allowing different, old and new systems in various government agencies and private 
sector to communicate with each other. Institutionally, the State Information System 
Department acts as a coordinator. It was initially under the State Chancellery but moved to the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications in 2000. Only in 2012 a national IT 
coordinator was appointed to the State Chancellery. For many years, position of 
undersecretary for state information systems at the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Communications remained unfilled. In 2013, Taavi Kotka, an IT entrepreneur and former 
CEO of Estonian IT company Webmedia was appointed as undersecretary for state 
information systems (which is effectively government Chief Information Officer).  
Throughout interviews a number of ICT initiatives by Estonian government were 
brought out which may have encouraged the use of the internet (Interviews 19-21). Similarly, 
scholarship and articles in popular media have focused on these initiatives. However, even if 
there are currently many different initiatives which one way or another target ICT sector and 
services and intervene in the market, it must be kept in mind that they are relatively recent 
phenomena. In the 1990s Estonia did not have an industrial policy, nor did it engage in 
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policies that would target the ICT sector or companies directly (Kilvits 1999, 263-265). 
Estonian did not have sufficient resources to make large-scale ICT investments. As the 
Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar from 1992 to 1994 and from 1999 to 2002 put it: “Most 
disadvantageous was that we did not have large enough resources to build up e-government, 
and this was very good because then we had to build public-private partnerships.” (Dutta 
2006, 86). The key public-private initiative was ID card which was launched by Laar’s 
government and was already discussed in Chapter Five.  
The late president Lennart Meri started a national discussion on the necessity of 
creating an “Estonian Nokia” in the 1990s but it did not translate into any concrete policy 
action.  General government spending on research and development in the 1990s was below 
0.5 percent of the GDP, and there were no crucial technology or innovation policies to speak 
of (Kilvits 1999, 268-277). Even the spending on information and communication 
technologies (ICT) remained modest from 1995 to 2003 in comparison with other countries. 
Estonian government budget has allocated about one percent for the ICT expenditure 
throughout this period, while many other countries spend 2.5-4 percent of the budget (Krull 
2003, 52-53). In spite of availability of unique and pioneering online identification methods 
provided by banks, Estonia’s government services remained inconsistent and it took a while 
for them to develop. While the Estonian government made international headlines with its 
paperless “e-government” sessions and most citizens filed their taxes online, the simple task 
of applying for a driver’s license still required physical visit(s) to the Department of Motor 
Vehicles (Kitsing 2011). Estonia does not have a e-government strategy, nor did it create a 
special office or ministry for information society, as was the case in Slovenia, for instance. 
The 1998 Principles of Information Policy was very general strategy document and all the 
following acts have been quite specific (Krull 2003, 49).  
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If we look at legislative changes in Estonia and compare them with a selected Central and 
Eastern European countries in Table 6.3, the we see that the Estonian e-government specific 
legislation was not passed significantly earlier than it was the case of other countries in the 
CEE. Certainly, the mere time of adoption does not indicate the true impact of legislation. 
Indeed, the quality of Estonian legislation may be better than in the case of the other CEE 
countries. 
Table 6.3: The time of adoption of e-government specific legislation in Estonia, Latvia, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. 
 
Act/Document Estonia Latvia Slovakia Slovenia 
Strategy for e-
government  
NA 2002 2004 2001 
E-signature and 
E-document 




1998 1999 2001 2003 




2001 1998 2000 2003 
 
Source:  adopted from Kitsing (2008) and compiled by the author on the basis of 
information retrieved from IDABC (2005). 
 
Formal law-making in IT, as in many other areas of public sector, has been quite 
minimal in Estonia. My analysis suggests that Estonian approach has seen  implementation as 
the key, and no need for writing excessive documents and creating additional layers of 
bureaucracy.  Indeed, the standard critique of the local e-experts was in the early years that 
Estonian government does not have a clear vision and a work plan and there is a lack of 
cooperation among different government agencies and between private and public sector 
(Krull 2003, 49). Nevertheless, in these early years the ground was prepared for diffusion of 
internet in Estonian government and private sector.   
The implementation of ICT policies has been successful in the CEE context without 
such documents and formalized cooperation, while many other countries which at least 
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formally have adopted such documents and formalized cooperation do not score that well on 
the e-government rankings. This is so because the institutional setting as encouraged 
entrepreneurial discovery - at least in some key initiatives which have been crucial for internet 
diffusion.  
One of the key initiatives that has lowered both transaction costs in the market as well 
as in public sector has been the use of digital signatures and electronic authentication, which 
are widely used both in the public and private sectors (as was discussed in previous chapter in 
the context of ID card). In 2000, Estonia adopted digital signature law, which made it 
mandatory for public sector institutions to accept digitally signed documents in 2001 
(Republic of Estonia 2000). Obviously, the development of digital signatures does not affect 
only Estonia , but it is possible to establish a company in Estonia over the internet with the 
use of Portugal, Finnish, Lithuanian and Belgian electronic signatures. The public sector has 
led the way in the use of digital signing, as accepting digitally signed documents and it has 
been made mandatory through legislation. Since 2014 through the e-Residence program 
citizens of other countries can receive Estonian ID card and use it for signing documents and 
transact digitally online.  
Nevertheless, the efforts to harmonize ICT policies within different government 
ministries and departments did not go smoothly. Actually, it offers the most straightforward 
case for illustrating the constrained nature of agency, policy heterogeneity and diversity of 
outcomes in practice. In other words, government’s practice was often quite different from 
stylized narratives about e-government in Estonia.  The electronic exchange of official 
government documents was still limited in 2007 because different departments purchased 
different software solutions, which are not compatible with each other (Riismaa 2007). Even 
if they purchased same software packages, then often the same software was configured 
differently which lead to incompatibilities within government for handling data. For instance, 
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interviews revealed that the Ministry of Environment was eager adopter of open source 
software while others are not. As a result, the ministry has to deal on daily basis with the 
challenges of converting different documents to the usable formats as interviews with officials 
revealed. These incompatibilities imply that data may have to be re-entered manually. Since 
the Estonian government departments tend to rely on proprietary solutions, then vendor lock-
in is widespread. This lock-in may not only mean always dependence on a company but on a 
particular person.  
However, government officials I interviewed argued that despite of shortcomings and 
setbacks, it can be argued that the public sector is leading the way in electronic document 
exchange in general (Appendix 1, Interviews 19-20).  Most of the invoices sent and received 
by public sector bodies are electronic. One government official I interviewed pointed out that 
in 2011, a study was conducted with an aim to analyze electronic records management  in the 
entire public sector of Estonia. “According to the results of the survey, approximately 90 
percent of public agencies use electronic document and records management systems. 
Electronic invoices are widely used with 64 percent of public sector organizations sending 
and 86 percent  receiving electronic invoices,” was pointed out by the same government 
official (Interview 20).  Nevertheless, only 25 percent of electronic invoices are in the 
machine-readable format such as EDI and XML which make fully automated processing 
possible.  
To sum up, this section demonstrated that Estonian ICT policy has not been as 
homogeneous and unified as sometimes it has been characterized. By looking at development 
over two decades, it is clear that policy-making in the area of ICT has been decentralized and 
heterogeneous. There have been some successful initiatives where the impact of local IT 
community has been strong. In addition to some islands of excellence, there areas such as 
harmonization of ICT policies within different government agencies where progress has been 
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slower.  Many of these changes have been taken place gradually, their role in the internet 
diffusion in the early years cannot be considerable. Rather, they have contributed to the 
opportunities for using the internet in recent years. Since the discussion of policy-making in 
this section was relatively general, then the next sections will look at specific cases to show 
institutional complexity has constrained the process of entrepreneurial discovery and led to 
diverse policy outcomes. The next part will look at institutional complexity and policy 
heterogeneity on the basis of the case of network neutrality.   
 
6.3. Institutional Complexity and Network Neutrality45 
Since Estonia became a member of the European Union and was quick liberalizer of 
its telecom market, it is crucial to discuss the Estonian government position in the institutional 
changes implemented by the new telecom package of the EU, which was adopted in 2009. 
This discussion allows understanding the ability of policy-makers to deal with institutional 
complexity and reveals the nature of policy-making concerning an important ICT issue. I will 
discuss network neutrality only in the context of the 2009 telecom package. This limitation 
stems from the following reasons. First, the 2009 telecom package is a fundamental legislative 
attempt to shape the EU telecom market. There has not been any comparable reforms in this 
scale after that. From the point of view of a relatively new member country such as Estonia, 
the telecom package represents an important reform, which is comparable for taking over all 
EU telecom related legislative acts in 2004 as it was discussed in Chapter Four. Second, the 
EU telecom package mobilized key actors in the preceding years. This was when actors 
revealed their preferences concerning institutional changes in the EU. It is difficult to discuss 
                                                 
45 This case has been also presented at the conferenses at  the Oxford University, UK,  in 2010 and at the 
ICEGOV 2011 in Tallinn, Estonia,  and made electronically available in the respective conference papers 
(Kitsing 2010; Kitsing 2011). As the Kitsing 2011 is the latest paper published by the ACM conference 




the role of entrepreneurial discovery and institutional changes in the process on the basis of 
secondary sources. I had unique access to some key actors and I was able to interview them in 
2008 and 2009 (Interviews 14-17). Hence, the data limitations also mean that the focus will be 
on the 2009 telecom package and not on the developments that took part later.  
 
6.3.1 Network Neutrality in the European Union 
Before I start discussing the position of Estonian government, it is important to 
highlight the broader context of how network neutrality has been understood in Europe. This 
is particularly important because as I have emphasized in the Chapter Two technology and its 
use is epistemological and therefore concepts associated with the technology use may also 
carry different meanings in different context. In other words, there is a danger of “conceptual 
stretching”, a term used by Sartiori (1971) here applied in the network neutrality debate. 
Furthermore, the institutional framework of the EU telecom markets and its members is quite 
different from that of the United States.   
The EU’s legislative attempts in the different drafts of 2009 telecom package defined 
network neutrality quite narrowly. The EU Commission’s understanding of the network 
neutrality is not as comprehensive as scholars approach it (Cave and Crocioni 2007, 270; Hart 
2006; Sidak 2006) and as in the case of US administration (Kitsing 2011). EU Commission’s 
Communication as a step towards the 2009 telecom package published in September 2008 
discussed network neutrality solely in the context of network management:  
“It is against this background that concerns have been raised about  
preserving "net neutrality" as the internet evolves. New network  
management techniques allow traffic prioritization. Operators may  
use these tools to optimise traffic flows and to guarantee good quality  
of service in a period of exploding demand and rising network congestion  
at peak times. However, traffic management could be used for anti- 
competitive practices such as unfairly prioritising some traffic or slowing  
it down and, in extreme cases, blocking it. “  




This concern over traffic prioritization found its way into so-called telecom package, 
which in its first versions set forth narrow but straightforward net neutrality provisions. The 
European Parliament included in the first draft of its regulations a prohibition against 
“hindering or slowing of traffic” (European Parliament 2008). However, this was excluded in 
the final version versions of the telecom package. The Council of Ministers and European 
Parliament reached a compromise and approved the telecom package in November 2009 
(European Commission 2010). The EU Commission summed up the net neutrality provisions 
found in the package in the following way:  
 
“…Under the new EU rules, national telecoms authorities will have the  
powers to set minimum quality levels for network transmission services  
so as to promote "net neutrality" and "net freedoms" for European citizens.  
In addition, thanks to new transparency requirements, consumers must be  
informed – before signing a contract – about the nature of the service to which  
they are subscribing, including traffic management techniques and their impact 
on service quality, as well as any other limitations (such as bandwidth caps or 
available connection speed).”  (European Commission 2010)  
 
The approved version of the package gives authority to national telecom regulators to 
ensure minimum quality of service requirements. It also asks service providers to provide 
information to consumers about the quality of service. In other words, already narrow network 
neutrality provisions as initially envisioned by the EU Commission were further narrowed 
down and almost non-existent in the package (Kitsing 2011).  
However, the package includes some other provision, which relate to a broader 
concept of network neutrality such as backward vertical integration. EU Commission points 
out that “National telecoms regulators will gain the additional tool of being able to oblige 
telecoms operators to separate communication networks from their service branches, as a last-
resort remedy” (2010). Nevertheless, these are additional measures. The functional separation 
has been already legislated through previous measures as will be discussed below. The 
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implementation of these measures differ in the different member states. At best, the EU 
gained a new formal measure to implement functional separation – success of which may 
depend more on national authorities than the EU Commission. In other words, the telecom 
package did not reduce institutional complexity and policy design and outcomes can still be 
quite heterogeneous because of potential differences in interpretation and implementation of 
rules by national regulators.  
Social science research on information technology about the network neutrality has 
sometimes accepted the normative claim that network neutrality legislation is in the public 
interests (Kitsing 2011). It has been argued that large corporations block network neutrality 
regulations, because it damages their business interests (Hart 2006). What is forgotten in this 
characterization, of course, is the fact that many companies that support network neutrality are 
content providers. Network neutrality may or may not be good for public welfare depending 
on what is exactly meant by its proponents (Kitsing 2011).  However, it is certain that content 
providers are convinced that supporting network neutrality legislation is beneficial to their 
business agenda.  Hence, the basic political economy of network neutrality is simple: interests 
of content providers clash with those of network providers. It is an attempt by content 
providers to change existing equilibrium in the cyberspace and increase their power vis-à-vis 
network providers by using government regulation. This is how the leading European 
regulatory experts characterize the push for the network neutrality regulations:  
“Net neutrality being an attempt by content and application providers –  
the likes of Amazon, eBay, Google, Microsoft, Yahoo! and Intel -  
to constrain the behaviour of broadband Internet access providers –  
such as AT&T, Verizon, Comcast and Sprint - through political pressure.“  
(Cave and Crocioni 2007) 
 
In other words, it is a classic case of political rent seeking where a group of companies 
tries to advance their business interests by government intervention (Kitsing 2011). Usually, it 
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is assumed in the public choice literature that political rent seeking serves vested interests - 
but not the general interest of wider public (Krueger 1974). However, there are exceptions to 
this rule if certain conditions are met. For instance, lobbying for opening a protected market 
can simultaneously serve interests of the lobbyist, other companies planning to enter the 
market and general public because it will increase competition, which potentially may lower 
prices. Certainly this is the way in which content providers characterize their position by 
emphasizing the importance of openness of and freedom to use the internet that the network 
neutrality legislation should secure. Even the term “network neutrality” puts content-providers 
support for new regulations in a more favorable light than network operators who have to be 
against “neutrality” (Kitsing 2011). Hence, it is to a great degree to activism of content-
providers that  “mundane conflict of business interest - content versus the network industry 
and its vendors – has risen to such a high position on the business agenda” (Thorngren, 2006). 
 Of course, network operators see the network neutrality legislation as purely 
benefiting content providers at the expense of other business and consumers. As the network 
neutrality regulation would reduce flexibility in management of the networks, then network 
providers argue that the network neutrality regulations will contribute to the internet traffic 
jams. This is so because of Web 2.0 type applications are creating a crushing new burden of 
data on the networks.  As companies push more content onto the internet, the networks at 
some point will reach capacity. Network neutrality regulations will accelerate these problems 
because flow of some data such as emails cannot be delayed in order to make space for 
priority data such as video. Heavy regulation may also create disincentives to invest in 
networks as these investments cannot be recouped (Kitsing 2011).  A view of network 
operators along the similar lines was expressed in the Financial Times about the delay of the 
telecom package adoption in May 2009:  “Telecom companies declined to comment publicly, 
but privately welcomed the delay to regulations that they have lobbied against for years. We 
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never like uncertainty in the regulation, but doubt is better than some of the stuff that was in 
the package,” one executive said. He added: “I still think most of it will go through, but we 
may have bought ourselves a year “(Pignal 2009). This is also consistent with my interview 
with a lobbyist for a large US multinational company in the EU (Interviews 17).  
As the interests of content- and network providers seem diametrically opposed to each 
other, it is surprising that both of these groups ended up in supporting the prevailing 
minimalist provisions on network neutrality in the EU telecom package. European Telecom 
Network Operators’ Association (ETNO), an organization representing interests of leading 
European telecom companies, expressed its public support to the final version of the package 
(Kiviniemi 2009). ETNO Director Michael Barthomelew told to the Wall Street Journal that 
telecom package’s “new provisions to boost investment in superfast broadband networks 
should be quickly put into practice” (Kiviniemi 2009). This was echoed by BT Group PLC’s 
president of public and government affairs Larry Stone who told to the Wall Street Journal  
that “his company strongly supports the EU's regulatory push for a more consistent European 
telecom market  “allowing for more competition, innovation and consumer choice in the 
telecoms sector"” (Kiviniemi 2009).  After two years of extensive lobbying and pushing their 
narrow agenda, it seems that this narrow self-interest became enlightened self-interest. Or it 
may be a realization that more favorable package is not feasible as expressed by a telecom 
executive in the Financial Times (cited above). It raises the question whether ETNO 
expressing revealed preferences of network providers or their real preferences.  
Nevertheless, the simplistic characterization of the interests ignores the fact that 
network operators and content providers operate in the environment of mutual 
interdependence. Let me recall the Chapter Two which pointed out that internet and related 
services are network goods. Use of one good such as internet connection increases the use of 
other goods such as google search. In other words, content providers and network operators 
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are selling complementary goods. An increase in demand for one good increases the demand 
for another good. Operators need content because this will increase demand for their network 
services and allow recouping investments in increasing the network capacity. Content-
providers need increased capacity of networks because this allows them to create and sell 
even more data-intensive content. In the European context sellers of both of these goods have 
to be functionally separated which makes even more sense in characterizing the interaction 
mutual interdependence.  
 
6.3.2  Estonian Government and Network Neutrality 
The Estonian government view on network neutrality can be placed in this European 
context. The main office of Skype, peer-to-peer online phone service provider, was based in 
Estonia and Skype employed over 300 people in the years prior to the 2009 telecom package 
as was shown in Chapter Four.  Estonia has set up a NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense 
Centre of Excellence in 2008 in response the 2007 cyber attacks that brought country’s 
electronic communication networks to standstill.  All of these factors make Estonia a critical 
case in understanding how ideas about network neutrality, institutional complexity of dealing 
with the EU level legislation and interests of powerful companies such as Skype interacted in 
the network neutrality debate and in the legislative efforts. Both Skype and Cyber Security 
Center are relatively small operations. The data about Skype is given in Chapter Five. The 
Center has 48 staff members from 16 countries-  not all NATO members have joined the 
center and contribute to its efforts.  However, both organizations carry much more significant 
symbolic meaning in the world of Estonian policy-making.   
 Starting with the interests, then the position of Skype is dominant in Estonian policy-
making. The company is basically seen as a national treasure and its interests are considered 
at least in political rhetoric to be in sync with the interests of Estonia. Skype’s country 
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manager Sten Tamkivi was also an adviser to Estonian president Toomas Hendrik Ilves on 
ICT issues during the network neutrality debate.  In other words, Skype can be seen also as an 
institutional entrepreneur trying to shape the rules of the game in Estonia in addition to its 
business activities in the peer-to-peer telephony.   
Estonian government’s position to see the interests of Skype and Estonia in sync 
ignored the fact that until September 2009 that the main shareholder of Skype was E-Bay, 
which had purchased the company from Danish-Estonian-Swedish founders in 2005 for 2.6 
billion US dollars. E-Bay’s and Skype interests in the network neutrality debate are consistent 
with the interests of other content providers such as Google. Interviews reveal that Skype 
supported tougher network neutrality regulations through its lobbying efforts both in Estonia 
and Brussels (Interviews 14-17).  
 Hence, it is not surprising that a short speech given by the Estonian Minister of 
Transport and Communication Juhan Parts at the EU Council of Ministers’ meeting in 
November 2008 echoed rhetoric of content-providers such as eBay, Google and Skype 
according to an interview with a person with access to meeting transcripts (Interviews 17) 
After it became clear that the EU Council of Ministers and Parliament were not able to reach a 
compromise on the telecom package in May 2009 because of the copyright issue, the minister 
even expressed opinion that Estonia should support reopening the negotiations on other issues 
in the package (Interview 16)  
 Most interestingly, this view was never debated publicly and did not receive any 
public attention in Estonia. The public debate – or to be more precise -  the lack of public 
debate on the net neutrality in Estonia and  the EU in general created much less favorable 
environment for the legislation than in the US. While in the US the net neutrality has received 
a considerable attention in the media such as National Public Radio and even in Daily Show 
of Comedy Central, it is perceived as highly technical issue in Estonia and the EU. It would 
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be fair to say on the basis of interviews that many experts working and investors in the field 
of telecommunications are not just familiar with the debate but had during the time of 
interviews in 2008 and 2009 never heard of the term “net neutrality”. Some of the ideas 
assembled under this concept may be, of course, familiar to them. In the US the debate has 
taken concrete political leanings where Democrats usually tend to support network neutrality 
regulations and most Republicans oppose it (Hart 2006). This is, of course, simplification as 
some Republicans have taken and still take a different position.  
 Nothing of that sort has emerged in Estonia and in Europe where most politicians have 
no position on the net neutrality. Hence, the issue seems to concern primarily lobbyists for 
particular interests and experts who have studied the issue.  It was politically relatively 
unimportant issue – perhaps even a non-issue (Interviews 15 and 16). There are no important 
political actors who are willing to invest their political capital for focusing on this issue. The 
expression of supportive views for Skype position by the Estonian minister can be seen as a 
default position - an acceptance that Skype knows the issue and politicians don’t. Thus why 
not trust Skype.  Therefore, it is also relatively easy to facilitate compromises as many 
political actors have not taken firm position on the issue. All of this is not helped by the fact 
that main supporters of the network neutrality legislation are American companies such as 
Google, E-Bay and Skype - even though the latter has significantly more employees in the EU 
than in the US. Nevertheless, it was still owned by E-Bay until September 2009 when its 
founders together with London and Silicon Valley-based venture capital firms purchased a 
majority stake in the company. In 2012 the company was sold to Microsoft. At the same time, 
network providers are usually European companies.  
The partisan nature of the debate is also completely different. In comparison with the 
US supporters of network neutrality, Juhan Parts is from a center-right conservative party of 
Isamaa and Res Publica Liit (IRL), which was chaired by famous Estonian economic reformer 
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Mart Laar. He was one of the most important ministers in a center-right coalition government 
made up of market liberal Reform Party and above-mentioned conservative party during the 
adoption of new EU telecom package. This is further indicator that ideological lines in the 
network neutrality debate are not as clear-cut in the European countries as they are in the 
United States.  
The low profile debate is a logical outcome in a way because the institutional 
framework in Estonia and European Union is different. As the leading EU regulatory experts 
Cave and Corcioni (2007) point out: 
 
“The net neutrality debate originated in the U.S. and is at least partly  
conditioned by    the U.S. specific regulatory and market features.   
It is most importantly the retail ISPs, operating at the IP layer of the  
network, making prioritization decisions. In the U.S. it is much more  
likely that the ISP is affiliated to the network access provider than in  
Europe. This is because the degree of access regulation for Internet  
broadband in the U.S. is currently considerably lower than in Europe  
where often because of access obligations, the retail ISP is not the  
wholesale network provider. Effectively there have been opposite  
regulatory trends to access to broadband networks in the U.S. and  
Europe. U.S. access obligations have been largely removed, while  
since 1998 European National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) and  
the European Commission have increasingly extended access  
obligations to broadband networks at different levels.” 
(Cave and Corcioni 2007). 
 
In other words, some important goals that are expected to be achieved by the specific 
network neutrality regulations in the US have already been implemented in the EU by other 
means. Hence, Estonian position expressed in favor of network neutrality legislation can be 
seen as political rhetoric.  
The EU telecom package was discussed for several years and deadlines for adoption 
were postponed. In the end, it was supposed to be approved by the Council of Ministers and 
European Parliament by May 2009. However, the Council and Parliament were able to reach 
compromises on most issues – including the network neutrality provisions discussed above – 
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except the one concerning copyright. Council proposed tough provisions denying access to 
the internet to those who have violated copyrights online three times (so-called three-strikes 
rule), while Parliament saw the access to the internet as a basic human right as Estonia,  which 
cannot be taken away without due judicial process. Elections to European Parliament took 
place in the summer of 2009 and new EU Commission was appointed and confirmed in the 
beginning of 2010 (Kitsing 2011). All of these developments increased uncertainty. The 
ETNO director Michael Barthomelew expresses the importance of reducing uncertainty. He 
told to the Wall Street Journal that the compromise reached on the telecom package “marks 
the end of a long period of uncertainty for the telecoms sector" (Kiviniemi 2009).  The current 
minimalist network neutrality regulations were seen by Estonia and others as a better outcome 
than no new telecom package in the near term and potentially even worse telecom package in 
the longer term (Interview 16) . Hence, actors did not push for re-negotiations of any clauses 
in the telecom package after the elections. The main focus was on reaching the compromise 
on the copyright issue which was achieved with the new EU parliament and the package was 
adopted in the fall of 2009.  
Furthermore, interview with a government official indicate that giving full-fledged and 
vocal support by the government for Skype’s position was complicated because of the cyber 
security agenda (Interview 16). Tougher network neutrality regulations imply that 
management of electronic communication networks becomes less flexible. At the same time, 
great degree of flexibility is needed to respond effectively to cyber attacks. Some traffic must 
be blocked, delayed and so on. Hence, official Estonian position was thorn between these two 
sides. Therefore it is not surprising that Estonian government kept a low profile in this debate.  
According to the interviews, the network neutrality was not discussed in the government 
meetings where the telecom package was on the agenda (Interviews 16). There was almost no 
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public debate on the issue.46 Indeed, interviews reveal that even people with experience in the 
field of telecommunications were generally unaware of the concept of network neutrality.  
The government policy concerning network neutrality demonstrates balancing among 
different vested interests.  The institutional framework constrained vested interested and the 
emergence of minimalist net neutrality regulations in the EU which the end was supported by 
Estonia.  The dynamics played out in the EU telecom package debate would have suggested 
that Estonia either would support its telecom companies if the regulatory capture would have 
been the case or supported content providers because of Skype has become an institution on 
its own in Estonia. Estonia Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications who is also 
responsible for telecom sector regulation sided with the content providers in the beginning. If 
we place this outcome in the context of chapter 4, then it is quite different from Slovenia were 
the ministry is suspected in acting in the interest of incumbent telecom company. 
Nevertheless, if we put Estonian government position and the interests of content-
providers and network operators into the context of ideas and institutions, then it is obvious 
that both institutional and ideological environment were more in sync with that of network 
operators. Content providers had to argue for network neutrality regulations in an 
environment where general public was indifferent for their cause. Institutional nature of the 
EU was not supportive either as effective legislation of network neutrality demands much 
more uniformity and enforcement capacity of federal state than it is available in the current 
EU. In addition, support for their cause means more centralization, which is opposed by many 
member states regardless of how noble the cause might be. Nevertheless, the Estonian 
minister decided to express its public support for content-providers in the EU meeting.  
                                                 
46 The author of this dissertation tried to encourage debate by publishing three op-eds in the leading Estonian 
language dailies Postimess and Äripäev as well in English in the Baltic Times in 2009. The author also gave an 




However, in the end Estonia supported the implementation of minimum quality 
requirements, which fall under responsibility of national telecom regulators rather than the 
EU. The main reason for this compromise was Estonia’s cybersecurity agenda rather than the 
interests of telecom companies. As the minimum quality requirements are the main way to 
implement network neutrality regulations, it is natural to expect a high degree of variance 
what network neutrality means in practice in different EU countries, i.e. Estonian and 
Slovenian approaches may considerably differ. Even if the language concerning the network 
neutrality in the telecom package would have been more explicit and detailed, then 
implementation of these seemingly uniform provisions would have been probably fairly 
diverse as has been with the previous EU telecom regulations (Section 2.8).  
In sum, the Estonian policy making demonstrates the institutional complexity of 
network neutrality regulations. In the case of network neutrality, the institutional complexity 
constrains actors – limits the entrepreneurial process of discovery in shaping institutions and 
policies. Even the presence of dominant content provider and their lobbying for network 
neutrality does not lead to uniform position and homogeneous policy outcomes. Furthermore, 
the lack of public debate and debate in government supports the broader points made that 
Estonia has either explicitly or implicitly tried to balance different interest and engaged in 
making general rules and regulations instead of trying to impose narrow sector-specific 
legislation in the telecom sector which would benefit particular interests. This case shows that 
government does not promote the use of ICT at any cost and policy entrepreneurship has 
serious constraints as a result of institutional complexity. The next section will tackle 






6.4 Government Venture Capital Investments in the ICT sector47 
Chapter 4 and section 6.2 demonstrated that Estonian government has focused 
primarily on rule-making and not intervening directly in the ICT sector to encourage diffusion 
of internet. However, there is a perception, which was discussed in the beginning of this 
chapter and also in developments of concerning Skype that Estonian government has had a 
particularly smart policy for encouraging the birth of new innovative companies. Chapter Five 
argued that birth of Skype and internet banking had to do more with government 
nonintervention than intervention. However, there has been a fundamental policy shift from 
2004 onwards. Estonian government actually tries to encourage directly emergence of new 
innovative companies. This has happened because the membership of the European Union 
means that EU structural funds are available for encouraging innovation and entrepreneurship 
in Estonia. Most of these funds have been spent in the form of grants. The impact of these 
grants has been characterized as “picking big winners and small losers” in a study by Vicente 
and Kitsing (2015) using propensity score matching. Most importantly, there has been a shift 
in thinking and policy-makers seem to believe that they can replicate success of Skype 
through direct policy measures. This is ironic because as it was pointed out in Chapter Five 
the emergence of Skype was accidental and spontaneous. It cannot be attributed to the direct 
policy measures.             
 This section will tackle equity injection by government in start-up companies. It will 
leave the question of grants aside as I have addressed it in other papers. The government 
venture capital scheme is a supply side measure to reduce constraints in availability of capital 
for new innovative ventures. Since these new venture will bring new technologies to the 
market, they can have positive externalities for some sectors or for the entire population as 
new reasons for using internet will emerge. It must be clarified, however,  that the Estonian 
                                                 
47 Earlier versions of this section have been presented at the Industry Studies Annual Conference in 2013 and at 
the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting in 2014.  
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government tries to encourage the development of ICT sector implicitly by government 
venture capital scheme. The targeting of ICT sector is implicit because the Estonian 
Development Fund (EDF), a government venture capital fund set up in 2006, does not have to 
invest exclusively in the ICT sector. However, it has invested primarily in ICT companies 
because companies from other sectors do not often meet its criteria.    
 The EDF was founded by the Estonian Parliament in 2006 with the purpose investing 
public funds in and offering management support for early stage research and development 
intensive companies. Differently from other government agencies, the EDF does not operate 
under the executive branch, i.e. it is not an agency under some ministry, but reports directly to 
the legislative branch – the Riigikogu. Nevertheless, in its ever day business the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Communications has some supervisory duties concerning the EDF. 
Both Ministers of Finance and Economic Affairs and Communications are members of the 
Supervisory Board of the fund. Other members include parliamentarians and independent 
experts. The EDF mandate is to take minority stakes ranging between 10-49 per cent in 
companies on the equal terms with its private sector co-investors. The time horizon for 
investments is 3-5 years. It is also important to point out that the EDF invests funds of 
Estonian taxpayers, not EU structural funds. The EDF model was created as a result of 
extensive study of Sitra, a similar organization in Finland. The space does not allow to discuss 
it here whether Sitra has been a success or not. However, it is crucial to point out in the 
context of smart specialization literature in Chapter 2 that Finland and Estonia have had 
different development trajectories. Hence, the notion that you can transfer one model of 
organizing government venture capital to another country is an example of simplistic policy-
making. There is also variance in time which is crucial for understanding how institutions 
constrain agency (Pierson 2004).  Sitra was founded in 1967 while the EDF in 2006. The 
1960s in Finland are different from the 2000s in Estonia. The following discussion is based on 
240 
 
data obtained from the Estonian Business Registry on the EDF investments, network analysis 
of digital ecosystem created by the EDF and 9 semi-structured interviews   - with 6 portfolio 
companies, with a high level EDF officer and two outside investors (Appendix 1, Interviews 
22-26, 28 and 32-34).  
6.4.1 The EDF Portfolio 
Since 2008 the EDF has directly co-invested with private investors in 18 start-ups 
either directly as the EDF or since 2012 through its Smartcap fund, an investment vehicle of 
the EDF. By July 2013, EDF had made 18 investments in seed and start-up phase totaling 8.7 
million euros. Of these investments 10 have been made in ICT companies amounting to more 
than 5 million euros. Table 6.4 highlights these ICT investments. Hence, either intentionally 
or unintentionally the EDF has been giving public support to the ICT sector in comparison 
with other sectors.  The following table gives an overview of the EDF portfolio in the area of 
ICT. 
So far the EDF has only exited from three companies. The first exit was the Modesat 
Communications in September 2012, a telecom company, which was acquired by NASDAQ 
listed Xilinx (Anderson, 2012).  In this company, the EDF investment totaled 750 000 euros 
as of May 2012.  The terms of the deal have not been publicly disclosed. Hence, the return on 
investment is not known. On the basis of indirect sources and interviews, it can be estimated 
that the sale price of Modesat share exceeded the initial investment but not significantly and 
the exit can be considered successful from the point of view of financial return. The second 
exit took place in September 2014 when a US 3D printing company Stratasys acquire 
GrabCAD, a collaborative product development software creator which makes it possible for 
engineers to share CAD files. The terms of transaction were not disclosed but Forbes reports 




Table 6.4: The EDF/Smartcap investments in ICT companies by size, year and phase. 
Company Investment size in 
euros48 
Year of initial 
investment 
Investment phase 
NOW!Innovations 950 000 2011 Start-up 
Modesat 
Communications 
750 000 2010 Start-up 
United Dogs and 
Cats 
479 337 2009 Start-up 
Massi Miliano 
(fits.me) 
960 000 2009 Start-up 
Realeyes 320 000 2011 Seed 
GrabCAD 127 800 2010 Seed 
Inner Circle 88 000 2010 Seed 
Sportlyzer 95 800 2010 Seed 
Defendec 1 200 000 2012 Start-up 
WeatherMe 250 000 2012 Start-up 
Source: Created by author with data from Arengufond (2013). 
 
The third exit took place in July 2015 when the leading Japanese e-commerce 
company Rakuten purchased fits.me (legal name Massi Miliano in the Table 6.4), a company 
that develops virtual fitting rooms meaning that it helps customers to visualize online whether 
items they purchase from e-commerce sites will fit them properly or not (Lunden and Lomas 
2015). Again, the terms of transaction has not been disclosed. All these exists have been ICT 
companies. By considering only exits, the EDF investments have success. Three exits out of 
                                                 
48 The investment size is based on publicly available data, which may be inaccurate and not be up to date 




total 18 portfolio companies can be considered quite a good outcome in venture capital. 
Certainly, it is not clear how much has the EDF earned from these exists but they have 
certainly exceeded the initial investment.  
So far it can be also confirmed that three EDF investments have failed. Two of these 
were ICT companies. The business models of two social network companies the United Cats 
and Dogs and Inner Circle did not materialize. EDF suffered a loss of all initial investment 
(Tänavsuu 2010; Poom 2012, Interviews 21, 22 and 25). The total loss of 1.2 million euros is 
about 14 percent of the EDF portfolio as of July 2013. Hence, it can be concluded that the exit 
from remaining 5 ICT businesses remains uncertain. According to semi-structured interview 
results optimistic projection would be that exit should take place in 4-5 years after initial 
investment and more realistic projection is 7 years. If this assumption is correct, then it is too 
early to expect exits by 2015 as the EDF invested in first two companies in 2008 (one of 
which has gone bankrupt) and remaining 16 investments were made in 2009-2012. The EDF 
estimates that the value of its portfolio is 11 million euros. Of the remaining 12 investments, 
the EDF has revalued 4 investments below the initial investment value. This implies that the 
four additional investments are likely to fail including some ICT companies.  
However, there is no objective way to confirm the accuracy of the EDF valuation of 
its portfolio. The standard valuation techniques of companies do apply in the case of start-ups. 
Their values may fluctuate significantly depending on the subjective interpretation of key 
stake holders. For instance, CEO of one ICT company pointed out that the valuation of his 
company can be 10-12 million euros but it is too early to say and it is highly subjective 
depending on what perspective the potential buyer might have.  According to another CEO of 
ICT company the value of their company is approximately four million euros. Nevertheless, it 
is impossible to evaluate the true value of the company as the exit remains uncertain. It should 
be pointed out that during the interviews valuation offered by EDF did not match often the 
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valuations given by the management teams of portfolio companies. Ultimately, the value of 
company will be discovered when the exit takes place and the exits will take place in the case 
of most portfolio companies if they are successful in raising funds in next financing rounds. 
Even though interviews were conducted in 2012 and 2013, the portfolio companies already 
insisted then that the most likely exit strategy is acquisition by large IT company rather than 
IPO in the case of Estonian start-ups. One owner and manager of portfolio company said that 
“the exit should take place within 5 years from the initial investment as this is the investment 
horizon of the investors” (Interviews 23). According to CEO of one company which has 
recently been acquired, “there is no certain date when the exit must take place but usually 
exits take 5 years”. He was not willing to discuss details when potential exit may take place 
and what is the valuation of the company (Interviews 21). However, interviews with 
investors, entrepreneurs and experts highlight that the main purpose of government venture 
capital is to develop the venture capital ecosystem and generate positive externalities of its 
investments. Hence, the main focus of this case will be on the impact of EDF on the 
ecosystem.   
 
6.4.2 Market Failures, Externalities and Ecosystem  
The main purpose of government venture capital is to develop the venture capital 
ecosystem and generate positive externalities of its investments. The literature on venture 
capital has emphasized the role of government venture capital can play in minimizing the 
impact of market failures. Some scholars have pointed out that private sector may 
undersupply venture capital because of asymmetric information. Hence, it is possible to speak 
of market failure resulting from the information asymmetry where government funding could 
potentially reduce the negative impact (Brander et al 2010). Other scholars have emphasized 
market failure stemming from insufficient incentives of private investor to supply funds to 
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innovation and research and development-intensive companies. This is caused by the inability 
of these companies to capture positive externalities of their investment. If there is a reason to 
believe that innovation is underprovided, then government intervention can reduce negative 
effects of this market failure (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Hsu, 2006).  This section analyzes 
the impact of the Estonian Development fund on the basis on these theoretical premises. In 
addition, to semi-structured interviews and descriptive statistics it relies on the online network 
analysis.  The purpose of network analysis was map the digital networks of the EDF, which 
offers one way to demonstrate its role in  the broader venture capital landscape.   
 The Estonian venture capital ecosystem is characterized by few, small but proud 
funds. In addition, to state-backed Estonian Development Fund only one or two well-
structured private venture capital funds exist. The following figure 6.4 gives an overview of 
venture capital and private equity market by highlighting the distribution of investments on 
the basis of geography and investment phase of 18 investors and their 120 portfolio 
companies.   
 
Figure 6.4: The characteristics of the Estonian private equity and venture capital market in 














One of the most active investor has been Ambient Sound Investment (ASI), which invests 
funds of Estonian co-founders of Skype and does not raise money from outside investors. The 
bottom-line is that existing funds and investors do a relatively small number of deals and are 
not well diversified and scalable (Jostov and Sonts, 2012).  
The Figure 6.5 shows a map a broader venture capital online ecosystem in Estonia 
through online network analysis as developed by Rogers (2013). 15 urls of full members of 
Estonian Venture Capital Association (EstVCA) were entered to the harvester of 
issuecrawler.net. 8 members of EstVCA are included in the output map below given in the 
figure 6.5. The EDF (arengufond.ee) is certainly in the central position of the network.  
 
 
Figure 6.5: The Estonian venture capital network with inlinks and outlinks (May 7, 2013).49 
 
                                                 




However, EstVCA itself as well as private sector investors such as asi.ee and wnb.ee 
play focal role in the network as many nodes connect to them. As the network nodes are quite 
evenly distributed (many firms connect to each other as well as to the EDF), then this network 
can be characterized as moderately centralized. The network includes also 14 portfolio 
companies of the EDF. It is surprising that it does not include 7 members of EstVCA. 
However, it does include most active co-investors of the EDF such as asi.ee and wnb.ee.    
The network analysis revealed that the EDF is an important focal point among its 
portfolio companies as well as in a broader venture capital ecosystem in Estonia. This finding 
has been confirmed also by interviews (Interview 22-26 and 32-34).  The analysis of EstVCA 
members revealed that the EDF plays a central role in the broader venture capital networks. 
However, its centrality is moderate as many companies in the network are linked directly to 
each other. Hence, this network is less centralized than portfolio network, which signals 
maturity and tight contacts among the network members. The network analysis does not only 
allow to grasp the links in the ecosystem but to assess the potential performance of portfolio. 
Following Hochberg et al (2007) the strong network links of the EDF could suggest that the 
potential performance of EDF portfolio could be better than the performance of venture 
capital firm with weaker ties. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that most co-
investors of the EDF are relatively inexperienced investors as is the EDF itself. Hence, the 
portfolio performance may still turn out to be inferior despite strong network ties.  
Most importantly, the central role of EDF played in the venture capital ecosystem is 
not necessarily a positive outcome. First, it may suggest that the ecosystem is not able to 
function without government intervention and is too dependent on government.  Second, the 
development of a venture capital ecosystem is not an end in itself. Rather it is a means to 
contribute to broader economic development. Thus the potential externalities of the EDF are 
explored below.  
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6.4.2.1 Asymmetric Information 
Thus, it is crucial to analyze the externalities of EDF investments and its impact on 
negative effects of perceived and real market failures. One theory in Section 6.4.2 suggested 
that the government venture capital is necessary for overcoming market failures stemming 
from asymmetric information. However, all interviews with co-investors and outside investors 
did not confirm this. Rather several investors argued that they are quite familiar with potential 
companies in the pipeline and here the EDF does not add value in solving information 
asymmetry by matching investors and start-ups. According to one outside investor the EDF 
requires non-disclose agreement (NDA) before showing its pipeline to potential investors. 
This was viewed by this investor as unnecessary requirement as the companies in the EDF 
pipeline approach potential investors independently as well and the NDA requirement creates 
just additional complications (Interview 28). At the same time, a co-investor of EDF told that 
he has never been asked for the NDA and he is familiar with the companies in the pipeline 
anyway (Interview 34). The EDF confirmed that they had treated potential investors 
differently but this is not the case anymore (Interview 25).   
Some technology companies in the EDF portfolio pointed out that the EDF has 
brought important contacts and contributes to finding potential investor. However, majority of 
portfolio companies complained about the EDF not helping them in finding new investors and 
not being sufficiently connected to potential investors. Most companies interviewed also saw 
the EDF as a financial investor rather than hands-on VC, which brings specific knowledge 
and expertise to the sector. In addition, most companies did see the EDF as too bureaucratic in 
comparison with private sector investors. One founder and former CEO pointed out that the 
EDF decision-making took too long and contracts were too lengthy and overly detailed. He 
told that negotiations took 4 months and the EDF approach was narrow-minded as they did 
not take a longer term perspective (Interview 34). The EDF did not have experience and 
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network that other venture capital firms could provide (he compared the experience with the 
EDF with his new venture which by 2012 had raised USD 700 000 in Silicon Valley).  
According to another manager, the EDF has primarily provided oversight over 
finances. The EDF has accepted management strategies and not intervened in the core 
business. However, he pointed out it is impossible to have a good quality investment team in 
such small fund such as the EDF. “The minimum requirement would 50-100 million euros 
under management for hiring a highly professional investment team,” said one manager 
(Interview 23). His assessment is that the EDF’s legal competence is very strong, but 
negotiations take too long, fund is not effective in making quick decisions, decision-making 
process is too formal and not very clear always. “The mandate of EDF representative is not 
always clear. You need to take 2-3 steps to figure it out but only 1-2 steps with private 
investors,” he said.  The EDF required very detailed final accounts dating several years back 
as a part of due diligence, which was difficult for the company as the previous management 
had not kept them and it required additional time and substantial work (Interview 23).   
Some portfolio companies offered more moderate criticism. According to another 
CEO, they had the first contacts with the EDF in the summer of 2010 and made some 
presentations, but started serious negotiations in December 2010 and it was completed by the 
beginning of 2011. “In the beginning, the requirements of the EDF were too complex and 
bureaucratic, but it was possible to simplify them,” he said (Interview 21). One company saw 
clear benefits. The CEO of a small company where the EDF has 20 % stake, pointed out that 
the EDF provides advice and legal assistance in drafting contracts and so on. The CEO 
considered this really important for him as the company is relatively small and cannot afford 





6.4.2.2 Underinvestment in Innovation 
The first part of this Chapter revealed that Estonian government has been a moderate 
investor in innovation.  Section 6.4.2 suggested that private sector investors may undersupply 
capital to innovative new start-ups because they cannot capture positive externalities of 
innovation. Government provision of venture capital does not just benefit these companies but 
leads to positive externalities of innovation and thus benefits broader economic development 
by minimizing negative effects of this market failure.  
Most companies pointed out that they did not have any alternative sources of financing 
to the EDF. Two companies had alternative options but they considered terms offered by the 
EDF better. In the case of one company, alternative options were not even explored. 
According to one CEO they needed investment for product development and the investments 
have allowed company to grow faster. Alternative options would have been to raise money 
from the UK and the USA. These options would have taken longer than raising the capital 
from the EDF. “If the EDF would not have injected capital, then the company would have 
found other options,” he said According to him, they have talked with 100 investors in order 
to find suitable options for fund-raising (Interview 24).  
Another CEO and founder argued that the EDF has fulfilled important gap in the 
market as in 2006 only one serious private venture capital firm existed in the Estonian market.  
According to him, his company did not have any real alternatives to the EDF investment and 
mobile parking solutions would seem too utopian for investors outside of Estonia.  He argued  
that his company needs to raise additional equity capital of 1-2 million euros but there are not 
sufficient funds available.   Additional capital would be necessary to secure sustainability of 
his team, which should be 2-3 times larger. The new equity injection would enable the 
company to be competitive in the mobile parking business, which has market size of 50 
billion euros in the US and EU.  
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According to CEO of company with a recent successful exit, they did not have any 
realistic alternatives for the EDF investment. It is difficult for an Estonian company to raise 
money, particularly if it is very research intensive. He said that research and development 
expenditure is 70 percent of all the funds company has raised so far. He argued that the 
company could not have made necessary investments without this equity injection. Patent 
applications alone take 4-5 years to handle and this means investors have to take a long time 
horizon. However, this execute saw the EDF role as a passive financial investor rather than 
active hands-on investor. “There is no need for active involvement in the company as they do 
not have experience and there is no necessity for that,” he said (Interview 21).  
For instance, CEO and owner of  another company said that the EDF has been 
instrumental in developing the company from the early days and alternative sources of 
financing have not been available to his venture. Only realistic alternative could have been 
bootstrapping, which was not very likely as he already had to live off his wife’s maternity 
leave money when he founded the company (Interview 33).  
However, the lack of funding itself cannot be a market failure. Otherwise, all areas of 
life can be seen as full of market failure as there is often lack of funds. The market failure is 
underinvestment in innovative companies, which would create economy-wide positive 
externalities and enhance economic development. Thus, it should be explored whether the 
EDF investment has created these desired externalities.  
 
6.4.2.3 Capturing Positive Externalities 
The key to understanding the impact of EDF is question whether Estonia is able to 
capture positive externalities of investments. Certainly, some Estonian entrepreneurs will get 
richer once their exits from companies will materialize. However, much more is at stake. 
Section 2.4 pointed out on the basis of smart specialization literature that the diffusion of ICTs 
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has increased differences among core regions and periphery. This is because ICTs are 
complements to knowledge-intensive activities which also require face-to-face interactions but 
they are substitutes for activities which can be routinized (McCann and Ortega 2013, 4). Hence, 
public policies aimed at encouraging internet diffusion can be self-defeating if they do not factor 
in local informal institutions, knowledge, skills and geographical specificity and ensure that 
positive externalities of diffusion process is internalized by local actors rather than by outsiders.  
Whether the EDF investments lead to positive externalities which will benefit 
Estonian economy is far from certain. The innovative activities have to materialize in terms of 
increased revenue, particularly increased export revenue as the domestic market is very small. 
The cumulative export revenue of whole portfolio for the years 2008-2012 amounted to 20 
million euros while the entire export revenue of Estonian companies was 48 billion euros 
during the same five years. Similarly, 131 employees in the EDF portfolio companies is 
miniscule considering that entire workforce is about 600,000 or even that of Skype which 
exceeds 400. Obviously, some of the portfolio companies may achieve significantly higher 
revenue and create jobs in the future. Hence, it may be too early to assess the externalities on 
these grounds. Only three portfolio companies – two of them ICT companies 
NOW!Innovation  and GrabCAD - were profitable in 2012. All other 15 companies made 
losses. The portfolio companies employed 131 people in 2012. The 131 employees implies 
that the EDF alone had invested 68,700 euros per each employee in its portfolio company by 
2013 (not counting the equal co-investments by private sector venture capitalists). The 
average gross salary was 1400 euros in the portfolio companies in 2012. In comparison, the 
Estonian average salary was about 900 euros in 2012.  
Alternatively, we could assess the likelihood that potential externalities would occur in 
Estonia. The current limited evidence seems to suggest that more successful portfolio 
companies usually create positive externalities, but they are not captured in Estonia. At the 
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same time, less successful portfolio companies generate negative externalities in Estonia. For 
instance, one successful exit did not generate positive externalities to the Estonian economy. 
Modesat was taken over by US- based company and its business operations are located in the 
US now. GrabCAD has moved its headquarters to Boston and has more employees there than 
in its office in Tallinn, Estonia. Fits.me has moved its headquarters to London.  Other 
investments which can be considered relatively successful by the abilities of companies to 
raise new funds signal similar trends. RealEyes does not employ anybody in Estonia. Its 
operations take place in London, UK, Boston, US, Budapest, Hungary and Minsk, 
Byelorussia. NOW!Innovations have significant operations outside of Estonia.  
EDF impact in generating externalities cannot also be seen in isolation. Considerable 
amount of EDF portfolio companies have also received grants from the Enterprise Estonia, a 
government agency for business support, and KredEx50, a government agency for financial 
services. At least two companies out of 18 have used services of KredEx, grants from 
Enterprise Estonia and equity injections from the EDF. About half of the EDF portfolio 
companies have received also grants from the Enterprise Estonia. Thus, it is not possible to 
distinguish the exact role that EDF has played in generating positive externalities in 
comparison with other agencies. And of course, sometimes these externalities have not been 
positive.  
For instance, fits.me has attracted total of 1.5 million euros in equity investments and 
R&D grants from the Estonian government agencies. The role of EDF is that of passive 
financial investor. Certainly, there has been positive externalities of these investments has the 
company cooperates closely with two largest universities in Estonia. However, the 
performance of the company cannot be assessed on the basis of publicly available data 
because they have not consolidated their accounts to Estonia. 
                                                 
50 The clients of KredEx cannot be publicly disclosed because they are protected by bank secrecy. 
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6.4.2.4 Portfolio Performance and Public Interest 
There is a constant challenge to find a proper balance between portfolio performance 
and a broader public interest. The EDF has to invest into Estonia-based companies, which was 
seen by many experts as unnecessary restriction as it limits the potential investment targets 
and hinders portfolio performance (Interviews 22-26, 28). One venture capitalist argued that 
there should not be any geographical restrictions (Interview 26). “What is Estonia?, ” he 
asked during interview. “Define Estonia!,” he added. “Let’s take Hardi Meybaum (founder of 
GrabCAD) as an example who has headquartered his company in Boston. Is Hardi Meybaum 
Estonia?,” he asked. He argued that we should not limit our definition of Estonia to geography 
in the 21 Century. He pointed out that Estonians can never make major breakthroughs in the 
world and be world-class professionals if their approach is too Estonia-centric.  “Hardi 
Meybaum with other founders will always seek and keep their roots in Estonia,” he argued.  
At the same time, the political masters of the EDF see requirement to invest in 
Estonia-based companies as a crucial building block for its operations. Some portfolio 
companies and investors agree that the main aim of EDF should be enhancing public benefits. 
One CEO pointed out that EDF’s goal is to maximize profits, but it should consider broader 
public goals. “In the end, any return on investment would be marginal from the point of view 
of Estonian economy. What really matters is creating success stories and fulfill gap in the 
venture capital market,” he said. He argued that the EDF should not focus too much 
technology-centric companies because they are acquired early by other companies. The EDF 
should invest more in sales-oriented companies, where new companies create brands, which 
allows have positive impact on the broader image of Estonia (Interview 23).  
In reality, the EDF has found ways to reduce the requirement to invest in Estonia to 
formality. For instance, RealEyes does not have an office in Estonia and does not have any 
employees in Estonia. The Company was founded in UK in 2006. In 2009, company was 
254 
 
officially registered in Estonia and shares of UK based corporation were sold to the Estonian 
entity in order to receive research and development grant of 770 000 euros from the 
Enterprise Estonia, a government’s agency that distributes EU structural funds for 
encouraging entrepreneurship and innovation. The EDF invested 120,000 euros as a seed 
investment in 2011, which was matched by Bellus (now Caplia Invest) owned by Rolf 
Relander and Rikard Relander, who are also co-investor in several other EDF portfolio 
companies. By June 2012, the EDF has invested additional 200 000 euros which has been 
matched by Kaplia Invest, which means total equity injection of 640 000 euros. As of August 
2012, the EDF share was 12.5 percent while founders owned 60 percent of the equity.  
Similarly, as was pointed out above, several other companies have moved significant parts of 
their business operations outside Estonia. For instance, fits.me has offices in Munich, 
Germany, Paris, France, New York, USA and Auckland, New Zealand. In order to stay 
competitive, it is natural for them to move to well-established ecosystems. Obviously, this is 
not just an issue in Estonia and peripheral EU countries. Even well established and wealthy 
US regions such as Atlanta have not managed to keep its new promising companies from 
moving to Silicon Valley and Boston (Breznitz and Taylor 2011).   
Thus, the tension between portfolio performance and public interest is not a temporary 
issue, which can be solved by clever design but rather it is a permanent feature of the 
government venture capital scheme.  Unless, of course, the definition of public interest would 
be radically altered – e.g. investments in the companies could be seen as marketing cost with 
the aim of promoting Estonia abroad.  
 
6.4.2.5 Private Equity and Transparency 
Imperfect data and insufficient transparency make measurement of positive 
externalities difficult. A considerable proportion of the EDF portfolio companies have not 
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consolidated their financial data and hence the Estonian Business Registry does not provide 
accurate overview of their operations. Some companies also like to inflate their revenues and 
other financial data. For instance, Fits.me reported to the Estonian media in 2013 that its 
annual sales revenue increased to almost 2 million euros in 2012 from 22,869 euros in 2011. 
The annual report available in the business registry shows this to be true. However, the 
company did not tell to the media that actually over 1.9 million euros was for the services sold 
to Fits.me’s UK-based holding company. Hence, it was a transaction between related parties, 
which is shown on its annual report as revenue for sales (Estonian Business Registry 2015).  
Similarly, it is difficult to assess the EDF performance if the information disclosed to 
the public is limited. As was pointed out before, it is difficult to assess the value of its 
portfolio, when even detailed information about successful exits cannot be disclosed. These 
tensions concerning data availability and broader transparency are not temporary problems 
which can be easily solved. Rather, the tensions stem from fundamental contradictions 
inherent to the government venture capital scheme. The important element of venture capital 
success is its private nature. It is a form of private equity. This allows making quick and 
focused decisions with limited public scrutiny. As the representative of EDF said in the 
interview  “These investment decisions concern private legal persons who are not public 
sector institutions and therefore making information public would actually harm them” 
(Interview 25) However, the distribution of public money by nature has to be public and come 
with certain degree of transparency. Hence, it is natural to scrutinize companies receiving 
money from public purse and organizations distributing the public funds. If the success of 
venture capital scheme depends on information asymmetry, then public scrutiny may become 





6.4.2.6 Entrepreneurial Discovery and Rent-seeking 
The discussion above on market failures and externalities pointed out some 
fundamental issues relating to the broader political economy of government venture capital. 
Government wants to have a cake and eat it at the same time by demanding both stellar 
portfolio performance and positive externalities for the benefit of broader economic 
development. Public demands strong scrutiny while the beauty of venture capital is in its 
private nature. In other words, government wants EDF to be entrepreneurial and through the 
process of entrepreneurial discovery to find new ventures. At the same time, these decision 
should be made in the public interest. However, there is considerable institutional complexity 
involved because government rules interact with formal and informal rules of venture capital. 
There is also considerable heterogeneity in policy design and outcomes. If the parliament is 
responsible for the EDF, who is really responsible? All 101 members or only members of 
governing coalition? How many exits is sufficient to decide that the EDF performance has 
been positive? How do we decide that positive externalities created by EDF are sufficient? All 
these questions do not have clear answers and hence, they create ambiguity and uncertainty.  
In this context entrepreneurial discovery and investment of public funds can become  
easily coupled with potential rent-seeking. There is a risk in the venture capital scheme, which 
seems to point towards a classic outcome where benefits are privatized and costs socialized. A 
straight-forward rent-seeking is difficult to explore on the basis of semi-structured interviews 
and descriptive statistics. Some perspectives suggest that government venture capital may 
crowd out private investments and government may want to pick successful companies which 
do not need its funds instead of companies which struggle in raising funds. Cumming and 
MacIntosh (2006) have shown that government venture capital tends to “crowd out” private 
investments. This fits well with the reasoning offered by Wallsten (2000) that government 
officials may not tackle market failures but select companies, which are likely to be successful 
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rather than businesses that actually cannot raise private sector funds and need government 
support. There is no evidence that the EDF has crowded out private investments. Interviews 
confirm the opposite (Interviews 22-26 and 32-34). Particularly, as the EDF started to invest 
in 2008-2009 when the financial crisis reached Estonia. The capital was scarce and terms of 
credit were tightened. The Estonian GDP had a cumulative drop of 20 per cent in the years 
2008-2009. The EDF has not invested in Transferwise which is valued over one billion dollars 
and is the most successful of recent start-ups. This financial technology start-up was founded 
in London by two Estonians (one of them first employee of Skype) but has a significat 
presence in Estonia. Interview with the EDF officer shows that they regret not investing in 
Transferwise.   
The EDF portfolio performance suggests that EDF has picked more losers than 
winners. There has been three successful exits so far. Three investments have failed and four 
investments have been revalued downwards. This would suggest that the current evidence 
supports more “traditional” political economy hypotheses that governments do not manage to 
pick winners even if they try very hard. Losers simply have stronger incentives to pick 
governments than governments’ incentives to pick winners. Nevertheless, on the basis of 
evidence it cannot be concluded that the government venture capital scheme is more likely to 
pick losers than winners. We have to see venture capital in a broader context. Majority of 
investments by private sector venture capitalist fail as well. A large number of failures is 
expected among the venture capitalist as long as some investments earn them extraordinary 
returns. Uncertainty surrounding venture capital investing suggests that even if governments 
may perceive some companies as clear winners and pick them, the companies may turn out to 
be losers because investors have to face unknown unknowns in decision-making. For 
instance, the EDF picked social networking start-up Inner Circle as its portfolio companies, 
which was backed by one of the most well-known Estonian venture capitalist Allan 
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Martinson. The decision-making was quick and the Chairman of EDF supervisory board 
became co-investor in the venture. However, the venture struggled to find a proper business 
model and eventually failed despite of excellent management team and strong financial 
backing (Interviews 22-26).   
There is limited evidence of other type of potential rent-seeking. Estonian business 
newspaper Äripäev has brought attention to the case of Inner Circle, where Chairman of the 
EDF supervisory board and other interested parties were shareholders (Tahlfeld 2010). The 
Estonian media reported in 2012 that unnecessarily exclusive and excessive office space was 
rented by the former management team of the EDF. The EDF paid annually 85,000 euros for 
500 square meters in one of the most exclusive office buildings in central Tallinn (Smutov 
2012). This is the price of most expensive office space in Tallinn but the EDF could have 
rented 30-50 percent cheaper space in a less exclusive office building in central Tallinn. 
Considering that the EDF had about 20 employees, there was 25 square meters of office space 
per each employee. Obviously, the EDF should have also been more economical with the use 
of space, which could have generated additional savings. Furthermore, Tõnis Arro, CEO of 
EDF was fired in 2014, for using EDF funds to cover his personal expenses.   
However, the rent-seeking may also take place indirectly as agents may not be always 
the best guardians of principal’s assets. In the case of one failed investment private co-
investor said that he invested his own money, while the EDF and other co-investor Ambient 
Sound Investment are investing other people’s money, which may also impact their 
incentives. According to this investor, the board did not execute sufficient control over the 
company. The CEO was an excellent sales man and was able convince board members that 
everything is going fine even if numbers showed otherwise. This investor argued that the 
main reason for the failure of the company was misallocation of resources. “They spent 
almost 4000 euros on servers per month,” he said. CEO paid himself and other employees 
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high salaries, which is out of line with start-ups. Too many people were hired who were given 
dubious and fancy job titles. He concluded that his decision to invest in the company was 
clearly a mistake and he must have suffered “a temporary loss of mind”, when he made this 
decision (Interview 22).  
 
6.4.3 Entrepreneurial Discovery and Institutional Complexity in the Case of EDF 
The main purpose of paper was to assess the broader impact of the EDF on the ICT 
ecosystem and how institutional complexity constrained entrepreneurial discovery and created 
heterogeneous policy outcomes.  Online network analysis and semi-structured interviews 
showed the central role of EDF in the venture capital ecosystem of Estonia. This is consistent 
with previous qualitative studies based on semi-structured interviews that have suggested a 
crucial role of the EDF in getting venture capital networks started in Estonia (Nightingale and 
Reid 2010; Jostov and Sonts 2012). The broad venture capital ecosystem network is modestly 
centralized where network nodes connect to the EDF as well as to other members of 
networks. One of the portfolio companies - accelerator Startup WiseGuys - has become a 
focal point in this network in less than a year.  Certainly, the analysis of online networks gives 
only a partial understanding of the EDF role as the offline world may not match online world. 
Nevertheless, it is a crucial factor – especially as many EDF portfolio companies are social 
network and ICT companies.  
While the EDF has contributed significantly for the creation of the ecosystem, it is not 
sufficient for capturing positive externalities. The findings suggest that the 18 EDF portfolio 
companies , including 10 ICT companies,  are small and insignificant from a broader 
perspective of the Estonian economy. By tackling market failures and externalities of 
government venture capital scheme, the case highlights policy dilemmas stemming from 
institutional complexity.  First, the research demonstrates that government’s aim to increase 
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the EDF portfolio performance and concurrently create positive externalities for local 
economy are in conflict with each in the government venture capital scheme. The portfolio 
performance can be increased by removing requirements for investing such as to invest only 
in the Estonian companies. But this would enhance already existing trend where successful 
companies are eager to leave peripheral economy of Tallinn, Estonia, for the better ecosystem 
in Boston, London and other areas.  Second, the principles of venture capital investing and 
public accountability of government expenditures are also mutually exclusive. By definition 
venture capital is a form of private equity, where most benefits stem from its private nature. 
At the same time, government expenditure has to be public and transparent. Information 
asymmetries concerning the losses and exits of the EDF portfolio companies work against the 
principles of accountability and transparency. Third, the case offers evidence of how 
entrepreneurial discovery process can become rent-seeking and negative externalities of 
government intervention. The EDF comes across as a passive financial investor rather than 
hands on venture capital fund and is seen as too bureaucratic and inflexible in comparison 
with the private sector funds.  However, lengthy formalities and inflexibility may also stem 
from the fact that the EDF is an institutional investor while its co-investors are less 
institutionalized and not comfortable with high degrees of complexity.   
 
6.5  Conclusion  
Even though often Estonian government’s ICT specific initiatives receive a lot of 
attention and Estonia government is seen as a unified strategic actor in encouraging the use of 
internet throughout society and providing numerous online services, these factor are not 
critically important for the diffusion of internet. As the discussion above demonstrated even 
semi-successful of these initiatives are at best false positives. Wrong conclusions are drawn 
on the basis of these cases.  First, even though numerous strategy documents for information 
society exist, the implementation mechanisms of ICT policies are relative decentralized.. With 
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the decentralization have come benefits as well as costs. On the one hand, Estonian system 
has delivered innovation in the form of groundbreaking initiatives (internet voting, ID card 
and digital signatures as discussed in Chapter Five) as a result of entrepreneurial discovery in 
different government agencies. On the other hand, the system has costs such as 
incompatibility of certain solutions and delays in implementation as well as lack of financial 
benefits that come with economies of scale and scope in centralized systems. Hence, the 
relative successes and failures (or the outcomes) of government initiatives have been quite 
heterogeneous by nature rather than homogeneous. As Estonia is often seen as an ICT success 
story it is often assumed that policy design and outcomes have been  homogeneous.  
 Second, many initiatives have been launched already after the significant take off of 
internet in 2000. Thus, they have actually been a reaction to the availability of internet and 
benefited the further use of internet rather than been crucial for the internet diffusion in the 
early years.  The internet diffusion has been outcome of a path-dependent process in Estonia 
where crucial critical juncture took place in 1996 when internet banking was launched. All 
following steps have in one way or another built on the success of internet banking. However, 
perception of Estonia abroad as an ICT innovator and some successes at home have created 
mental models for key policy-makers and other actors where they aim to replicate earlier and 
accidental success by deliberate design. Some of these attempts have been fruitful but as this 
Chapter tried to demonstrate outcomes have been heterogeneous at best. Let me re-call the 
Chapter Two that policy-makers may actually not understand causal mechanisms and draw 
wrong policy lessons.   
 As it was emphasized throughout the description, Estonia does not have sector-
specific approach to ICT. Either explicitly or implicitly ICT is seen as priority by government 
institutions and members of society at large. Many government initiatives have been and are 
small in its significance for the take-up of internet and they have indirect impact through 
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political rhetoric rather than direct impact. The implicit and informal elements of internet 
diffusion are more fundamental than formal strategy documents. This also makes it more 
challenging to compare and copy directly the Estonian initiatives and solutions in contextually 
different. Therefore, it is important to locate specifically the drivers of internet diffusion 
beyond reliance on formal strategy documents. The beginning of this Chapter highlighted that 
many other countries in the world look to Estonia for guidance on building a path to an 
information society. However, the understanding of causal mechanism behind Estonia’s 
achievements is often superficial. For this reason, it is important to understand the formal and 
informal institutions that actually build internet diffusion. It is crucial to separate the ICT 
projects and other activities that are more peripheral to the country’s success. Especially, as 
sometimes these projects are false positives.  This chapter took also a hard look at the actual 
successes of Estonia in the ICT domains and note some significant weaknesses, troubling 
long-term trends and project failures. In other words, Estonia offers opportunities to learn 
from both its successes and failures but its model must not be automatically copied and 
universally transferred to other countries. As it has been emphasized throughout this 
dissertation, different countries follow different development trajectories and there is no one 














The purpose of this study was to describe and explain how the internet diffuses in 
different institutional contexts.   Let me recall that dissertation asked three questions. The first 
question was following: How do Estonia and Slovenia differ in the outcomes of internet 
diffusion?  The second research question of this dissertation was the following: How have the 
entrepreneurial discovery processes and internet diffusion intertwined in Estonia? The third 
research question of this dissertation was the following: How has institutional complexity 
constrained entrepreneurial discovery processes and internet diffusion in Estonia? These 
questions corresponded to each individual chapter. In this concluding chapter I will offer 
overview of findings which is followed by discussion of methodological limitations and 
policy implications.  
 
7.1 Overview of Findings 
 In order to examine two similar countries and their developmental paths with respect 
to internet diffusion, Chapter Four offered a comparative descriptive analysis of Estonia and 
Slovenia from 1991 to present. It demonstrated that there is significant variance in the internet 
diffusion between Estonia and Slovenia when measured by both eleven variables in the last 
year of data availability as well as over time. Most importantly, Estonia has performed better 
in internet diffusion outcomes than Slovenia when measured statically in one point of time as 
well as dynamically over time.  Estonian internet users have been able to use better quality 
and higher speed internet for longer time-period than Slovenian users. The more regular use, 
better supply of internet and demand for more sophisticated services have interacted more 
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favorably in the Estonian case and contributed to both better intensive and extensive diffusion 
the internet. 
 The comparative analysis of Chapter Four also shows clearly that the national wealth 
as has been suggested by some scholars cannot explain the variance between internet 
diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia. Estonia has been and is considerable poorer than Slovenia 
as the data on per capita GDP demonstrated. Furthermore, Estonia is considerably less equal 
than Slovenia as the data on the Gini coefficient demonstrated. In spite of lower per capita 
GDP and higher inequality, internet has diffused more among Estonian population and among 
different population segments by income in Estonia than in Slovenia. Thus, the propositions 
based on wealth and/or distribution of wealth as an explanation for the internet diffusion can 
be rejected as a crucial factor in the variance between internet diffusion in Estonia and 
Slovenia. Furthermore, Chapter 4 also shows that there is no considerable variance in human 
capital in the form of ICT skills between Estonia and Slovenia.  The dissertation does not aim 
to generalize to entire world and hence, it is plausible that national wealth hypothesis and/or 
human capital hypothesis fail to be rejected on the basis of different sample of countries. As it 
is a descriptive study, then I do not entertain the possibility of causality. However, the wealth- 
based hypothesis can be rejected by a simple logic on the basis of descriptive statistics in the 
case of this comparison.  
An examination of institutional developments that investigates formal institutional 
arrangements – in other words, the thick description -- shows that most important have been 
institutional changes carried out by the Estonian government in the 1990s and the early 2000s. 
Interviews showed that both Estonia and Slovenia had vibrant IT communities in the 1990s 
but mere existence of an IT community is not sufficient for influencing government decisions 
if entrepreneurial discovery processes are seriously hindered by institutional complexity. 
Precisely, the interaction between telecom-specific rules of the game and the broader 
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institutional framework is fundamental for understanding the reasons for the different 
outcomes in the internet diffusion. This is so because it reduces conflicts among different 
institutional logic. Estonia had broadly liberal institutional framework for economic 
governance after radical reforms in the 1990s. Opening up telecom market for competition 
was consistent with these general changes in the rules of the game. All these institutional 
changes were also consistent with the EU legislation in both letter and spirit. At the same 
time, Slovenia introduced a form of managed capitalism after gradual reforms in the 1990s. 
Government was reluctant to open up telecom sector for competition and did so under the EU 
pressure. Government is still the main owner of incumbent telecom company and to present 
day this issue creates tensions with the EU. Even if Slovenia may follow EU regulation is 
letter, it does not do so in spirit as the interviews revealed.   
Most importantly, mutual reinforcement of general and sector-specific formal 
institutions and timing of institutional change offers an explanation how high quality and high 
speed internet has spread widely in the Estonian society and how distribution of internet 
among users with different socio-economic backgrounds is more equal in market liberal 
Estonia than egalitarian social democratic corporatist Slovenia. The rules created greater 
openness in Estonia than in Slovenia.  Telecom sector liberalization provided a critical 
juncture, which enabled a path that led entrepreneurs to supply high quality fast internet. The 
telecom sector liberalization and encouragement of competition is a fundamental difference 
between Estonia and Slovenia. It fits nicely with previous empirical works which has 
emphasized the importance of telecom liberalization and competition which is discussed in 
Chapter Two (Dasgupta et al 2001; Guillen and Suarez 2005; Caselli and Coleman 2001). 
However, the telecom sector liberalization and encouragement of competition is not 
sufficient on its own for internet diffusion. Chapter Five shows that this supply of telecom 
services interacted with other forms entrepreneurship in an ecosystem that produced the 
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provision of innovative online services by both public and private sector. The institutional 
changes unleashed the process of entrepreneurial discovery and experimentation with 
different ICT services as documented in Chapter Five. As an example of this ecosystem, 
Chapter Five discussed how innovative peer-to-peer telecom service provider Skype emerged 
in Estonia in 2003 and it was sold for 2.6 billion dollars to eBay in 2005.  
Most important of these was the online identification method provided by the leading 
banks and accepted as a platform by government for building online services. We can 
attribute this acceptance of innovation by government as an example of a mental model that 
sought out and leveraged innovations for the public good. The banking system with 
innovative internet solutions was one of the unintended outcomes of market liberal reforms 
carried out by the Estonian governments in the 1990s. It was accidental but it set-forth a path-
dependent process where interests of government and banks were incentive compatible.  In 
the 2000s, both government and banks built on the foundation and gradually started to 
substitute the old online identification methods with national ID card. Certainly, this 
adoption was possible because of government’s rule-making, which made the ownership of 
ID card mandatory and by doing so contributed the emergence of new sophisticated online 
services.  
Nevertheless, government did not make the use of ID card online mandatory per se 
rather certain government services had higher transaction costs when accessed without the ID 
card.  The emphasis is on the rule-making by the government in contributing to the intensity 
of internet diffusion rather than specific initiatives and policies. Certainly, this rule-making 
was not rational, top-down process which was able to foresee outcomes. Rather, it was 
learning-by-doing, experimental. Some of the experiments worked out well as Chapter Five 
documented  on the basis of online tax declaration, ID card and internet voting. Other 
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government initiatives and policies were by design and outcomes more heterogeneous as 
shown in Chapter Six.  
Institutional complexity, bounded rationality, uncertainty and policy heterogeneity 
documented through various case studies in Chapters Five and Six do suggest that the reason 
why Estonia has the higher penetration rate of internet in comparison with Slovenia is not 
because of some master plan drawn out to achieve this particular rate adopted by the 
government. Although various strategy papers expressing grandiose visions for promoting the 
internet did exist, these plans were a reaction to already existing phenomena and an attempt 
by politicians as rational agents to capitalize on success; they were not the cause of Estonia’s 
rapid internet diffusion. As the thick description on Estonia showed many government 
initiatives targeted at the ICT sector and use of internet were not existent in the early years of 
internet diffusion. Chapter Six showed that differently from other CEE countries Estonia did 
not have a comprehensive ICT strategy before the emergence of internet banking, introduction 
of online tax declarations and other crucial initiatives. Chapter Four also discussed that 
differently from Slovenia Estonia did not have a special ministry dedicated for ICT. Skype 
emerged in 2003 in Estonia but government initiatives for imitating Skype’s success in the 
case of other start-ups materialized in 2008 in the form of government venture capital 
investment.   Once government initiatives such as government venture capital have been 
implemented, the allocation of government expenditure to them has not been significant and 
these initiatives have not created serious positive externalities for innovation and internet 
diffusion as shown in Chapter Six.  
The main role of Estonian government as a catalyst for innovation and internet 
diffusion has been in the form of general rule-making rather than contributing to the internet 
diffusion by specific initiatives and government programs. In the 1990s the Estonian 
government followed the advice of its local IT community by unifying the public sector IT 
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systems through X-Road and increasing IT use in public sector administration because it fit 
well with reforms aimed at making government more efficient and reducing the size of 
government in the economy. Most importantly, it was a technologically decentralized and 
cost-effective approach which aimed to make different legacy systems to connect to each 
other.   
The Estonian government did not increase a public sector spending on R&D and did 
not engage in industrial policies for IT promotion, however. The government online services 
to the general public emerged gradually and were heterogeneous reflecting the different 
priorities of different agencies. Overall, the government approach to the ICT use remained 
quite decentralized not only technologically but also institutionally as Estonian did not aim to 
create any new ministry responsible for the ICT as Slovenia did in the early 2000s.   
Hence, analysis of the impact of institutions has to go beyond the consideration of 
formal institutions. This is challenging to do because formal institutional changes are 
documented and informal institutional changes have to be interpreted indirectly. Nevertheless, 
the interaction between formal and informal institutions is fundamental for understanding 
effective institutional changes. Chapter Five discussed the case of Skype, which cannot be 
understood solely on the basis of formal institutions. The existence of bohemian-libertarian 
ecosystem in Estonia enabled various entrepreneurial discovery processed to take place and 
allowed experimentation with various forms of ICT ventures. Indeed, the Skype founders’ 
early venture called Kazaa made them the fugitives of US justice system because their peer-
to-peer technology was primarily used for illegal file sharing. However, Estonian government 
stayed aside and did not intervene.  
Entrepreneurial discovery process can take many different forms and exist in both 
public and private sectors. Chapter Five showed how on the basis of private sector initiatives 
in internet banking public sector online services can be offered. This is a positive case of 
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entrepreneurial discovery benefiting public good. However, Chapter Six offered some insights 
on basis of interviews how entrepreneurial discovery process can become affiliated with rent-
seeking on the basis of government venture capital, where risks are socialized and benefits 
privatized.  Institutional complexity stemming from different institutional logic of venture 
capital and public sector governance creates perverse incentives for agents. Thus benefits for 
public good are unclear.  
By emphasizing the institutional framework and how it conditions entrepreneurial 
discovery, the dissertation has demonstrated that the institutional context matters and there are 
many tacit elements in understanding the process of internet diffusion. This highlights the fact 
that practices on the ground are not captured by nominal variables. In a large N-study based of 
limited variables the differences between the telecom sector regulation as well as the role 
played by the entrepreneurial discovery in creating online identification methods would be not 
understood. Their role of critical junctures of for the extensive and intensive diffusion of 
internet in Estonia would be ignored. The path-dependent nature of these developments would 
not be captured. Internet is tacit as it is used differently in different political, social and 
economic context. Many factors explaining differences in Internet use are also tacit as they 
are not easily measurable. 
 
7.2 Limitations of the Study  
Certainly, this study comes with several limitations stemming from its descriptive 
nature, small population and sample (population equals sample), limited comparisons and 
imperfect data. The limitations of data and self-selection biases inherent in using semi-
structured interviews reveal several obstacles for analysis. This is a fundamental issue that 
cannot be solved by more publicly available data and more interviews with actors whose 
interests are at stake. Only time may allow overcoming these barriers because only over time 
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agents involved in decision-making may become more open about the past decisions. Even 
more importantly, the institutional changes are challenging to address because of path-
dependency on previous decisions and lack of proper counterfactuals. Second, measurement 
difficulties are empirical.  
As the number of experts, high level officials, ministries and other very important 
persons is small in Estonia and Slovenia, then significant portion of information cannot be 
aggregated and published without revealing sensitive information, which people do not want 
to reveal in public. The interviews were coded in order to encourage more openness in 
interviews but this may not be always useful and people are reluctant to discuss important 
issues even on the unpublished record.  In addition, public information sources such as 
business registries do not always have comparable data on different countries.  
However, the future research can be certainly improved by incorporating more 
theoretical insights on process-tracing, policy entrepreneurship and institutionalism as well as 
improved methodological approaches in the form of network analysis and collection of more 
data.  
7.3 Policy Implications 
The cases come with specific characteristics and these characteristic mean that 
findings may not be relevant for all countries but it may be relevant for small countries or 
countries. Obviously, this is not just a methodological issue but creates substantial issues for 
policy-makers as they try to learn as they go and would like to learn from the Estonian “best 
practices”. Hence, this particularist version of history of internet diffusion in Estonia is 
limited in its lessons that policy-makers can draw. The purpose of dissertation was to 
understand the processes rather than give simplistic “take-aways” as lessons. The particularist 
emphasis itself signals that there is no take away. Governments cannot create unintended 
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path-dependencies by design which would benefit them. The rationale for policy intervention 
is crucially different from the emphasis on institutional complexity in the dissertation. Policy-
makers assume institutional complexity away and use simplistic deterministic mental models 
for making their case. Often policymakers aim is to make long-term commitment of public 
funds with limited accountability, transparency and ability to track the performance of 
programs aimed at bridging digital divide and justify the public investments in the broader 
public discourse.  
Even if government schemes are able to establish incentive structure that would make 
decision-making processes incentive compatible and establish the best possible public 
investment model, the performance of government initiatives are difficult to measure. First, 
partially these measurement difficulties are conceptual. The government interventions are 
surrounded by uncertainty in fast-changing technological environment. Politicians and 
government officials may want certainty and short-term result, which may lead to the 
adoption of superficial projects - some of which may be successful and others not - as the 
Estonian experience demonstrates. Success is relative and its measurement overdetermined, 
which means in the end it is not known whether an initiative materialized accidentally or 
because of deliberate actions.  
However, one of the key lessons from the dissertation is that the process of 
entrepreneurial discovery should be encouraged also in the public sector. Usually, government 
officials are not seen as entrepreneurial and entrepreneurs and government bureaucrats are 
seen mutually exclusive. However, the Estonian experience suggests that it does not have to 
be so. It certainly comes with caveats. Entrepreneurial discover process should not become 
rent-seeking. There is a fundamental difference between the two. Former is about creating 
new value, new products and services. The latter is about redistributing existing resources.  
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Another important message from the Estonian experience is that reduction of 
institutional complexity has to be a priority for government because it reduces constraints on 
entrepreneurial discovery in both private and public sectors. The key to reduction is 
understanding of different institutional logic and how creation of new formal rules of the 
game may interact with existing formal and informal rules. This requires more institutional 























KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
 
This appendix defines key terms and concepts used in the dissertation in alphabetical 
order. 
Entrepreneurial discovery – this dissertation relies on broad definition of 
entrepreneurial discovery. It is Schumpeterian approach where entrepreneurs are risk-takers 
and innovators who find ways to break old routines and establish new ones. Entrepreneur is 
not an ordinary business person or employee in a corporation. The latter tends to follow 
routines and is not motivated to break the routines. Entrepreneurs engage in constant process 
innovation as well as improve existing products and bring new products to the market place. 
This approach to entrepreneurial discovery also includes what in smart specialization 
literature McCann and Ortega-Argiles (2013a) call an entrepreneurial process of discovery. 
This process means involvement of entrepreneurs in policy-making process and consideration 
of their insight in early stages of policy design, which allows identification of new domains 
for technological development as well as re-designing public policies through constant 
feedback mechanism between entrepreneurs and policy-makers. The involvement of 
entrepreneurs in policy-making concerning ICTs and other technologies is crucial because 
successful innovation policy has to be aware of developments in real economy. The degree of 
embeddedness and relatedness of domain increases the impact of innovation developments 
across different activities and sectors. It has to be pointed out that smart specialization 
literature defines entrepreneurs very broadly: public universities and research institutes can be 
entrepreneurial and part of the process. It is not impossible that policy makers can be 
entrepreneurial.  Hence, the entrepreneurial discovery is not only limited to private sector, but 
can also take place in public sector as well as in the non-governmental sector.  
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Epistemological nature of technology means that diffusion an use of technology 
takes place within the social frameworks of knowledge. Our previous knowledge and beliefs 
affect how we use technology. At the same time, technological change affects how we think 
and our thinking about thinking. It is circular process but technological change does not have 
unifirm impact. We perceive technology differently depending who we are.  Braman (2012) 
see information policy as epistemology policy. She argues that epistemology affects 
perceptual entity, i.e. how we perceive technology, it affects how material and social world 
are experienced, translation of experiences into facts and which facts are are discussed in 
social groups and lead to consensually understood truth (Braman 2012, 137)   
Institutions are “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction” (Pierson 2004, 27). Institutions consist both 
formal and informal institutions. The former is understood as laws, regulations, constitutions 
and other rules made by government and/or international governmental organizations. The 
latter is defined as social norms, culture and other nonformalized rules of the game shaping 
the behavior of agents. It also includes social networks and social capital.  
Institutional complexity – refers to the interactions of formal and informal 
institutions as well as interactions of formal institutions on different levels of government 
regulations. This implies that broad rules governing macroeconomic environment may 
conflict with regulations on micro level. There is considerable literature on institutional 
complexity and one way to define it is “incompatible prescriptions from multiple institutional 
logics” (Greenwood, Raynard et al. 2011, 317). Different institutions, their interactions, 
conflicts and institutional logics (see it defined below) creates institutional complexity. 
Usually, it can be assumed that greater institutional complexity implies greater constraints on 
agency. However, it does not have to be so. Some entrepreneurs and policy entrepreneurs may 
be well equipped for navigating in institutional complexity and achieving desired outcomes. 
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They may benefit from complexity and it may create absolute or comparative advantages for 
them.  
Institutional logic - may stem from laws and regulations imposed by government in 
the case of formal institutions as well as socially constructed historical patterns of behavior, 
mental models of agents, habits, assumptions, expectations, values, culture and other rules, 
which may constrain or enable individuals and groups of individuals in their behavior and 
define social reality for them. Institutional logic may operate on community level as long as 
community members share the same beliefs. On a macro level, community may be a nation. 
Different nationalities may share the same beliefs about themselves and other nations. On a 
micro level, such abstract community as a nation may consist many different communities, 
which may follow different institutional logic. These communities may have different 
understanding of the same issue depending on their beliefs, knowledge and other factors 
(Smets, Morris et al., 2012; Thornton, Ocacio et al. 2012). For instance, nation as a 
community may be proud of IT developments in their country. They may experience the 
differences in quality and availability of services when spending time abroad or read about it 
in the newspapers. Within a nation IT community may also share the view about overall 
progress but may be more critical of recent developments finding that the government is not 
investing enough in IT development. Within IT community open source community may have 
a different view finding that government has overinvested in proprietary software solution and 
should rely on open source solutions instead.  
Internet diffusion - There is no uniform definition of internet diffusion in the 
literature. Often scholars use the terms  internet diffusion, penetration, adoption, 
connecitivity, access, use and digital divide interexchangably to describe the same 
phenomena. For example, the Internet Encyclopedia offers the following definition: 
“diffusion of an innovation is a macro process concerned with the spread of the innovation 
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from its source to the public” (Dholakia et al 2004). The adoption is defined as “… a micro 
process that focuses on the stages through which an individual passes when deciding to accept 
or reject the innovation” (Dholakia et al 2004). However, individual decisions to adopt or not 
to adopt the Internet have clearly consequences on macro level. And diffusion on macro level 
impacts individual decisions on micro level to adopt the internet.  In practice, it is not possible 
to draw clear lines between adoption and diffusion as these processes are mutually 
interdependent. Micro and macro processes interact. Often macro outcomes are simply 
aggregates of multiple micro processes. Adoption of internet by groups of individuals such as 
students or businesses in manufacturing sector, for instance, increases diffusion of internet on 
per capita basis on macro level.  Indeed, the same encyclopedia talks about “adoption and 
diffusion patterns of internet” without clearly distinguishing between the two (Dholakia et al 
2004).  Essentially, adoption, use, penetration and diffusion of Internet describe the same 
phenomena. 
Path-dependence – this dissertation uses following definition: “At every step along 
the way there were choices political and economic - that provided real alternatives. Path 
dependence is a way to narrow conceptually the choice set and link decision making through 
time” (Pierson 2004, 52). It is not a story of inevitability in which the past neatly predicts the 
future. Rather than assuming causal independence through time, it assumes that events are 
normally "path dependent," that is, that what has happened at an earlier point in time will 
affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time (Pierson 
2004, 20).  
Policy heterogeneity – implies that public policies often have heterogeneous context 
and design. Knoepfel et al (2011) argue that if implementation of public policy falls under 
several ministries, or several departments within one ministry, then policy context is 
heterogeneous. If policy is implemented by one unit at the same ministry, then it is 
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homogeneous. They give defense policy as an example of homogeneous administrative 
context while policies dealing with natural disasters are heterogeneous (Knoepfel et al 2011, 
186-187). Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine completely homogeneous policy context – 
even in the case of defense policy different ministries are involved as stakeholders. For 
instance, the implementation of defense policy depends on taxation which means trade-offs 
have to be made among ministries and in society. Hence, it is a question of degree of 
heterogeneity and homogeneity. Most importantly, ICT policies have high degree of 
heterogeneity by administrative context as well as design. ICT is by nature horizontal 
dependent on physical infrastructure as well as humans skills in different administrative units 
and in society as well. Knoepfel et al (2011) approach seems also narrow considering nature 
of public policy implementation in general and ICT policies in particular.  Even if  policy 
context and design is homogeneous, then the impact of public policies can be heterogeneous. 
This may stem from unintended consequences, interactions of government regulations with 
informal rules as discussed under institutional complexity. It is similar to competitive 
heterogeneity affiliated by scholars such as Harold Demzets (1973) and Michael Porter (1980) 
in strategic management and industrial economics, which examines why industries do not 
converge on one single model of operations. In international economics policy heterogeneity 
is used to highlight regulatory differences between countries (Kox and Lejour 2005). 
However, there might be also regulatory differences within countries or among the group of 
countries such as EU, which formally have adopted same regulations. It is a fact of life that 








OVERVIEW OF ESTONIA AND SLOVENIA 
Estonia 
Estonia per capita GDP was almost 20 000 in current US dollars in 2014 which is 
below the EU average of 36 000 dollars (World Bank 2015). In 1995 Estonian per capita GDP 
was 3000 in current US dollars. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Estonia 
experienced rapid decline in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in combination with high 
levels of inflation. GDP in 1992 decreased by 14.2 percent and the annual rate of inflation 
was 1.076 percent. However, Estonia’s economic misfortune turned around relatively quickly. 
By 1995 rapid GDP growth became characteristic to this economy. For instance, Estonia 
reached 11.7 percent growth in 1997. Since 1998, the inflation rate has been limited to single 
digits. Within a few years Estonia had oriented its economy to the Western markets to such a 
degree that even the 1998 financial crisis in Russia had relatively small consequences in 
Estonia – GDP dropped 0.3 percent in 1999 and the growth was restored to positive figures by 
2000 (International Monetary Fund 2009).  In retrospect, the Russian crisis and collapse of 
markets in the East helped to cool down an overheating economy and strengthen economic 
integration with Western markets. Most importantly, Estonia experienced some of the most 
spectacular GDP growth rates in Europe in the second half of the 1990s and early years of the 
decade. The rate of growth was more than seven percent for each year between 2000 and 






Estonia’s total GDP was 26 billion in current US dollars in 2014 while it was slightly 
over 4 billion US dollars in 1995 (World Bank 2015). Estonian labor productivity based on 
hours worked was slighlty over 60 percent of the EU average in 2013 (Eurostat 2015). 
However, it was only 41 percent of the EU average in 2000 which signals significant progress 
over the decade. Estonian population is 1.3 million people of whom 32 percent lives in rural 
areas (World Bank 2015). Estonia is one of the most attractive destinations for inward FDI in 
Europe as well as in the Central and Eastern Europe. Inward FDI to GDP ratio was 84.5 
percent in 2012 (Eurostat 2015). Only Bulgaria with almost 94 percent had better outcome in 
the CEE.  
Estonian general government debt to GDP ratio was 10.6 percent in 2014 while it was 
3.7 percent in 2007. The increase was modest considering that Estonian GDP decreased 
cumulatively by almost 20 percent in 2008 and 2009 which made it the third-deepest 
recession in the EU (International Monetary Fund 2009). Estonian government pursued 
conservative fiscal policy throughout crisis and aimed to keep budget balanced. the 
government implemented contractionary economic policies in response to the current crisis. 
Throughout the economic depression, Estonia has remained a beacon of fiscal prudence, 
keeping the public sector debt at the lowest level in Europe and one of the lowest levels in the 
world. Estonia has not issued and does not issue government bonds, thereby essentially 
making this country the  “Anti-Greece,” to use a term recently coined in a Financial Times 
editorial (Financial Times 2010). As Estonia is a small open economy and rapid credit 
expansion had boosted domestic consumption after entrance to the European Union (EU) in 
2004, then it is not surprising that the country was hit hard by the recent financial crisis. 
Significant export markets disappeared and the domestic housing bubble deflated 
The overall government budget surplus was 0.6 in 2014 while it was 1.8 percent in 
2003 (Eurostat 2015). Even during severe recession in 2008 and 2009 government deficits did 
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not reach 3 percent of GDP which is maximum allowed by the EU Maastricht criteria. 
Throughout the so-called boom years the government ran constant budget surpluses and built 
up emergency reserves, moves that also helped to respond to the crisis without any external 
assistance. Instead of external devaluation by changing the exchange rate of the Estonian 
kroon to the euro, the government kept the peg and opted for internal devaluation, resulting in 
wage cuts averaging twenty percent.    Estonia joined the eurozone in 2011, when many 
experts started to question the viability of euro as a currency in the long run.  
Slovenia 
Slovenia became independent from Yugoslavia in 1991 and was the wealthiest of 
Central and Eastern European countries which joined the European Union in 2004. Slovenia’s 
population is about 2 million and Slovenian make up roughly 80 percent of this population. 
Other ethnic groups include Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks and many others. 50 percent of 
population lives in rural areas.  Population density is 101 inhabitants per square kilometer. 
Total area of country is 20,273 square kilometers. Slovenia per capita GDP was 24 000 in 
current US dollars in 2014 which is below the  EU average of  36 000 dollars. In 1995, 
Slovenia’s per capita GDP was almost 11 000 in current US dollars (World Bank 2015). This 
signals that Slovenia’s transition from market socialism to market economy has been 
relatively gradual over the past decades without significant ups and downs.  
Slovenia’s total GDP was 49 billion in current US dollars in 2014 while it was 21 
billion in 1995. Slovenia’s labor productivity was 86 percent of the EU average in 2013 and it 
was 76 percent in 2000 (Eurostat 2015). Slovenia’s general government debt to GDP ratio 
was 81 percent in 2014 while before the economic and financial crisis at 23 percent in 2007. 
In 2003 Slovenia’s debt to GDP ratio was close 27 percent which indicates that government 
debt had been gradually reduced. This clearly indicates that Slovenia has suffered in the crisis 
and followed relatively loose fiscal policies by trying to stimulate economy by public sector 
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spending. Furthermore, Slovenia’s current debt level exceeds 60 percent allowed by the 
Maastricht Treaty. Slovenia joined the eurozone in 2007 and made a commitment to follow 
Maastricht criteria concerning government debt level and deficits.  
However, Slovenian government has run excessive deficits since 2009 which have 
been significantly higher than 3 percent to GDP ratio allowed by Maastricht treaty. In 2014 
Slovenia’s public sector deficit was 5 percent and in 2013 15 percent. However, before the 
country joined the euro, the annual deficits stayed within 1-2 percent  and never exceeded 3 
percent (Eurostat 2015). Because of excessive macroeconomic imbalances, Slovenian 
economy has been under close scrutiny of the European Commission. In Spring 2015 EU 
Council warned that Slovenia’s government macroeconomic policies do not meet the criteria 
of EU Stability and Growth Pact. It also sätted that Slovenia’s business environment is 
constrained by excessive regulations which do not facilitate the growht and government has 
been slow in privitizing state assets such as state owned banks.  
Constraints in the business environment of Slovenia are well demonstrated by looking 
at FDI statistics. Slovenia was one of the most attractive destinations for FDI in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) in the late 1980s throughout the mid-1990s. However, according to the 
current FDI to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio, Slovenia lags behind other countries in 
the region. Inward FDI to GDP ratio was 33.2 percent which is the worst outcome among the 
CEE countries who joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 (Eurostat 2015). One key difference with 
other CEE countries is that FDI in Slovenian telecom sector is nonexistent. Throughout the 
years, Slovenia has engaged in selective protection against certain types of FDI. Most inward 
FDI is directed into the manufacturing sector, including industrial output such as paper, paper 
products, machinery and equipment, rubber and plastic products, chemicals and chemical 
products, and motor vehicles (OECD 2002, 10). Most of these products play an important role 
in Slovenia’s export structure. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
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Development (OECD), foreign investors were attracted to Slovenia because of individual 
companies rather than specific industries (OECD 2002, 10). In addition, FDI is concentrated 
on a small number of large multinational companies (MNEs) of European origin. This 
characteristic indicates that Slovenia has been well integrated with the economic clusters in 




















LIST OF SEMISTRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
 
No Position Company Date Place Method 
1 Minister government Jan 6, 2003 Ljubljana in person 
2 high official government Jan 7, 2003 Ljubljana In person 
3 owner IT company Jan 7, 2003 Ljubljana In person 
4 official parliament Jan 8, 2003 Ljubljana In person 
5 researcher University Jan 8, 2003 Ljubljana In person 
6 activist social movement Jan 9, 2003 Ljubljana In person 
7 expert ICT company Jan 9, 2003 Ljubljana In person 
8 regulator government Jun 7, 2012 Ljubljana In person 
9 researcher university Jun 7, 2012 Ljubljana In person 
10 executive telecom Jun 7, 2012 Ljubljana In person 
11 professor university Jun 8, 2012 Maribor In person 
12 expert university Jun 6, 2012 Ljubljana In person 
13 owner IT company Jun 6, 2012 Ljubljana In person 
14 executive ICT company Dec 3, 2008 Tallinn In person 
15 journalist TV May 5, 2009 Tallinn In person 
16 official government May 7, 2009 Tallinn In person 
17 lobbyist telecom March 4, 
2009  
DC In person 
18 former banker bank Sept 25, 
2011 
Tallinn In person 
19 official government Dec 3, 2011 Tallinn In person 
20 high official government Dec 5, 2011 Tallinn In person 
21 CEO/owner ICT company September 
4, 2012 
Tallinn In person 
22 regulator government Sept 5, 2012 Tallinn In person 
22 Investor/owner social network September 
7, 2012 
Tallinn In person 
23 CEO/owner ICT company September 
3, 2012 
Tallinn In person 
24 CEO/owner ICT company Aug  23, 
2012 
Tallinn In person 
25 executive government  Sept 20, 
2013 
Tallinn In person 
26 investor ICT August 13, 
2013 
Tallinn In person 
27 expert university August 8, 
2013 
Tallinn In person 
28 former banker banking August 21, 
2013 
Tallinn In person 
29 official government August 13, 
2013 
Tallinn  In person 
30 former CEO large ICT company August 23 
2013 
Tallinn In person 
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31 executive telecom August 29, 
2013 
Tallinn In person 
32 former banker banking August 21, 
2013 
Tallinn In person 
33 CEO/owner IT company August 17, 
2012 
Tartu In person 
34 former 
CEO/owner 
social network August 13, 
2012 
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